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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The book of Job, which Tennyson called "the greatest poem, whether 
of ancient or modern literature,"^ poses questions about the most basic 
and urgent concerns of men at all times: the problem of death, the 
meaning of suffering, the question of God?s nature, the justice of His 
world order, and the value of manrs life. As the classic treatment of 
many of these problems it has clearly influenced numerous literary works 
directly; to others it shows affinity on account of closely related 
subject matter or structural characteristics. There is hardly a period 
of German literary history in which the question of Jobfs image does not 
play a significant role; be it in a work by Hartmann von Aue, 
Grimmelshausen, Goethe, Heine, Kafka or Frisch. 
Although many works have been compared to the book of Job, few bear 
a more striking resemblance to it in subject matter and structure than 
does Johann von Tepl's Ackermann aus Bohmen, a late medieval debate 
between a plowman and the figure of Death over the question of the justice 
and justification of death in God's world order. Apart from a few isolated 
suggestions of similarities between Job and the Ackermann, no examination 
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of the relationship between them has been undertaken. 
Both works take the form of a debate. Each is framed not as a 
philosophical argument over an academic point, but as a personal exper-
ience of suffering and grief with which the protagonist attempts to 
come to terms. Both portray the archetypal experience of a sudden, 
precipitous fall from a secure and happy life into a state of acute 1 
misery. The ordeal produces a new awareness of the problem of suffering 
in the world at large and a questioning of the reasons and justification 
for its existence* 
Both debates make use of legal terminology and a quasi-legal setting 
in which traditional attitudes are on trial as the protagonists struggle 
to reconcile their own experiences of suffering with traditional concepts 
of God's justice. Underlying both works is the age-old problem of 
theodicy, the question how to reconcile the existence of evil with a God 
who is at once all-powerful and all-good. 
Job and the Plowman ponder the puzzling relationship between 
virtue and reward. The Plowman rages at the injustice of Death in taking 
away his wife, who, Death himself admits, was a woman of model virtue. 
Job is dismayed at the contradiction in the fact that a just God can 
allow a "blameless and upright" man to suffer. Both examine the question 
of man's relationship to God and his place in the creation as opposing 
views vie with each other. The Plowman and Job defend the worth of 
man against cynical opponents. At the same time they struggle with the 
contradiction between GodTs loving care in fashioning man and the 
processes of sickness and death which seem to belie it. 
In both contests God appears at the end as referee and judge to 
resolve the disputes. But in spite of His arbitration, no actual 
explanations are given. Both debates conclude with a moving hymn of 
praise to God's power and wisdom. In each case the encounter with God 
has a profound effect on the questioner, who capitulates, ceases his 
questioning, and affirms the order of the universe as it is. 
Such a comparison raises many questions. What is the meaning of 
the startling similarity between Tepl's work and Job? What significance 
did it have for Tepl? Did he begin with the book of Job and then deviate 
from it to hide the similarity of his borrowings? How familiar was the 
story of Job during Tepl's time? How was the figure of Job depicted and 
his conflict perceived? To what extent were the readers of the 
fifteenth century aware of the similarity? How were the problems of 
death and suffering dealt with in other medieval works? The answers to 
these questions and the comparison of the works provides new insights 
into the place of Tepl's work in the wider context of literary history. 
Ernst Schwarz, in his summary of recent research on the Ackermann 
concludes that the many difficulties in the interpretation of the work 
result from the fact that we know so little about the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. He states: 
Immer noch steckt das Werk, das langst in die Forschung 
der internationalen Literaturwissenschaft eingegangen ist, 
voller Probleme, uber die sich der Dichter wohl selbst am 
meisten wundern wurde, da sie darin begrundet sind, dass wir ^ 
zu wenig von dieser Zeit des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts wissen. 
By taking the book of Job as a traditional standard of reference in dealing 
with the problems of the justice of the world order, suffering and death, 
and the Job theme as a recurrent motif in world literature, it is the 
plan of this study to examine the attitudes which are unique to Tepl's 
handling of the issues which the works treat in common and thus to provide 
a new criterion by which to judge the place of Tepl's work in the history 
of ideas. 
The study shows that the attitude of Tepl*s Plowman differs from 
previous attitudes toward suffering. Unlike the traditional ideal of 
the pious, patient, sufferer, which Job epitomized throughout the Middle 
Ages, Tepl allows his protagonist to question the reasonableness and 
justice of his virtuous wife's death as well as the justification for 
the very existence of death. Tepl's handling of the problem goes beyond 
previous treatments in the questions it tolerates and represents a real 
confrontation with the problem of the justice of the world order and 
the assumptions of his time. The comparison casts light on Tepl's con-
cept of God and the way the late medieval mind dealt with the problem of 
evil. It indicates that Tepl was aware of certain contradictions in the 
traditional concept of the nature of death and the relationship between 
death and God. 
Although it may appear that the Plowman's suit against Death con-
cerns a matter quite different from Job's complaint against suffering, 
the two are actually very similar. The Plowman's complaint, like Job's, 
focuses on his suffering resulting from his loss. In the book of Job 
itself the problem of death is a major theme, although it does not 
receive the same attention as the theme of suffering. Both problems 
are aspects of the larger issue of theodicy—the relationship between 
God and evil. 
The comparison and contrast undertaken here has relevance to the 
controversial problems of Ackermann interpretation. As is the case with 
the book of Job, the interpretive positions on the Ackermann have been 
many, varied, and often contradictory. The history of this criticism 
has been treated often and will be only briefly summarized here. After 
twice being rediscovered—by Gottsched in the eighteenth century and by 
Hanka in the early nineteenth century—and subsequently all but forgotten, 
interest in Teplfs Ackermann was again revived by the publication of 
Kniescheck's critical edition in 1877 and was greatly increased by the 
1917 Bernt-Burdach edition and Burdach's extensive commentaries. Burdach, 
Bernt, Rehm, and others heralded the work as a landmark of early 
Renaissance humanism, interpreting it as an affirmation of the freedom, 
beauty, rationality, and essential goodness of man. This interpretation 
was questioned by Ella Schafferus, who, in an article published in 1935, 
denied any humanist influence whatsoever in the work arguing that it 
reflected strictly medieval (particularly Thomist) doctrines and 
attitudes.^ Thus the Ackermann became the center of a controversy over 
whether it should be considered more characteristic of medieval or of 
early Renaissance thinking. More recently the terms medieval and 
Renaissance have themselves come under fire, so that the periods are no 
longer considered to be sharply divided. 
Arthur Hubner took up a position between the two extremes. On the 
one hand he pointed to the close connections between Tepl's work and 
earlier German literary forms such as the Meistersang, the popular song, 
and the Marienlied. But he also acknowledged the form, "die neue 
Latinitat," to be something new in German literary tradition. Hubner 
faulted both sides of the argument, however, for attempting to classify 
the work in terms of the history of Ideas (geistesgeschichtlich) before 
the form had been properly analyzed, saying: "Es ist ein Unding, eine 
Dichtung. . . geistesgeschichtlich, also weltanschaulich, zu analysieren, 
ehe man sie nicht formgeschichtlich analysiert hat*"^ Since Hubner's 
remarks, most studies have concentrated on analyzing the form and 
structure of the work, but the controversy over the proper placement of 
t*ie Ackermann in the chronology of ideas has never been abandoned. 
In 1943 Renee Brand published a radically new interpretation of 
the Ackermann in which she argued that the author's point of view is to 
be identified with that of Death7 She asserts that Death wins the debate 
by convincing the Plowman of the necessity for and justness of his 
function in the world order and of the foolishness of rebellion against 
it. Brand's view strongly influenced Walshe's 1954 structural inter-
pretation of the work and was affirmed in Bauml's 1960 study of the 
g rhetorical devices and structure of the Ackermann. Other critics such 
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as Hahn and Sichel reject Brand's thesis. Kuhn and Hahn regard the 
debate not only as undecided but as essentially unresolvable."^ 
The Job-Ackermann comparison provides us with an opportunity to 
evaluate the widely divergent views about the Ackermann. This study is 
partially consistent with Hubner's admonition in that it deals with 
problems of content and historical questions by arguing from the work's 
structure. But it also considers the history of the Job theme to be a 
useful and valid point of reference for the study of Tepl's treatment 
of the issues. 
The history of the Job image is well documented. This study begins 
with a review of the development of the theme from Old Testament to 
medieval times and an examination of the relationship between the 
medieval Job figure and Tepl's plowman. It establishes a convincing 
set of arguments for the position held by Hahn, but goes further in its 
examination of the Plowman's speeches from the point of view of the 
strategy of the Plowman's arguments. The analysis shows that, similar 
to the pattern in the Job debate, the Plowman by no means concedes to 
his opponent in the conflict, but strongly maintains his opposition to 
the end. The arguments by which the author characterizes Death reveal 
that it was Tepl's intention that the contest should end in a draw. 
Death's role is not that of a consoler. It is God, not Death, who 
convinces the Plowman. The softening of the Plowman's attack and his 
apparent conciliatory overtures are merely strategic feints and are 
characteristic of the varied approaches of the Plowman's mosaic style of 
argument. These alternations are part of the dramatic give-and-take of 
the debate and reflect the overall principle of contrasts and juxta-
positions which the author employs as a stylistic device. As in the 
book of Job the speeches often do not directly answer or try to refute 
the charges of the opposing side, but are judged individually by their 
overall impressiveness and rhetorical cleverness. 
An awareness of the analagous structure of Job and a comparison 
of the treatment of the issues points up the large number of inconsis-
tencies in the Plowman's arguments and shows that Tepl purposely 
characterized the Plowman as holding a naive and contradictory view of 
God's nature, which he intended to replace at the end with a more com-
plex and complete view. As in the book of Job, the response to God's 
verdict constitutes the culmination of the work. It Is in the final 
prayer that the author attempts to come to terms with the questions 
raised in the debate. 
The comparison with Job allows us to view the controversy over 
medieval and Renaissance elements in the work from a new perspective. 
Though widely separated in time, the works arise from, and call into 
question, similar sets of traditionally accepted beliefs. If the 
depiction of Job's revolt in the Old Testament represents a daring 
act, the implications of which are inexhaustible and revolutionary 
in nature, then our finding that the Plowman's revolt against Death 
bears profound similarities to Job justifies the proposition that 
t*ie Ackermann is, in a sense, a similar kind of revolt or, at least, 
an interpretation of the revolt in the original Job story. Written at 
a time when the image of the patient Job predominated, the Ackermann 
appears to move against the long established Christian tradition, tran-
scending its time and to show genuinely modern tendencies. 
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CHAPTER II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOB THEME 
The Old Testament 
The story of Job is one of the oldest legends in the history of 
literature. It seems to have existed long before the Old Testament 
book of Job was composed. In the apocrypha of the Septuagint Job 
is identified with Jobab the King of Edom, great-great-grandson of 
Abraham."̂ " The name Job is found in texts ranging from the nineteenth 
to the fourteenth century B.C., and literary parallels to the work date 
2 
back to the second millennium B.C.. 
The date of composition of the Old Testament book of Job is placed 
by most Bible scholars somewhere between 800 and 500 B.C., although a 3 
few consider it to be as recent as the third century. Some scholars 
date the two major parts separately, placing the prose section—which 
comprises the prologue and epilogue—in the eighth or ninth century, and 
the verse section—the dialogue between Job and his friends—in the 
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sixth century. The question which part of the book is older and 
represents the original conception of the work remains one of the 
main issues of controversy, along with the question of the authorship 
of the various parts. 
The debate over the unity of the work is prompted by the fact 
that two different views of Job appear to be represented in the book. 
The Job of the prologue accepts his fate unquestioningly with the words, 
f,[T]he Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of 11 
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the Lord" (1:21). He never questions the cause of his misfortunes or 
the rightness of God's action, saying: "Shall we receive good at the 
hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?" (2:10). But the Job of 
the verse dialogue is anything but the patient sufferer of the prologue. 
In despair he curses the day of his birth crying: "Let the day perish 
wherein I was born" (3:3), and criticizes God directly: "If I sin, what 
do I do to thee, thou watcher of Men? / Why hast thou made me thy mark?" 
(7:20). "As for me, is my complaint against man? / Why should I not be 
» 
impatient?" (21:4). He challenges the justice of God's world order: 
"Does it seem good to thee to oppress, / to despise the work of thy 
hands / and favor the designs of the wicked?" (10:3). "Behold, I cry 
out 'Violence!' but I am not answered; / I call aloud, but there is no 
justice" (19:7). "Why are not times of judgment kept by the Almighty, / 
and why do those who know him never see his days?" (24:1). Far from 
patiently acceding to the punishment that has been meted out to him, 
he staunchly defends his integrity and his rights before God: "[Never-
theless I will maintain and argue my ways before Him—even to His face" 
(13:15, Amplified Bible).6 
How is it that we are given two such disparate pictures of Job? 
Part of the answer seems to lie in the fact that the work was almost 
certainly written by more than one author and over a long period of time. 
Some critics argue that the dialogue poem is the oldest part of the 
work and represents the original conception of the problem. They 
speculate that the prose frame was added to the poem by a later hand, 
possibly to moderate the unorthodox questionings of the dialogue. Others 
claim that the prose narrative already existed in written form and was 
used as the basis for the poetic dialogue. A third group believes that 
the prose section and the verse dialogue were written at the same time 
and were based on an ancient Edomite oral tradition.^ 
Although there is no real concensus among Bible scholars, it seems 
fairly certain that the prose narrative must have preceded or been 
composed at the same time as the dialogue, since, as Andersen explains, 
"It is essential for the book that the reader knows (as Job does not 
know) that his troubles come from God, but [sic] were not provoked by 
any fault on his part, but were, in fact, a consequence of his virtue 
and were intended to prove and enhance his righteousness" (p. 44). If 
the reader could not be certain of Job's integrity, the debate Itself 
would be pointless. Terrien points out that, "It is not probable that 
the poet began his work in medias res with the sentence, 'And Job 
opened his mouth and cursed his day' (3:1)" (p. 887). Even if a general 
acquaintance with the legend on the part of the listeners could be 
assumed, some preparatory remarks to set the scene would certainly 
be expected. 
In addition to the uncertainty as to the relationship of the 
two major parts of the book, there are other sections, such as the 
poem on wisdom (chapter 28) and the speeches of Elihu (chapters 32-37) , 
which differ considerably in language and style from the main body of 
the work and are believed to have been composed independently and 
inserted. Just how all the parts were fitted together, when and by 
whom, remains unclear. 
Study of the book of Job is complicated as well by the fact that, 
because it is one of the oldest works of world literature, the exact 
meaning of many passages remains obscure«, Some words occur in no 
other sources, and scholars can only guess at their meaning. Other 
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passages have obviously been corrupted by mistakes in copying. Added 
to this are sections which many scholars believe to be out of order 
or to have been placed in the mouth of the wrong speaker. An example 
is the missing speech of Zophar in the third round of speeches, which 
may have been replaced by that of Elihu, a character who appears 
nowhere else in the work. Or perhaps Zopharfs speech was incorporated 
into Job's last and longest discourse, which contains several statements 
manifestly inconsistent with the rest of his remarks. 
Yet, on the whole, due to the greatest of care exercised by Hebrew 
scribes in transcribing, the book is remarkably well preserved for a 
work of its great age. In spite of the obscurity of certain sections, 
the broad outlines and intention of the work are clear. Problematical 
passages must be considered in the context of the clear direction of the 
whole. 
Jewish Interpretations 
The difficulties presented by the text and the two conflicting 
pictures of Job in the work have complicated interpretation of the book 
from the beginning. With few exceptions most early interpreters chose 
to portray Job as the pious, patient sufferer of the prologue and 
epilogue, emphasizing his steadfastness and ultimate reward. They 
either ignored or tried to interpret away Job's rebellious questioning 
of God's justice in the dialogue. 
Other references to Job in the Old Testament scriptures characterize 
him as a saintly example. The book of Ezekiel cites Job, alongside 
the partiarchs Noah and Daniel, as a model of righteousness, saying: 
"even if these three men, Noah, Daniel, and Job, were in it [the land], 
they would deliver but their own lives by their righteousness" (Ezekiel 
14:14). The apocryphal book of Tobias speaks of him as an example of 
patience, saying: "Now this trial the Lord therefore permitted to 
happen to him [Tobias], that an example might be given to posterity of 
g 
his patience, as also of holy Job"(2:12). 
It is difficult to say to what degree early references to him 
were influenced by sources other than the Old Testament book such as 
the Tar gum of Job, which was in circulation before the first century 
B.C.; but was probably composed two or three centuries earlier; the 
Testament of Job, which dates from the first century B.C., and the 9 
writings of Jesus Ben Sira of the second century before Christ. All 
of these, as well as numerous references to him in other early Semitic 
works, adhere to the popular legend, depicting him as a pious patriarch 
and hero. How strong the influence of this legend was, is illustrated 
in the writings of Bishop Theodore of Mopsuestia (392-428). Bishop 
Theodore accepted the popular story as true, but rejected the Old 
Testament book of Job on the grounds that the speeches attributed 
to him in the book were unfitting to a man of his character. 
Nahum Glatzer states that both Jewish and Christian expositors 
"avoided a direct confrontation with the text of the book, in order not 
to be exposed (or to expose the pious reader) to the bluntness of the 
hero's speeches and the shattering self-revelation of God in His 
answer" (p. 11). 
In the talmudic-midrashic commentaries on the scriptures, however, 
a few writers did acknowledge that Job acted rebelliously and was repri-
manded by God for his lack of patience. Some tried to excuse his 
behavior by arguing that he acted under extraordinary duress. Datz 
16 
cites at least one example from the Talmud which states that Job 
blasphemed God by his complaint and that he deserved his punishment 
because of it (p. 26). On the whole, however, as Glatzer states in 
his summary of classical Judaic interpretations, "The talmudic-midrashic 
literature (primarily of the first centuries) treats Job as the most 
pious Gentile that ever lived" and "avoided reference to the extremes 
of Job's rebellion against evil and injustice and their Author" 
(pp. 17-18). 
It is therefore not surprising that the Jewish scholars in the 
third century before Christ who translated the scriptures into the 
Greek of the Septuagint chose to emphasize Job's moral character. It 
was also these scholars who, influenced by the widespread acceptance 
of belief in immortality, which began in the second century before 
Christ, introduced the most important change in the interpretation of 
the work—the doctrine of reward in the hereafter.^" This doctrine 
made Job's dilemma less problematic and had a profound influence on 
subsequent interpretations of the work. It was now possible for suffering 
to be seen as a discipline to be faithfully endured in the hope of a 
future reward. 
Job in the New Testament and Interpretations 
of the Church Fathers 
The only New Testament reference to Job, that in the book of 
James, pictures him as the already stereotyped model of patience. James 
writes: "As an example of suffering and patience, brethren, take the 
prophets who spoke in the name of the Lord. . . . You have heard of 
the steadfastness of Job" (5:10-11). 
17 
Likewise, the early church fathers such as Origen of Alexandria 
(ca. 185-255), who wrote the first complete Christian commentary (now 
lost) on the book of Job, asserted that the purpose of Job's suffering 
12 
was to demonstrate his virtue. John Chrysostom (ca. 344/5-407), who 
was considered the greatest preacher of the Eastern Church, although 
unable to read Hebrew and relying on translations which minimized Job's 
rebellion, was one of the few to acknowledge such impious gestures as 
Job's tearing of his clothing and cursing the day of his birth. But he 
explained that these were proofs that Job was really human and had not 13 been "anaesthetized" by God. 
The commentary of Ambrose (ca. 339-397) which treats both Job and 
14 
David as representing two types of Christ figures—sufferer and king— 
is characteristic of the increasing tendency to view Job as a pre-
figuration and symbol of Christ. The most important step in this 
direction was taken by Jerome (ca. 347-419/20) whose translation of the 
scriptures, the Latin Vulgate, interpreted Job's statements to signify 
belief in the resurrection. It was on the basis of this translation 
that the book of Job came to be used as proof of the resurrection and 
support for the doctrine of eternal life."^ 
The Medieval View of Job 
The most exhaustive and influential commentary was the Moralia in 
Job of Pope Gregory the Great (ca. 540-604), which became and remained the 
primary authority on Job throughout the Middle Ages. Datz calls it the 
most read, or at least most often copied, work of the Middle Ages and 
the moral handbook of the Church until well into the twelfth century 
(pp. 66-68). The-thirty-five books of Gregory's commentary on Job give 
a threefold explication of the text, explaining the historical, the 
allegorical, and the moral meaning of each passage. As in other inter-
pretations, Job is seen from the New Testament perspective as a type 
of Christ and prototypical patient sufferer. According to Gregory, 
Job could not have sinned either before or during his trial because 
God would have been proved wrong and would have lost the wager.^ 
Subsequent commentaries, such as the Glossa Ordinaria of the 
twelfth century and the Compendium in Job of Peter of Blois (1135-1204) , 
largely echoed Gregory's interpretation."^ Neither Albertus Magnus nor 
Thomas Aquinas, both of whom wrote Job commentaries, deviated from the 
prevailing view.*^ 
Thus throughout the middle Ages Job was thought of strictly as the 
passive figure of the prologue. The impatient, questioning Job of the 
dialogue was ignored almost completely. Job's complaint, especially his 
cursing of the day of his birth, was never taken literally, but was 
always interpreted to be cursing of something else which might be more 
acceptable. Gregory the Great, for example, states that Job was 
actually cursing evil, and Odo of Cluny, that he cursed the transience 
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of life. In Hartmann von Aue's Armer Heinrich it is Heinrich rather 
than Job who curses his day. Heinrich is contrasted with Job, who is 
the prime example of forbearance: 
do schiet in sin bitter leit 
von Jobes gedulkikeit. 
wan ez leit Job der guote 
mit geduldigem muote, 
doz im ze lidenne geschach, 
durch der sele gemach 
den siechtuom und die swacheit 
die er von der werlte leit: 
des lobete er got und vreute sich. 
do tete der arme Heinrich 
leider niender also: 
er was truric and unvro. . . . 
vervluochet und verwazen 
wart vil dicke der tac 
da sin geburt ane lac. ?n 
(w. 137-162) 
In addition to commentaries on the Old Testament book, Job was 
frequently mentioned in literature, as in Hartmann's Armer Heinrich; 
Hugelsberger, in his dissertation "Der Dulder Hiob in der deutschen 
Literatur" (1930) , traces the Job theme back as far as the Old High 
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German Wurmsegen. Although the Wurmsegen does not itself mention the 
name of Job, later manuscripts regularly introduce it with references 
to Job, who, it was held, had been plagued by worms. A standard a 22 
introduction was: "Job lac in miste / er rief uf ze Criste . . . " 
Other works consistently praise his righteousness and unfailing patience. 
Rudolf von EmsTs Weltchronik refers to "den gutin Jobin" and his "veste 
gedultecheit, / die er mit wancke nie verlie, / swie groz erbeit in 
23 u ane gie" (w. 3932-34). Das Vaterbuch likewise speaks of Job, "Der 
24 in Gedult sich hette ergeben" (v. 37053). In Konrad von Helmsdorffs 
Spiegel des menschlichen Heils he is "Sant Jop, der gedultig man" 
25 
(v. 1631). The fourteenth century poetic paraphrase of the book 
of Job, in the literature of the Deutscher Ritterorden, includes in the 
introduction to the book the usual comment on Job: "So gar geduldeclich 
er leit / Daz er kegen Gote, daz geschach, / Ny ein torlich wort 26 gesprach" (w. 254-256). 
In the iconography of the Middle Ages as well, Job was depicted 
as a type of prototypical sufferer. He often appeared in the 
familiar medieval formula described by Pickering: "a male figure 
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with bowed head, seated on a rock or mound." Although this figure 
usually represented a thinker or philosopher pondering or sorrowing, 
it was easily adapted to Job's situation, since the rock could be a 
refuse or ash heap. Pickering includes a reproduction of a painting of 
Job in this pose, describing it as the medieval "posture of humility 
and obedience, of the man sorely tried" (p. 113, plate 12). 
Although the medieval picture of Job conformed to a rigid stereo-
type, there were developments within the basic concept. Beginning in 
the twelfth century with Bernhard of Clairvaux, and in the writings of 
the mystics, emphasis shifted from Job's passive submission to praise of 
28 
his perseverance and endurance. The passive sufferer became a heroic 
one. Determined endurance of misfortune became a discipline to be 
rewarded in the afterlife and suffering a test that could be a process 
of purification, a preparation for life in the hereafter. Heinrich 
Seuse describes man's life as a kind of knighthood: "Tder lidend Job 
sprach: militia est etc., des menschen leben uf disem ertrich ist nit 
29 »# anders denn ein riterschaft.f" In at least two texts, the Vaterbuch 
and a sermon of Johannes Tauler, Job actually requests his ordeal of 
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suffering. Job's torment was seen as a challenge and a process of 
purification. 
The second development was an increase in emphasis on Job as a 
symbol of hope, the hope of the resurrection. In the fourteenth 
century this aspect assumed greater importance, overshadowing the 
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sufferer figure. The Old Testament patriarch who prefigured Christ's 
suffering and pointed ahead to the resurrection in the famous words: 
"For I know that my Redeemer lives, / and at last he will stand upon 
the earth" (19:25) became the preeminent witness to the resurrection. Job after 1400 
Thus as we have seen, no sign of questioning or rebellion on 
Job's part was acknowledged in medieval writings about him. He remained 
throughout the prime example of the pious sufferer. It was an attitude 
which held into the eighteenth century. Even Luther's translation of 
the Bible did little to alter the prevailing outlook. Luther himself, 
though admitting in his preface to the book that Job "talks in his 
human weakness too much against God, and thus sins amid his sufferings," 
still believed, as he states in one of the Tischreden, that "The author 
32 
wished to paint a picture of patience," 
Not until the eighteenth century did Bible expositors such as 
Robert Lowth (1710-87) acknowledge "the impatience of Job" and his 
irreverence toward the justice of God. Lowth, however, still inter-
preted the true object of the poem to be: "to demonstrate the 33 necessity of humility." In the nineteenth century commentators such 
as Lamartine (1790-1869) saw Job's rebellion clearly. For him Job was 
34 
a Promethean figure, "the victim become judge." 
Modern interpreters of the book deal almost exclusively with 
the Job of the dialogue—the dissenter, the rebel, the one who questions 
the justice of God and the meaning of life if there is no justice. They 
see in Job's questioning the existentialist dilemma. Modern commentators 
call him "the baffled sufferer," the "problematic rebel," the "faithful 
rebel."35 
In his work Hiob—der Existentialist (1952), Hans Ehrenberg writes: 
36 
"Unsere Zeit ist Hiob-reif geworden." That the twentieth century has 
experienced a resurgence of interest in the Job theme can be shown by 
a cursory survey of works written on the theme. One can find at least 
seventeen modern English plays about Job, including works by such 
authors as H. G. Wells (The Undying Fire, 1919), Archibald MacLeish 
(J. B.: A Play in Verse, 1956) and Robert Frost (The Masque of Reason, 
1945). There are at least fourteen German titles, the better known of 
which include KokoschkaTs 1918 play Hiob, a novel by Joseph Roth, 
Hiob (1930), and^five dialogues by Ehrenberg titled Hiob—der Existen-
tialist (1952).37 
The modern proliferation of works on the Job theme is contrasted 
by Jon Levenson with the nineteenth century's lack of "a single 
38 significant work in English re-creating the story of Job." Germany 
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produced some five examples which have survived. Two of these, 
however, deal only remotely with the Job theme. Levenson sees this 
lack of popularity as due to the fact that the story of Job was 
incompatible with the optimism of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and with the belief in man's ability to solve his problems 
through social reform, science and technology (pp. 1-2). The catas-
trophies of the twentieth century destroyed this optimistic confidence 
and produced a more favorable climate for works which portrayed man in 
Job's dilemma. Modern Job dramas have dealt with Job's criticism 
of the adequacy of traditional beliefs to explain what has happened 
to him. They question not only man's ability to solve his problems, 
but also the capacity of reason to find a meaning in man's tribulations 
and to provide consolation for trials. They deal with the nature and 
justice of God, belief in God, the question of cosmic meaninglessness. 
Since the twenties, according to Elisabeth Frenzel, Job has repre-
sented in literature "das Glaubensproblem des aus der Sicherheit der 40 Existenz gestossenen Menschen. 
The Ackermann 
The modern image of Job the rebel and questioner contrasts radi-
cally with the medieval picture of Job the pious sufferer* Thus, when 
Gunther Muller says of TeplTs Plowman: "Wie ein Hiob begehrt der 
41 
Ackermann auf gegen sein Geschick," he is speaking in modern terms 
and certainly not of the view of Job current in Tepl's time. If Tepl 
did think of his Plowman as a Job figure, he certainly had a more 
enlightened view than his contemporaries. If so, probably from his 
own reading of the book. Glutsch provides at least one hint that a few 
religious sects may not have followed the prevailing interpretation, 
but one closer to the actual biblical text (p. 24). 
The extensive similarities raise the question whether the book of 
Job was Tepl's point of departure. Many sections resemble passages in 
the Old Testament book: the catalog of God's virtues, the description of 
his governing of the forces of nature, rain, snow, hail, winds; the 
words spoken by Death enumerating manTs remarkable accomplishments. But 
in spite of these similarities there is not enough evidence to establish 
direct borrowing; nor does Tepl specifically mention Job as Hartmann does. 
Lacking any such direct references to Job, we must assume that 
the revolt of Teplfs plowman is an independent confrontation with the 
assumptions of his time. While Hartmann's Armer Heinrich deals with the 
Jobean situation in the medieval categories of tugend, triuwe, ere, etc., 
Tepl's plowman resembles the modern view of Job as a real questioning 
of the concept of the justice of the world order. This study will 
examine how the two works deal with the themes which they treat in 
common and how Teplfs conception of the isses is reflected in the 
structure of his work. 
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CHAPTER III. JOB AND THE ACKERMANN 
Death in the Book of Job and in the Medieval View 
Although JobTs own struggle centers on the justification of 
suffering in this life, he is also concerned with the problem of 
death, a theme which is a primary motif in his speeches. For Job the 
problem is a critical one, since at the time of the book's composition 
there was no belief in immortality of the kind that later Hebrew and 
Christian thought envisioned. At this stage in Old Testament writings 
all souls were thought to go down to Sheol where they continued in a 
kind of shadowy half-existence. It is clear from Job's words that 
this was not a place to look forward to. He calls it "the land of 
gloom and deep darkness. / The land of gloom and chaos, where light 
is as darkness11 (10: 21-22). 
If any wrongs were to be righted, any judgments meted out, it 
had to happen in this life. Indeed, Jobfs dearest wish is for his 
integrity to be vindicated in this life. What good will it do if he 
be vindicated after his death? Job says of death: "so thou destroyest 
the hope of man. . . . His sons come to honor, and he does not know 
it; / they are brought low, and he perceives it not. / He feels only 
the pain of his own body" (14: 19-22). He answers his friends on the 
subject of the fate of the wicked: "You say, fGod stores up their 
iniquity for their sons.1 / Let him recompense it to themselves that 
they may know it. / Let their own eyes see their destruction" (21: 19-20). 
It is essential that the relationship between sin and punishment, 
virtue and reward, be made clear in this life."̂  
With the acceptance of belief in immortality, the scene of retri-
bution and reward could be shifted to the afterlife. This change eased 
Job's dilemma somewhat, but it still did not explain the reason for 
suffering and evil. In the strict monotheism of Old Testament thought, 
God was the only creator and therefore ultimately responsible for every-
2 
thing. There was no dualism between good and evil. Even Satan was 
subject to God, as can be seen from the prologue in which he must ask 
God's permission to test Job. King explains that in the course of 
time "the ideal of Yahweh was gradually moralized so that it became 3 
increasingly difficult to assign evil directly to him." 
Christian thought was influenced by Greek ideas, especially 
Plato's definition of God as "the Idea of the Good," which made it 4 
heresy to say that God is the cause of evil. Augustine, who was 
himself indebted to Platonic thought, fought against the Manichean 
heresy that posited two gods, one good and one evil. He resolved the 
problem of evil by defining it as a lack or deprivation of good. Evil 
was not a substance with its own essence, but a defective good."* 
Aquinas likewise defined evil as "a certain absence of good" (Summa 
Theologica, pt. I, q. 48, art. 1). 
In answer to the question whether God as the sumraurn bonum could 
be the cause of evil, Aquinas answers, not of the evil which consists 
in defect of action (fault); but with regard to "the corruption of 
some things" the answer is yes. This was extended to explain the 
problem of death. Aquinas writes: "TGod made not death' (Wisd. I. 13), 
but it is "a condition of matter" (Summa, pt. II, 1, q. 85, art. 6). 
Such is the condition of matter that it displays various weaknesses. 
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This defect of nature was supplied by God, who also gave man "a certain 
incorruptibility" while he was in a state of innocence. By choosing to 
disobey God, man also chose death. In this way Aquinas can say both that 
God did not make death and that death is the punishment of sin. Thus 
Aquinas writes: 
Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said, 
above . . . that there should be some things that can, 
and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in 
things the good of the order of the universe, conse-
quently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions 
of things, according to I Kings 2. 6: 'The Lord killeth 
and maketh alive.1 But when we read that rGod hath 
not made death1 (Wis. I. 13), the sense is that God 
does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless 
the order of justice belongs to the order of the 
universe, and this requires that penalty be dealt 
out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil 
which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault" 
(Summa, pt. I, q. 49, art. 2). 
In this way medieval thinkers attempted to separate God from the 
burden of having created death outright. Williams states that the 
cause of death was variously attributed to "man or the devil or sin." 
"God was in no case the cause of death even though he made it possible."^ 
The medieval practice of personifying Death separated God from 
death even further. Death could be, and was, thought of as an independent, 
malevolent personality, thus freeing God from direct association with death. 
The Lamenter and Death 
The figure of the lamenter upon the death of a friend or beloved 
occurs frequently throughout the literature of the Middle Ages. In his 
study of the medieval view of death, Der Todesgedanke in der deutschen 
Dichtung vom Mittelalter bis zur Romantik, Walter Rehm characterizes 
the medieval attitude in such laments as a resigned expression of 
dismay at the sadness and inevitability of death.^ Criticism or 
questioning of the institution of death were excluded. Most of the 
examples Rehm cites express fear of death, warnings of its suddenness, 
and admonitions about the transience of life. The passive and resigned 
attitude described by Rehm can be seen in the words of Walther von der 
Vogelweide: "sundig lip vergezzen, / dir sint diu j£r gemezzen: / der 
tot hat uns besezzen / die veigen ane wer," (77. w . 32-33) and in 
those of Frauenlob: "Waz half ir kunst unt wiser sin? / der tot der nam 
si dannoch hin, / got selbe enmochte niht dem tode entwichen."^ The 
only example of a real outcry recognized by Rehm is Enite's speech in 
HartmannTs Erec: 
si sprach, 'we dir, vil ubeler Tot! 
daz dfi verfluochet sist. 
wie manec bilde d<i gist ̂  
diner unbescheidenheitlT 
(w. 5914-17) 
Rehm calls it "eine . . . Anklage des Todes, die in der Zeit allein 
bleibt und erst wieder in des Ackermanns GesprMch mit dem Tod eine noch 
gewaltigere, zeitsymbolische Nachfolge findet" (p. 54). 
In contrast to Rehm, however, Johannes Kleinstuck points out 
numerous examples of medieval laments expressing hatred, criticism, 
and even cursing of death.^ In Chretien's Cliges, for example, the 
knight, Cliges, curses death who, he believes, has robbed him of his 
beloved Fenice: nfHa morz,' fet il, 'come ies villaine'" (v. 6238).^ 
In two poems of Eustache Deschamps (1346-1406) the lamenter cries: 
ffEnemie de toute creature / Et de tout ce qui avoir naissance," and 
12 "Mort mauvaise, maleureuse et dolente. . The words of Dante's 
Vita Nuova are still stronger: "Villainous Death . . . my tongue wears 
13 
itself out in cursing you." 
Examples in German literature of hatred of death are numerous as 
well. In addition to Enite's "we dir, vil ubeler Tot!" (Erec, v. 5914), 
we find: "her tot, ich bin iu gehaz" (Wolfdietrich, (G), v. 87).14 In 
Mai und Beaflor: "Tot, du bist et immer / unbescheiden, als man seit" 
(p. 150, w . 18—19). Far from being passively accepted, death is 
criticized frequently, particularly for his caprice and injustice in 
taking the wrong victims: 
owe dir, unbescheiden tot! 
du nimest mangen schoenen lip 
und laest vil wundernaltiu wxp 
leben gar uber ir zil. , 
(Wigalois, w . 11387-90) 
In the Dialogus Mortis cum Homine the speaker inquires of death whether 
he does not reap with his sickle only T,ripe grain,11 saying if death 
should do otherwise, he would not be a good harvester. Death answers 
that he takes the young grain if it pleases him to do so and is not 
bothered by the man's opinion."^ In the Briefwechsel zwischen Leben 
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und Tod death is criticized because he doesn't even spare children. 
Still, however, such outcries do not go beyond cursing and hating of 
death. 
In courtly society God was seen as the essence of all courtly 
virtues. People of the time found it difficult to reconcile unpleasant 
traits with this view of God. Death was seen as an anomaly, an intruder, 19 
and berated for his unchivalrous behavior. People did not understand 
how God could tolerate such a servant and wondered at God's patience 
in allowing death to behave as he does. But, as Kleinstuck notes, 
this did not extend to criticism of God's government of the world: 
fl[E]s geht nur uber ihr Begriffsvermogen, dass etwas geschieht, das 
nicht geschehen sollte" (p. 52). They did not really confront the 
relationship between death's function and God. 
In some dialogues between a man or some other figure and death 
which preceded the Ackermann, there is indirect criticism of death, but 
no rebellion against it or challenging of death's right to function as he 
does. In the Dialogus Mortis cum Homine a man, frightened by death's 
terrible appearance, asks who death is, where he comes from, why he is 
so horrible and whether or not he reaps with his sickle only ripe grain. 
Death's answers to these questions emphasize his dreadfulness, power and 
arbitrariness. He is a strict and awesome judge. The man begs for 
mercy, and there is no questioning of death's right to exercise his 
prerogative as he does. In the Briefwechsel zwischen Leben und Tod 
life reproaches death for his terribleness, but criticism is limited to 
complaints that death does not even spare children. He is called 
horrible and impious. In this case death regrets his cruel function 
and begs to be released from it by God. But there is no actual 
questioning of God himself. In the Legende von der Todes-Vision des 
Magister Polycarp Polycarpus is granted the chance to talk to death, 
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to ask why he is so bitter for men. Polycarpus is so shattered by 
the encounter with death that he enters a religious order. Again there 
is no rebellion or attack on death. The strongest criticism in these 
works is limited to dismay over death's unjust and arbitrary ways. 
Some wonder briefly how God can tolerate such a bad servant. 
The strongest criticism to be found is of the mild kind uttered by 
Ulrich von Turheim, whose words do imply a certain censure of God's 
justice: 
ich bin dem tode gar gehaz, 
war umb tuot unser herre daz 
daz er die vromen gar hin nimt 
und in der boesen niht gezimt? 
zw£re daz ist wunderlxch. 
ich von Turheim Uolrich 
lieze tusent boese sterben, 
e einen vrumen verderben.̂ -. 
(w. 3591-98) 
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How rare attacks on God's justice in condoning death were, is illustrated 
by the single example cited in Richmond's survey of Laments for the Dead 
22 
in Medieval Narrative. Bishop Turpin in the Sage of Melayne learns from 
Roland that many knights have been slain, and, "Casting his staff and 
mitre away, he vows never to wear them again and demands why Mary so 
rewarded men who fought for her" (p. 72). Richmond calls this "not 
simply a reaction against the established order of the kingdom, but 
also an aggressive defiance of the accepted divine order" (p. 72). Her 
statement that "there is no other lament like this one in any other 
romance" (p. 73) indicates how inconceivable was any real attack on the 
injustice of death's functioning or on God's justice in condoning it. 
The Plowman in Tepl's Ackermann attacks death more aggressively 
than does the protagonist of any preceding work. He considers not only 
the question of the justness and impartiality of death's functioning, 
but also the reason for its very existence in God's world order and 
thus, indirectly, God's justice in condoning death. The Plowman exceeds 
earlier criticisms by accusing Death in legal terms, in forcing Death 
to defend the rationale for his existence, and in demanding directly a 
decision from God. In the long line of lamenters he is the first to 
confront Death without being intimidated by Death's terrible power and 
by his own transience. 
Two Late Medieval Attitudes Toward Death 
As can be seen from the differences between the conclusions drawn 
by Rehm and those of Kleinstuck and Williams, there is little agreement 
among authorities as to what the prevailing late medieval attitude in 
regard to death was. Many have suggested, as does Huizinga, that the 
age was one of extremely morbid preoccupation with the physical side of 
death. Dubruck suggests that, although there were two possible fates 
for the soul after death—eternal blessedness or hell—attention was 
increasingly focused on the horrible aspect. Medieval man "seems to 
have been more preoccupied—often with near pathological insistence— 
23 with the horrors of death." 
It is true that the plague of 1348-50, which killed some 
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twenty-five million Europeans, was accompanied by a violent fear of 
death and a morbid interest in its macabre aspect, including the 
gruesomely realistic depiction in art of the process of decay. 
Describing this period, Huizinga asserts that "No other epoch has laid 25 
so much stress as the expiring Middle Ages on the thought of death." 
Yet alongside the fear and horror which characterized late medieval 
literature on death, the mystics wrote songs of praise to death, 
viewing it as the last obstacle to the life beyond and union with God, 26 
as the "exitus vitae, introitus melioris," One example of this 
attitude is to be found in Johann von NeumarktTs translation of the 
mystical Leben des heiligen Hieronymus, which refers to death as "des 
ewigen lebens pforte," exclaiming, "0 du frolicher suzzer tod! o wie 27 
er irret, der dich tod nennet." 
Indeed, even Huizinga, who describes the late medieval obsession 
with a morbid view of death, does not present an exclusively negative 
picture. Along with his description of the fear and horror, the 
"lamentation about the briefness of all earthly glory," he also 
mentions the opposite aspect: "jubilation over the salvation of the 
soul" (p. 135). He depicts the extremes to which both views were 
carried rather than the exclusiveness of either attitude. 
Mary Pecheux has argued that alongside the negative view of 
death, there was also a more optimistic and hopeful view which emphasized 
that death was the servant of a higher power and was actually God's 
messenger. She holds that this attitude became increasingly dominant 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, eventually subordinating 
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the morbid, fearful view. 
Although Rosenfeld's study of the medieval Dance of Death 
corroborates Pecheux's contention that the trend was away from abject 
horror at the spectre of death, other researchers suggest that the 
greatest preoccupation with the gruesomeness of death occurred in the 29 
fifteenth, sixteenth, and even seventeenth centuries. Peter von Moos 
stresses the need for further research on the subject (Bd. Ill, 108). 
I would suggest that one reason for the many conflicting descrip-
tions of the medieval attitude is the fact that there were two separate 
and fundamentally incompatible traditions in regard to death, both 
functioning at the same time. The two attitudes reflect not just the 
possibility that death could lead either to heaven or hell, but a folk 
tradition and a Christian tradition. 
The folk tradition, which featured an evil, gleeful, malicious 
figure of death, is best represented in the literature and murals 
depicting the Totentanz, the Dance of Death. This tradition probably 
originated with the superstition that the dead rose at night to dance 
in graveyards and could draw unsuspecting passersby with them. The 
idea of the dancing dead evolved into the dancing figure of death, a 
rapacious, cruel, grinning figure who attacked his victims in all ranks 
of society, unexpectedly and Inexorably. Contrasting with this view 
was the Christian tradition which pictured death as the servant of 
God and advocated that death, for the faithful, was not to be feared, 
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but calmly and hopefully accepted as the passage to eternal life. 
During the late medieval period the two traditions seem to have 
existed side by side with very little amalgum between them. Elements 
of the Totentanz themes such as the unexpectedness, inexorableness, 
universality, and impartiality of death as well as an emphasis on 
physical decay are to be found frequently in medieval literature. 
The positive view, which asserts that death is not to be feared because 
Christ has conquered it and promises eternal bliss for the redeemed, 
is to be found as well. But in the dialogues with death which preceded 
t*ie Ackermann, such as the Dialogus Mortis cum Homine, the Briefwechsel 
zwischen Leben und Tod, and the Legende von der Todes-Vision des 
Magister Polycarp, the attitudes of fear and horror predominate. 
The Ackermann contains a mixture of the two groups of themes. 
The relationship between them will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The Archetypal Experience: Suffering, 
Insight, Questioning 
Both the book of Job and the Ackermann aus Bohmen deal with what 
might be called the archetypal situation of a man in the prime of life 
who suddenly and unexpectedly is brought low by a cruel misfortune. 
The experience of a fall from a secure and happy life brings with it 
new insight into the world's misery. 
Both Blank and Hubner envision the Plowman to be a man in his 
30 forties. Job is portrayed by H. G. Wells, in his novel The Undying 
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Fire, as a man "of little more than fifty." Although Job's age is 
not specifically given in the Old Testament book, he cannot be extremely 
old, since Eliphaz reminds him that some of -the three friends are older 
than Job's father (15:10). Job's children are mentioned in the prologue. 
Some or all of them must be grown, but there is no mention of grand-
children until his restoration in the epilogue. 
The Plowman seems to be a man of comfortable circumstances* He 
recalls the respect his wife enjoyed in the community (chapter ix, 9-12) 
and that she was of noble birth (vii, 7—8)• He himself is an educated 
"man of the pen11: "von vogelwat ist mein pflug11 (iii, 1). Job like-
wise is in every way a man in his prime, having, in addition to his 
many children, such vast possessions that he is known as "the greatest 
of all the people of the east" (1:3), 
Both formerly lived in a state of idyllic happiness. The Plowman 
says: "Frut und fro was ich vormals zu aller stunt; kurz und lustsam 
32 was mir alle weil, tag und nacht" (iii, 11-13). Job describes himself 
in former days with the words: "my roots spread out to the waters, / 
with the dew all night on my branches, / my glory fresh with me, / and 
my bow ever new in my hand" (29:19-20). 
Yet each falls into a state of wretchedness and misery as a 
result of an unexpected calamity, which breaks into that idyllic life 
with other-worldly force. For the Plowman it is the premature death of 
his wife. For Job it is a series of terrible catastrophies including 
the death of his children, a loathsome disease, and loss of all his 
worldly goods and reputation. Their present wretched state contrasts 
starkly with their former happiness and is depicted in vivid images-
The Plowman says: 
Nu wirt zu mir gesprochen schabab! Bei trubem trank, auf 
dilrrem ast, betrubt, swarz und zerstfirt beleib ich und 
heule on underlass. Also treibt mich der wind, ich swim 
dahin durch des wilden meres fliiss, die tunnen haben 
Uberhant genomen, mein anker haftet niergent (iii, 15-19). 
Job cries: 
My spirit is broken, my days are extinct . . . 
He has made me a byword of the peoples, 
and I am one before whom men spit. 
My eye has grown dim from grief, 
and all my members are like a shadow. 
(17:1, 6-7) 
In neither case can sufficient cause for the tragic events be 
found in the sins of the sufferer. The seeming inapproprlateness, the 
cruel and unusual nature of their suffering, causes them to reexamine 
their assumptions about the moral order of the universe. Each finds 
a contradiction between his religious beliefs and his experience, 
between belief in the justice of God's world order and his personal 
experience of injustice. 
In the Ackermann the experience of suffering, or leit, is acknow-
ledged by God with a certain regard. It results in a confrontation with 
the truth. God says to the combatants: "der krieg ist nicht gar on 
sach. Ir habt beide wol gefochten: den twinget leit zu klagen, disen 
die anfechtung des klagers die warheit zu sagen" (xxxiii, 15-17). 
In both works the archetypal sequence of suffering-insight-
questioning is climaxed by the intervention of the supernatural. In the 
end it is the encounter with God which triumphs over the experience of 
suffering. It is not a victory of faith over reason in abstract terms, 
but rather of the experience of God over the experience of suffering. 
The Question of the Biographical Background 
The protagonists in both debates are drawn with a great deal of 
dramatic life. They do not simply argue abstractly about an academic 
question. Each has a personal stake in the outcome of the issue and 
argues in an involved way. So much so, in fact, that the outcries and 
intense personal expressions of grief in both works have led to specula-
tion on whether or not they were written out of the personal experience 
of the authors or whether they are the products of purely creative 
imagination. 
In the case of Job many interpreters have suggested, as does 
G. Uellenberg, that the author of the dialogue seems to be speaking, 
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"von selbsterlebter Qual." The author, of course, cannot be Job 
himself, for the legend goes back long before the book was composed. The 
historical Job, if there was one, would have lived much earlier. But 
perhaps the author was someone who had also experienced a severe 
reversal in life and chose the story of Job as a vehicle for dealing 
with the problem of suffering. 
The difficulty with this suggestion lies in the fact that most 
scholars believe the book to have been composed over a long period of 
time and by several authors. Samuel Terrien explains that the tradi-
tional method of composing such a poem was probably similar to the 
practice of Bedoin tribes of today—a kind of community effort which 
is carried out by the whole tribe seated around the fire at night. 
Each evening part of the poem is retold; new phrases are tried out by 
the tribal poet and approved or disapproved as the group repeats them. 
If approved, the additions are repeated on the following night. In 
this way they become part of the tribal memory. Several generations 34 
of poets may work on one particular theme. Still, however, it is 
through the inspiration of the poet that the poem is built up. And the 
impetus for his contributions no doubt grows out of his own experience. 
Thus it is difficult to rule out the influence of personal experience. 
Not all are in agreement, however, as to the authorship of the 
various parts of the book. Pope suggests that: 
in the heart of the book, in the Dialogue (chs. iii-xxxi), 
there is a characteristic literary excellence which 
suggests the influence of a single personality. . . . There 
can be no question that we are confronted with a poet of 
genius, for his work has been acclaimed as one of the 
great masterpieces of world literature. . . . The poet had 
himself probably experienced physical and mental agony, 
since it is hard to understand how one could have written 
thus without personal knowledge of s u f f e r i n g . 3 5 
In the case of the Ackermann the question Is likewise undecided. 
Many have felt that the intense emotion in the outcries of the Plowman 
and the words of the closing prayer, ffMich reuet Margaret, mein 
auserweltes weib" (xxxiv,69-70), seem to be personally felt. The 
strongest argument that the work has a biographical basis comes from 
Willy Krogmann, who points to the many biographical details which 
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otherwise would have no reason to be in the work. Such personal 
references include the naming of the Plowman's wife and the city in 
which she lived, the exact date of her death, the mention of the 
surviving children, and the acrostic in the final prayer: I0HANNES MA. 
All of these details agree with the facts which are known about the 
author's life. 
In addition, the phrase in the author's accompanying letter to 
his friend Peter Rothirsch: "Karitas, que nos homines floride 
inventutis vinuit, me hortatur et cogit, vestri memoria consolari" 
has been interpreted by some as evidence that the author, and possibly 37 
Rothirsch too, had recently suffered a bereavement. The difficulty 
stems from the translation of the word consolari which can be either 
passive or deponent. Heilig translates the sentence as follows: "Die 
Liebe, welche uns in Blute, Jugend, Mannlichkeit einte, veranlasst und 
verpflichtet mich, Euer eingedenk Euch zu trosten," but adds that the 
last three words can also be translated "mich zu trtfsten" and would 
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then be a reference to the authorTs own bereavement. 
Anton Blaschka, however, rejects both theories on the grounds 
that the phrase is merely an example of the traditional topos, 39 
letter-writing as consolation for the letter-writer. The consolation 
referred to is simply that of communicating with the person from whom 
the writer is separated and was a standard introduction to a letter. 
Since the discovery of Tepl's letter to Peter Rothirsch, many 
have become convinced that the work is primarily a rhetorical exercise. 40 Httbner calls it a !Tstilistisches Paradestflck," B'auml states 
emphatically: "The fact that the Ackermann was intended by its 
41 author to be a rhetorical exercise can no longer be denied." Others, 
however, suggest that to regard the work as a stylistic exercise does 
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not exclude the possibility of a biographical background. Hahn 
observes: "So kann aber—muss es nicht!—der Aufwand In der 
Durchgestaltung des Formalen, der grosse Ornat, . . . gerade und im 43 
Gegenteil dafur zeugen, wie tiefernst das Behandelte genommen ist." 
The question whether or not the Ackermann is based on a real 
event will be important later in considering whether or not the final 
prayer is part of the debate or an epilogue spoken by the author. If 
it can be established that the author himself did not suffer a 
bereavement, then the references to a lost wife must be the words of 
the Plowman. 
The book of Job also contains certain biographical details about 
Job, his family and his friends. We learn, for instance, that Job was 
a prince of the Land of Uz (Edom) . We are told the number of his 
children, the size of his flocks, that his servants were killed by 
the Sabeans and Caldeans, the number of years he lived after his ordeal, 
and the names of the three daughters who were born to him after his 
fortunes were restored. We are also told the names and families of 
the three friends Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar, as well as of Elihu. 
Although it cannot be argued that this biographical information is 
anything other than fictitious or at best legendary, the work is no 
less valid for the author's not having experienced all the ndsfortunes 
of Job. Regardless of whether or not the biographical details of 
either work have a basis in fact, the problems dealt with in the debates 
are universally real. 
The Judicial Theme 
Both the Ackermann and the book of Job in several respects 
resemble a judicial proceeding. In both cases there is an injured 
party who senses that there has been a miscarriage of justice and 
appeals for justice to God. Although neither work is framed as a full-
fledged legal case, both make use of the judicial theme and at times 
affect the tone of a court proceeding. 
Although Job himself has. not witnessed the scene in heaven, he 
rightly senses that he is on trial. He protests against what he feels 
to be cruel and unusual punishment, defending himself boldly in legal 
terminology. He declares; "But I would speak to the Almighty, / 
and I desire to argue my case with God" (13:3). "I would lay my case 
before him / and fill my mouth with arguments. . . .There an upright 
man could reason with him, / and I should be acquitted for ever by my 
judge" (23:4,7). "Oh, that I had the indictment written by my 
adversary!" (31:35). "Behold, I have prepared my case; / I know that 
I shall be vindicated" (13:18). "0 that my vexation were weighed, / 
and all my calamity laid in the balances!" (6:2). "Let me be weighed 
in a just balance, / and let God know my integrity!" (31:6). "For 
he is not a man, as I am, that I might answer him,/that we should come 
to trial together" (9:32). "[T]hou knowest that I am not guilty" (10:7). 
Job is confident that, given a fair hearing, he would be acquitted. 
He believes in a man's rights before God: "Even now, behold, my witness 
is in heaven, / and he that vouches for me is on high. . . . My eye 
pours out tears to God, / that he would maintain the right of a man 
with God, / like that of a man with his neighbor" (16:19, 20-21). He 
says of God: "[A]n upright man could reason with him" (23:7). 
Job's last recourse is to an ancient legal procedure, the 
traditional "oath of clearance" which takes the form of a negative 
44 confession. The negative confession was made to vindicate one's 
public honor, but "it was addressed to God in an appeal against human 
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judgment." In performing it the accused calls on God to curse him 
if it should be true that he has committed a crime. Pope writes of the 
oath of clearance: 
The taking of an oath was the last word in assertion of 
innocence, tantamount to acquittal, since it was assumed 
that the terror of the sanctions of the self-imprecations 
would deter anyone from swearing falsely. After the 
oaths there is no more the friends can say. It is now 
up to God to strike down the blasphemer or acquit him 
(p. lxxii). 
In his oath Job lists a long series of crimes of which he has 
been accused in the implications of the friends, as well as some which 
they have not thought of. He names the punishments-that should befall 
him if he is guilty. For example, he declares: "If I have walked 
with falsehood, / and my foot has hastened to deceit; . . . then let 
me sow, and another eat" (31:5-8). "If I have withheld anything that 
the poor desired . . . if I have raised my hand against the fatherless, . 
. . then let my shoulder blade fall from my shoulder, / and let my arm 
be broken from its socket" (31:16-22). 
Job ends his oath with the resolute cry: "Here is my 
signature! Let the Almighty answer me!" (31:35). He now feels con-
fident that he will be vindicated. Willing to give account of all 
his steps (31:37), he likens the imagined indictment to a crown which 
he would wear to approach his accuser "like a prince" (31:36-37). 
But it is not merely his own vindication that Job wishes. His 
most urgent hope is that God will vindicate Himself. Job realizes 
that the moral order is at stake. If there is no moral order in the 
world, if God is not to be trusted, then there is nothing left for 
Job himself. The frightening aspect of the debate at this stage is 
that it is difficult to see how both Job and God can be right. If Job 
is right about his integrity and God is allowing him to suffer unjustly 
or simply for no reason at all, then Job also loses. If Job is wrong 
about his integrity and God is just in punishing him, then Job cannot 
trust his own conscience or his ability to judge himself. It seems 
an insoluble dilemma. Both must be vindicated in order that there 
be a rational moral order in the world. Job is confident that this 
will somehow happen. 
Tepl's Ackermann also contains elements of a judicial proceeding 
and places emphasis on the concept of justice which the Middle Ages 
saw as residing in, and emanating from, God. The opening of the 
debate begins with the traditional cry of murder or cry for help, 
the ceremonial opening to a medieval judicial proceeding, naming and 
cursing the accused: "Grimmiger vertilger aller leut, schedlicher 
durchechter aller werlt, freissamer morder aller menschen, her Tot, 
euch sei verflucht!" (i, 1-2). Eckhart calls it a "feststehende 
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mittelalterliche Prozessformel." According to Philippson the 
gerflfte or Zetergeschrei was "the strongest form of accusation in 
German medieval law" and "was only in order when there was no doubt 
whatever concerning the guilt of the murderer and the findings of the 
court, the gerufte itself meant outlawing the respondent by means of 
the severest form of impeachment" (p. 268). 
Although the specific form of a legal proceeding is not carried 
beyond the first chapter, the question of Death's guilt or innocence 
continues to be pursued by the Plowman: "Ir habt sie alle und meine 
schc5ne und zarte ermort . . . Wer ist daran schuldig?" (xvii,19-20) . 
As in the book of Job the theme of recht or justice is of paramount 
importance. The Plowman's sense of justice is outraged by the loss 
of his wife. Something is terribly wrong in the world order if this 
crime goes unredressed. He is confident of his right to legal recourse 
as the injured party and calls on God to take his part and avenge him 
for the miscarriage of justice. Death is surprised at this unexpected 
attack but aims to prove that he is within his rights. The Plowman, 
because of his conviction that God is the source and essence of all 
justice, fully expects God also to be outraged by this offense against 
His order. Like Job, the Plowman appeals to God to be his judge and 
is confident that the outcome will be a fair judgment of the case. 
The roles of plaintiff and accused are reinforced by the repeated use 
of the words recht, unrecht, rechtfertig, Gerechtigkeit, etc. It is 
the primary concern of each combatant to establish the legality of 
his claim. 
The PlowmanTs claim to justice is based on his view of God as 
"mein, euer und aller welt rechter richter" (xix,19-20). He contrasts 
God's character as the true dispenser of justice vith that of Death, 
the false judge, saying: "Richte, herre, richte uber den falschen 
richter!" (xv,23-24). "Werlich, herre, in deiner wilrkung ist . . . 
nicht ungerechters dann der Tot!" (xv,18-20). His repeated use of the 
word recht and the contrast with God's justice is most striking in 
chapter xvii, where it becomes an ironic chant: "Ir spreqhet faste, 
wie rechte ir richtet . . . Ist das rechte gericht? . . . sagen wir 
lob und ere dem Tot, der also rechte richtet! Gotes gerichte ist kaum 
also gerecht" (xvii,21-22, 3-33). 
The Plowman repeatedly emphasizes his injured-party status: 
"Werlich, so kurz geschach nie manne!" (xix,15-16). He stresses his 
legal right to restitution for his loss, alternately feigning restraint 
and making exaggerated threats of vengeance. "[W]ie unrechte ir an mir 
habt gefahren, . . . geriche [ich] es nicht, als ich zu rechte solte: 
. . . ich getrauet euch wol, ir wiirdet euer gerechtigkeit (or 
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"ungerechtichkeit" in some versions ) selbs erkennen, darnach mir 
genugen tun noch grosser untat. . . . Anders es mlisste der hamer den 
amboss treffen" (xix, 10-11, 21-23). It is essential to his view of 
the world that justice be done: "Hilfe, rates und widerbringens seit 
ir mir pflichtig, wann ir habt mir getan den schaden. . . . gerochen 
miisst es werden—weder dann got bet in seiner allmechtigkeit nindert 
rachung!" (xxi,16-19). 
Numerous as the Plowman's references to justice in his complaint 
may be, those of Death are even more frequent. Death, in fact, is the 
first to mention the issue. Although he does not feel threatened by 
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the Plowman, he expresses an interest in vindicating himself on legal 
grounds, and in showing that his activity is just and lawful. He says: 
"Rechtfertig wellen wir werden, rechtfertig ist unser gefertIT (ii,19-20). 
In his second speech he objects: "[D]u tust uns heftiglichen unrecht11 
(iv,3). Again, in his third speech, he clearly states his stake in 
the debate: "Wir wellen beweisen, das wir rechte wegen, rechte 
richten und rechte faren in der werlt11 (vi,6-7). 
Death argues that it is the Plowman who is overstepping his 
bounds: "Du fluchest und bittest rachung unverschultlich und on notdurft" 
(xii,2-3) "Falsches gerichtes beziehestu uns; uns tustu unrecht. Das 
wellen wir dich beweisen" (xvi,2-3). Death, too, sees the matter in 
legal terms: "Was ein mensche entlehent, das sol es widergeben. . . . 
jegliches mensche ist uns ein sterben schuldig und in angeerbt zu 
sterben" (xx,12-13, 16-17). "[W]ir hetten dich gutlich underweiset, 
das du nicht billichen den tot deines weibes klagen soltest und 
beweinen" (xx,4-5). 
He bases his claim to lawfulness on the fact that he is God's 
tool and completely impartial: "Wir sein gotes hantgezeuge, . . . 
ein rechte wurkender meder" (xvi,4-5). Of his impartiality he boasts: 
"Sihe, das ist rechtfertigkeit! Uns haben rechtfertig geteilt die 
R&ner und die poeten" (xvi,9-10). 
The justice of God's world order and ultimately of God himself is 
no less important to Tepl's Plowman than, to Job, his more outspoken 
predecessor. His question how Death can be seen to function justly 
and with God's sanction unavoidably points up the inadequacies in 
the concept of God which the Plowman has held up to now. 
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The Concept of Justice 
The Relationship between Suffering and God 
Although both works deal with the question of justice, in 
particular the justice of the world order, their conceptions of God's 
nature and their views of His relationship to suffering and death 
differ. Job has a very clear understanding of the relationship 
between his suffering and God. It is God who is directly responsible 
for it. He says to his wife, who has urged him to curse God and die: 
"Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive 
evil?" (2:10). To his friends, the comforters, Job exclaims: "Who 
among all these does not know that the hand of the LORD has done this? / 
In his hand is the life of every living thing / and the breath of all 
mankind" (12:9-10). Feeling the full weight of his misfortunes, he 
cries: "For the arrows of the Almighty are in me; . . . the terrors of 
God are arrayed against me" (6:4). Although the Job of the prologue 
differs in his outlook from the Job of the debate, their attitudes 
on this point are the same. The impressive and moving first words 
spoken by Job after the news of his terrible loss in the prologue 
leave no doubt about his idea of the relationship between his suffering 
and God: "Then Job arose, and rent his robe, and shaved his head, 
and fell upon the ground, and worshipped. And he said, 'Naked I 
came from my mother's womb, and naked I shall return; the LORD gave, 
and the LORD has taken away; blessed be the name of the LORD" (1:20-21). 
Although the prologue depicts Satan as the initiator and agent 
of Job's sufferings, with God's permission, neither Job nor his 
friends ever think of attributing any of his misery to Satan. For Job 
the problem of suffering is the problem of God, 
The Plowman, in sharp contrast to Job, has a contradictory and 
confused idea as to the cause of his suffering. While he accuses 
Death of being the immediate cause, he also knows that God is in 
control of Death. Rather than openly criticizing God, however, he 
tries to separate the two, calling on God to avenge him on evil Death. 
His ax̂ areness that God has power over Death is not something that 
develops during the debate; it is there from the outset. In his opening 
speech he pointedly calls God the creator of Death: "Got, euer tirmer, 
hasse euch" (i,3). Again in chapter xv he states that Death is part 
of God's creation: "Werlich, herre, in deiner w^rkung ist nicht 
greulicheres, . . . nicht ungerechters dann der Tot!" (xv,18-20). He 
repeatedly acknowledges God's power over Death: ffGot, der mein und 
euer gewaltig ist, getraue ich wol, er werde mich vor euch beschirmen" 
(xi,l-2). "[S]olichen Ion . . . schicke euch, der des todes und lebens 
gewaltig sei!" (xiii,22-24). 
Although he recognizes that God is responsible for death, at 
the same time he indicates that Death acts independently of God and 
against God's wishes. He calls him God's enemy, inciting God to 
destroy him: " . . . vertilge den greulichen Tot, der dein und aller 
unser feint ist! . . , Er betrtibt und verordnet dir alle dein irdische 
herschaft" (xv,16-18 , 20-21). To Death he says: "Got beraube euch 
euer macht" (v, 19). He clearly asserts that it is not God who has 
caused his suffering but Death, independently and maliciously. There 
are only two possible sources of his misfortune, Death and God, and, 
since God certainly has not done it, Death must be responsible: "Auch 
weiss ich wol, das soliches gewaltes sunder got und euer niemant ist 
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gewaltig. So bin ich von got nicht also geplaget: . . . Ir seit der 
ubelteter!" (xv,6-10). 
The Plowman's contradictory viex* of the relationship between 
Death and God seems to result from his concept of God as a kind of 
chivalrous ideal. The Plowman stresses in particular two aspects of 
God's character. He sees God as a gentle, benevolent comforter. He 
calls him a "milter loner" (xi,19), "aller betrttbten herzen troster" 
(xv,15), "Der milte got, der mechtige herre" (ix,3-4). In addition, 
God is a knightly righter of wrongs, an avenger of injustices. By far 
the most frequently used description depicts him as avenger, sometimes 
coupled with praise of his gentleness: "Der milte got, der mechtige 
herre, gereche mich an euch" (ix,3-5). "Eia Got, aller betriibten 
herzen troster, troste mich und ergetze mich" (xv,15-16). "Got! 
aller untat gerecher!" (xiii,27). "[S]Qnde libersehen und gerochert 
hat got biss her" (xxxi,18-19). !T[G]erochen musst es werden—weder 
dann got het in seiner allmechtigkeit nindert rachung!" (xxi,18-19). 
"Got, . . . getraue ich wol, er werde mich vor euch beschirmen und . . . 
strenglich an euch gerechen" (xi,l-3). 
This chivalrous view of God contributes to the Plowman's contra-
dictory conception of the relationship between God and Death. It has 
been mentioned that the courtly Middle Ages epitomized God as the 
essence of all courtly virtues and tried to divest God of unpleasant 
traits in order to make him comformable to the courtly ideal. Death, 
in contrast, was hated for his extreme, unchivalrous behavior. As 
examples of medieval laments over death have shown, it was possible to 
curse and hate Death without directly implicating God. Some writers 
went so far as to wonder how God could tolerate such a servant, but to 
criticize God himself, or His justice, was virtually unthinkable. By 
trying to separate death's function from God's the Plowman puts himself 
in the inconsistent position of calling on God to defend him against 
God's own world order. 
We learn from God's verdict in the contest that He approves of 
death, including the death of the Plowman's wife, and acknowledges His 
own ultimate responsibility. The Plowman's insistence that God cannot 
approve is shoyn to be wrong, and after the verdict revenge on Death 
is never mentioned again. An analysis of the text to follow shows 
that Tepl purposely characterized the Plowman's concept of God as 
naive and contradictory, and Death in the negative light of the 
Totentanz tradition, in order to replace both views at the end with 
a more mature and complete picture of God and His relationship to the 
world. 
One important contributing factor to the contradictory view of 
the relationship between God and death was the medieval practice of 
personifying the figure of death. Throughout the middle ages death 
was commonly regarded as a real being and was personified as a malicious 
individual who attacked his victims from outside. Kleins tuck states: 
"Mit naiver Selbstverstandlichkeit reden Chretien, Dante, die 
Troubadours and and ere vom Tode, als ob er jemand ware. . . . Sicher 
glaubten im Mittelalter viele Menschen, dass wirklich ein Wesen 'Tod* 
auf der Erde tatig sei. . . .fl (p. 54). One of many such examples 
of the personification of death is found in Hartmannfs Erec, where 
Enite, distraught and believing Erec to be dead, no longer wishes to 
live. She tries to lure death by claiming to have suddenly fallen in 
love with him and offers to become death's bride: 
dem bin ich gahes worden holt, 
hete ich umbe den versolt 
daz im geviele miri lip, 
dem wolde ich sin ein staetez wip 
vil lieber Tot, nu meine ich dich. 
(w. 5882-86> 
That this notion had begun to change by the fourteenth century 
can be seen in Chaucer's spoof of the idea in his "PardonerTs Tale" 
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in the Canterbury Tales, 1387-1400. The fear of the Totentanz 
figure as an actual being has been largely overcome by the time of 
Holbein's Totentanz of 1526 in which the figure of death has become • 
a symbol of mortality rather than the terrifying apparition which 
dominated earlier versions. Rosenfeld says: 
Dieser Tod hat keinerlei metaphysische Wirklichkeit mehr, 
ist nicht mehr die Gestalt, an der der mittelalterliche 
Mensch sich seiner Kreaturlichkeit bewusst wurde und 
erschauerte vor dem Unendlichen. Der Holbeinische Tod 
ist lediglich eine Mahnung an die Verganglichkeit, . . ̂  
eine Hieroglyphe fur 'Sterben* geworden. (p. 284, 289) 
Kurtz writes that Corozet, the author of the text accompanying the 1538 
edition of Holbein's Totentanz, no longer regards death as a person but 
. 50 as a concept. 
The view expressed in the Ackermann seems to have already broken 
away from strict personification of the figure. Although Death speaks 
and acts the part of a personality, his own description of himself 
indicates that he is to be conceived of in ways other than strict 
personification. Although the Plowman refers to him as a person, calling 
him "tummer man" (ix,2Q) and complaining, "0, her Tot, alle werlt klagt 
iiber euch . . . und auch ich, das nie so boser man wart" (xxi,9-10), 
yet Death speaks of himself not as a person, but as an event, "ein 
geschickte," saying he has no form and is not alive: 
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Wir sein nichts und doch etwas. Deshalben nichts, wann 
wir weder leben noch wesen noch gestalt noch understant 
haben, nicht geist sein, nicht sichtig sein, nicht greiflich 
sein; deshalben etwas, wann wir sein des lebens ende, des 
wesens ende, des nichtwesens anfang, ein mittel zwischen 
in beiden. Wir sein ein geschickte, das alle leut fellet. 
(xvi,11-16) 
Elsewhere he says he is "unbeschreibenlich" or "unsichtig" (xvi,19). 
He seems to distinguish between what he is and the way he is depicted 
in works which describe him as a man. For instance, he says that he 
was painted in Rome ,fals ein man sitzend auf einem ochsen11 (xvi,20-21). 
But he speaks of the man on the ox as "unser bedeutnuss" (xvi,26), 
indicating that the man only represents him. He recalls that Pythagoras 
once compared him to a man, one with basilisk's eyes or form: "Pictagoras 
geleichet uns zu eines mannes schein, der hat basiliskes gestalt" (or 
augen in some versions"*"'") (xvi,27-28). 
Although the Plowman still regards him as a personality, the 
figure of death has lost much of the fearsomeness of earlier medieval 
representations. The Plowman speaks to him unintimidated, as if to 
another person. This change in attitude toward Death indicates a 
breaking away from strict separation of God and death. The view- ex-
pressed by the Plowman represents a popular medieval concept which is 
characterized as inadequate and is replaced at the end of the debate 
by a new understanding of God's nature, in the same way that the 
Plowman's predecessor, Job, is to learn that God is greater and more 
mysterious than he thought. 
The Problem of Impartiality 
A problem which is closely related to the question of God's 
connection with death and suffering is the issue of how these evils 
are distributed in the world, assuming some responsibility for them on 
God's part. It is the idea that death and suffering do not seem to be 
meted out fairly which most concerns Job and the Plowman and which seems 
to contradict the idea of God's ultimate responsibility for them. 
Since God is in control of everything, it would seem that 
suffering should always be commensurate with wrongdoing. This, in fact, 
was the official teaching in Job's time. It was the traditional belief 
in Israel and Mesopotamia that, under God's rule of the universe, evil 
was always punished and virtue rewarded. Just as suffering was always 
evidence of sin, early death was regarded as a punishment. Job's 
friends certainly believe this. They constantly affirm that the wicked 
die young and the righteous live to old age. Elihu says: "He does not 
keep the wicked alive, . . . The godless in heart cherish anger; / . . . 
They die in youth, / and their life ends in shame" (36:6, 13-14). 
Eliphaz claims that "The wicked man writhes in pain all his days" 
(15:20), and Zophar adds: "But the eyes of the wicked will fail; / 
all way of escape will be lost to them" (11:20). The causal connection 
between sin and suffering is strictly maintained. Eliphaz assures them 
that God does not send affliction for nothing: "For affliction does 
not come from the dust, / nor does trouble sprout from the ground" (5:6). 
But Job's experience contradicts these traditional religious 
beliefs. The root of his conflict is, in fact, his knowledge that he 
is suffering innocently, that the magnitude of his sins does not justify 
the severity of his misfortunes. He repeatedly protests his innocence: 
"I hold fast my righteousness, and will not let it go; / my heart does 
not reproach me for any of my days" (27:6); " . . . thou knowest that I 
am not guilty" (10:7). Job's righteousness is confirmed by God in 
the prologue when he twice declares that Ifthere is none like him on the 
earth, a blameless and upright man, who fears God and turns away from 
evil" (1:8). God admits to persecuting Job without just cause when He 
says to Satan: "He still holds fast his integrity, although you moved 
me against him, to destroy him without cause11 (2:3). 
His own experience of undeserved suffering causes him to observe 
the plight of others, and he becomes disturbed by what seems to be a 
distinct lack of justice in the government of the world. It is clear 
that the wicked often do prosper and are not punished. Job asks: 
"Why do the wicked live, / reach old age, and grow mighty in power? 
. . . Their houses are safe from fear, / and no rod of God is upon 
them. . . . They spend their days in prosperity, / and in peace they go 
down to Sheol" (21:7, 9, 13). "How often is it that the lamp of the 
wicked is put out? / That their calamity comes upon them? . . . the 
wicked man is spared in the day of calamity" (21:17, 30). There 
seems to be no difference between the lot of the good and that of the 
wicked: 
It is all one; therefore I say, 
he destroys both the blameless and the wicked. 
When disaster brings sudden death, 
he mocks at the calamity of the innocent. 
The earth is given into the hand of the wicked; 
he covers the faces of its judges— 
if it is not he, who then is it? 
(9:22-24) 
Angrily he cries: "Why are not times of judgment kept by the Almighty? 
(24:1). 
In contrast to the Plowman, it is precisely Job!s clear view of 
the relationship of his suffering to God—the fact that he does not 
perceive his suffering as coming from some other hand — that the problem 
arises. If God is not responsible for both good and evil, there is no 
Job dilemma. 
The Plowman too is disturbed by the injustice he has experienced— 
the loss of his virtuous wife. It is DeathTs terrible indiscriminateness 
and unpredictability that trouble him. He too feels that there should 
be some link between virtue and reward, that his wife should have 
been spared because of her exceptional goodness. He attacks Death 
for being unfair. 
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The Plowman's protest that Death functions unpredictably and un-
justly is the traditional medieval complaint which we have seen in 
earlier laments. The fact that death is no respecter of persons had 
long been stressed and was a prominent theme of the Toteri&nze. Death 
was frequently berated for taking the virtuous and the young, and for 
often leaving the old, the infirm and the wicked. He seemed to spare 
life at the wrong time, refusing to act when he could have relieved 
pain and sorrow. He was particularly blamed for taking children. It 
was expected that death rightly should reap only the ripe grain. 
This is also the Plowman's grievance. Why does Death take good 
people like his wife and leave evil ones? He says: ,f. . . ee das 
tuchtig dann das untuchtig nimt er hin; schedliche, alte, sieche, 
unnutze leute lesst er oft alhie, die guten und die ntitzen zuckt er 
alle hin" (xv,21-23). He calls Death Mden falschen richter" (xv,24), 
On the other hand, Death's own definition of justice is based on the 
assertion that he is impartial and not influenced by considerations of 
social class, beauty, wealth, etc." 
. . . niemands adels schonen, grosser kunst nicht achten, 
keinerlei schone nicht ansehen, gabe, liebe, leit, alter, 
jugent und allerlei sachen nicht wegen wir. Wir tun als 
die sunne, die scheinet liber gute und bose, wir nemen gute 
und bose in unseren gewalt. 
(vi,7-ll) 
The Plowman does not accept Death's claim to impartiality. How does it 
happen, he asks, Tfdas sie dann mer disteln dann guter blumen und mer 
boser leut dann guter unversert lesst beleiben?" (xvii,9-10). He once 
personally witnessed a battle in which the outcome was far from fair: 
!,In dem here etelich totet ir, etelich liesset ir leben. Mer knecht 
dann herren sach ich tot ligen; . . . 1st das rechte gemeet? 1st das 
rechte gericht?11 (xvii,27-30) . 
To imply that Death should be impartial is a weak argument on the 
Plowman's part, since true impartiality would not necessarily spare 
his wife. Some good people would always be taken. Does the Plowman 
really think Death should be impartial? Or does he think he should be 
a judge and spare the virtuous as he suggests in chapter xv? He never 
actually argues that the virtuous should be rewarded with long life, 
yet he seems to think that it should be so, since God loves virtue 
and punishes sin: "Tugent lieb gehabt, bosheit gehasset, slinde 
ubersehen und gerochen hat got biss her" (xxxi,18-19). He claims 
that God was his wife's protector because of her virtue: " . . . got 
was ir gunstiger hanthaber. Er was auch mir gunstig durch iren 
willen: heil, selde und gelucke stunden mir bei durch iren willen* 
Das het sie an got erworben und verdient, die reine hausere" (xi,15-18). 
In implying that Death should judge more fairly, the Plowman 
reveals another misconception which he holds concerning the relation-
ship between Death and God. He attributes to Death God's function as 
judge. That is, he confuses physical death with judgment. The church 
had long made a distinction between physical death, which is the result 
of original sin (Adam's fall) and eternal death or damnation, which is 
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the punishment of individual sin. Everyone is equally subject to 
physical death because of man's inherited guilt, but individual sins 
are to be judged by God. Only the first death, physical death, is 
the province of the Plowman's opponent in the debate. In repeatedly 
referring to Death as an unjust judge, he fails to recognize that judg-
ment is a function exercised exclusively by God. Death, on the 
contrary, is only God's tool, and has been ordained by Him as a sort 
of impartial broom which keeps order in the universe by preventing it 
from becoming over populated: " . . . uns [hat] der mechtig aller werlt 
herzog befolhen, den worten das wir alle tiberflussigkeit sullen 
ausreuten und ausjeten" (viii,4-6). 
It is this very impartiality—an impartiality which implies no 
value judgments—that the Plowman objects to and is confused about. 
What is the mechanism that determines this random selection? Is it 
Death, or is it ultimately God? What is the rationale behind it? Is 
random selection equivalent to justice? Are not impartiality and 
partiality (justice) mutually exclusive? It is clear from all accounts 
that God created Death in paradise, and that all must die for man's 
inherited guilt. But it is not clear what determines when a person is 
to be taken. It would seem logical that true impartiality, and a real 
test of disinterested virtue, would be to allow everyone to live the 
same length of time. Why are some taken before their time? The 
argument of the impartial natural order of the universe still leaves 
unanswered the question why things should be so ordered. The Plowman 
implicitly questions the justice of God in ordering the world so 
that the good can die young. 
To suggest that there should be some connection between virtue 
and reward, as the Plowman does, or between sin and punishment, as Job 
does, involves a similar contradiction. If God were always to act in 
the way man expects and deems just, he would no longer be free. 
The fact that all must die is not really what bothers the Plowman. 
He seems not to object to death in old age, but to the fact that some 
die before their time. He complains that his wife was taken too soon: 
"Zu frtf ist sie mir entwischet, allzu schier habt ir mir sie enzucket" 
(xiii,11-12). His objection is not to the inevitability of death but 
to the injustice of Death's exercise of his function. 
In how far, then, does the Plowman actually challenge Death's 
right to exist? Although it is true that the Plowman directly calls 
on God to destroy Death saying: f'[H]erre, . . . vertilge den greulichen 
Tot, der dein und aller unser feint ist!" (xv,16-18), the reason he 
gives has nothing to do with the justification for the institution of 
death itself. Instead he criticizes the capricious way in which Death 
carries out his function: 
Er betrubt und *verordnet dir alle dein irdische 
herschaft; ee das tuchtig dann *untuchtig nimt er hin; 
schedliche alte, sieche, unntitze leute lesst er oft 
alhie, die gut en und die nUtzen ztickt er alle hin. 
(xv,20-23) 
Death likewise defends himself by stressing his impartiality: 
Wir sein gottes hantgezeuge, herre Tot, ein rechte 
wurkender meder. Unser sengse geet fur sich: weiss, 
schwarz, rot, braun, gel, griin, bla, gra und allerlei 
glanz blumen und gras hauet sie fur sich nider, ir 
glanz, ir tugent, ir kraft nicht geachtet. . . . Sihe, 
das ist rechtfertigkeit! 
(xvi,4-9) 
Both of them seem to confuse the question of Death's impartiality 
or fairness in exercising his function with the justification for the 
existence of the function itself. To say that someone kills men and 
women in equal numbers is not a justification for the killing. Sur-
prisingly, the charge of capriciousness is the most serious charge 
the Plowman makes against Death. He never gives any actual grounds 
for questioning Death's existence as an institution, although he 
behaves as though he does. 
Like Job's friends, the Plowman expects the universe to operate 
in accordance with an absolute moral law. He expects that the natural 
order and the moral order should in some way coincide. But in the 
functioning of Death, natural law and moral law paradoxically do not 
seem to be related. The death of the Plowman's wife represents to him 
a chaotic breakdown of moral providence. In the Plowman's view, unlike 
that of Job, God simply cannot be responsible, he cannot be both 
creator and destroyer. To the Plowman God is exclusively the loving 
creator. It is Death who is the destroyer. This distinction is main-
tained to the last and is expressed in the Plowman's final words before 
God's appearance: "Des beruf ich mich mit euch an Got, meinen heilant, 
her Tot mein verderber!n (xxxi,27-28). 
The Plowman's insistence on seeing only one side of God and on 
attributing those functions that are difficult to deal with to Death, 
prevents him from coming to a satisfactory resolution of the issues 
during the debate itself. 
Man's Relationship to God 
An important feature of both debates is the staunch defense of 
the worth of man as God's creation by a beleaguered sufferer in circum-
stances which might otherwise be expected to make one despair of God's 
concern. Both defend man against cynical opponents who belittle the 
worth of man and the value of life. Although Job at first curses the 
day of his birth and wishes for death as an end to his misery, he never-
theless defends his own integrity in the strongest terms and the worth 
of the relationship between man and God. 
His opponents skeptically ask at least three times: lfCan mortal 
man be righteous before God? . . . those who dwell in houses of clay, / 
whose foundation is in the dust" (4:17-19). Eliphaz asks: "What is man, 
that he can be clean? / Or he that is born of woman, that he can be 
righteous?" (15:14). Bildad puts it most strongly: "How then can a 
man be righteous before God? . . . man, who is a maggot, and the son 
of man, who is a worm!" (25:4-6). 
But although Job admits with them that life is pitifully short and 
full of trouble, Job has a far different view of man's relationship to 
God. He stresses another aspect of man—that of the beloved creature 
of a loving creator. The prime evidence Job cites for his conviction 
is the care with which God fashioned man: 
Thy hands fashioned and made me; 
. . . (2 lines) 
Thou didst clothe me with skin and flesh, 
and knit me together with bones and sinews* 
Thou hast granted me life and steadfast love; 
and thy care has preserved my spirit. 
(10:8-12) 
Job feels that he has integrity as God's creation and that a relation-
ship of mutual responsibility exists between God and man because of 
God's creative care. Job maintains his integrity at all cost. His 
confidence in his own rights rests in turn on his belief in God's 
integrity: 
This will be my salvation, 
that a godless man shall not come before him. . . . 
Behold, I have prepared my case; 
I know that I shall be vindicated. 
(13:16-18) 
. . . there is no violence in my hands, 
and my prayer is pure. . . . 
Even now, behold my witness is in heaven, 
and he that vouches for me is on high. 
(16:17-19) 
He is confident that he will be vindicated, saying: 11. . .he that has 
clean hands grows stronger and stronger" (17: 9); "Let me be weighed 
in a just balance, and let God know my integrity!" (31:6). Of God he 
asserts: 
But he knows the way that I take; 
when he has tried me, I shall come forth as gold. 
My foot has held fast to his steps; 
I have kept his way and have not turned aside. 
I have not departed from the commandment of his lips; 
(23:10-12) 
He has sworn an oath of innocence and calls on God to answer: "Here is 
my signature! let the Almighty answer me!" (31:35). A stronger 
assertion of innocence and integrity could scarcely be imagined. 
The friends insist that man is nothing to God: "Can a man be 
profitable to God? . . . Is it any pleasure to the Almighty if you are 
righteous, / or is it gain to him if you make your ways blameless? 
(22:2-3). Yet we know, as Job does not, from the prologue that God is 
concerned with the righteousness of His creatures and that Job can do 
something for God. 
Although Job's faith in God's justice and His special relationship 
to man is strong, it is threatened at its foundation. God may have 
fashioned man with great care, but Job's present diseased condition 
seems to belie God's loving concern for His creature. Job is struck 
by the contradiction. He asks: "Your hands have formed me and made 
me, would You turn around and destroy me?" (10:8 Amplified Bible). 
Job defends himself on the basis of this past show of concern for man 
and God's consequent responsibility to deal justly with man: ". . . let 
me know why thou dost contend against me. / Does it seem good to thee 
to oppress, / to despise the work of thy hands . . . although thou 
knowest that I am not guilty" (10:2-3, 7). 
Although God's ways are beyond man's comprehension, it is 
essential that there be some overlap between God's standards and man's 
if there is to be communication between the two. Though not bound by 
them, God must to some degree be just by man's standards. 
A similar confidence in the worth of man as God's good creation 
characterizes the Plowman, and he is plagued by a similar contradiction: 
how can God, who created all things good and lovingly be the destroyer 
of his wife? The idea that her death should be God's will does not 
fit into his view of God as a chivalrous righter of wrongs. 
The Plowman, like Job, views the care with which God fashioned 
man as evidence of his commitment to life. He praises man's similarity 
to God, his gift of reason, saying: 
. . . der mensche ist das allerachtberst, das allerbehendest 
und das allerfreiest gotes werkstuck. Im selber geleich 
hat es got gebildet, als er auch in der ersten wurkung 
der werlt selbs hat gesprochen. . . . Er ist allein der 
lieblich kloss, dem geleich niemant dann got gewurken 
kan, darinnen so behende werk, alle kunst und meisterschaft 
mit weisheit sint gewurket. 
(xxv,19-22, 39-42) 
In criticizing man Death criticizes God, since man was created by God 
and in His own image. God created all things well and man as His most 
noble piece of work. 
Like Job's friends, Death disparages the dignity and value of 
human life, accusing the Plowman of making more of man than he can be: 
"Dein kurze vernunft . . . will aus leuten mer machen dann sie gewesen 
mugen" (xxiv,6-7). Death attempts to discredit man by criticizing him 
from all angles. He exposes the baseness of his physical nature in 
chapter xxiv, reciting a whole list of the most repulsive aspects of 
man's physical body and calling him lfein kotfass, ein wurmspeise," etc.. 
He mocks man's gift of reason, citing the ineffectualness of all the 
sciences to save man from death (chapter xxvi) and satirizing man's 
achievements (chapter xviii). He detracts from love, married life, 
and women in general (chapter xxvii). His last two speeches describe 
the vanity, meanness, evils and transience of earthly life as a whole: 
11. . . alles, das in der werlt ist, ist eintweder begerung des fleisch 
oder begerung der augen oder hochfart des lebens" (xxx,5-7). "Alles 
ist es ein eitekleit und ein serung der sele, vergenglichkeit, als 
der gestrig tag, der vergangen ist" (xxxii,34-35). According to Death 
man's lot is a truly wretched one: "0 die totliche menschheit ist 
stete in engsten, in trubsal, in leit, in besorgen, in forchten, in 
scheuhung, in weetagen, in siechtagen, in trauren, in betrubnuss, in 
jamer, in kumer und in mangerlei widerwertigkeit" (xxxii,37-40). 
Although Job too recognizes with his friends that man's life 
is "of few days and full of trouble" (14:1), agreeing with Eliphaz 
that ". . . man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward" (5:7), 
Job does not believe all of life to be vain. For Job there is value 
and integrity in man's life and his relationship to God. 
The Plowman likewise never seems convinced by Death's assertions 
that this life is all wretchedness and vanity. He defends the joy of 
a happy marriage and family life. Although God's judgment is accepted 
and in the prayer he formally relinquishes his beloved wife, finally 
commending her soul to the care of Jesus, yet he, as an earthbound 
creature, does not seem fully convinced that this is the best way 
things could have happened. He still grieves at her loss: "Mich reuet 
Margaret, mein auserweltes weib1' (xxxiv,69-70). But in spite of his 
intense grief, he manfully summons courage to affirm the deed against 
all his feelings of love and loyalty and his acute sense of loss: 
Gunne ir, genadenreicher herre!, in deiner allmechtigen und 
ewigen gotheit spiegel sich ewiglichen ersehen, beschauen und 
erfreuen, darinnen sich alle engelische kore erleuchten! 
Alles, das under des ewigen fanentragers fanen gehort, es 
sei welicherlei creature es sei, helft mir aus herzen grunde 
seliglich mit innigkeit sprechen: Amen! (xxxiv,70-75). 
It is in this final act of acceptance and affirmation of God's 
sovereignty, in spite of his human feelings, that the Plowman ranks 
with Job as one of the most beautiful and moving treatments of manrs 
attempt to face the absolute, ultimate reality. 
The Resolutions of the Disputes 
"We had a wager of sorts," said Satan. "It was some time ago. . . 
Did I lose or win? The issue was obscured by discussion." 
H. G. Wells, The Undying Fire53 
The Ackermann 
In both works God appears at the end and passes judgment on the 
suits of the two sides. But in both cases the verdict is far from 
clear. The question of the outcome of the dispute between the Plowman 
and Death has been the subject of varying interpretations. Opinions 
differ on how the debate is resolved and on whether the resolution 
represents orthodox, medieval views or calls such views into question. 
Among those who believe the conflict to be resolved in some way, most 
maintain that the ending is consistent with traditional medieval 
attitudes about death, Godfs nature and the world order. At least one 
critic, however, finds it to be decided in an entirely new and modern 
way. On the other side of the issue, among those who believe the 
conflict to be fundamentally unresolved, some find this lack of a 
solution to be typical of medieval thinking and unproblematical. Others 
believe the author to have been aware of the contradictory nature of 
the outcome. They see his recognition of the paradox and his attempt 
to come to terms with it as going beyond previously held attitudes and 
as evidence of the work's modern spirit. 
The terms medieval and Renaissance, though themselves much in 
doubt, will be retained in this discussion, partly for lack of better 
designations and partly because they are the terms used in many of the 
articles to be reviewed. It is assumed, however, that no hard and fast 
division between the periods is meant, and that these terms are to be 
considered in their historical context. 
Konrad Burdach and Walter Rehm, although disagreeing on who wins 
the debate, both see the work as more modern than those works which went 
before it. Both identify in the Plowman a representative of what they 
call the new humanism and find in the conflict a new spirit of self-
awareness. Burdach says of the Plowman: "Aus ihm spricht die religiose 
Weltgesinnung der jungen Renaissance: er ist im schonsten und reinsten 
Sinn ein Humanist."5^ Although, in Burdach's view, the Plowman formally 
loses the fight against Death, traditional medieval explanations are 
not sufficient to resolve the issues raised. 
Walter Rehm, on the other hand, proclaims the Plowman to be the 
real victor in the debate, in spite of God's verdict giving the victory 
to Death. Rehm writes: ". . . ausserlich zwar bleibt der Tod stets 
der Sieger, aber innerlich besiegt und uberwindet der Ackermann den 
Tod. . . . Der Ackermann vernichtet im Vertrauen auf den gottlichen 
Charakter des Lebens dessen Zerstorer und Verneiner, den Tod" (pp. 117, 
136). In Rehm's view the debate provides a modern answer to the 
problem of death. The Plowman defeats Death, man's enemy, though his 
faith in Christ's victory over it. Thus life and man's newly recognized 
right to life triumph over death. Rehm sees in the Plowman a forerunner 
of Luther in breaking down the supremacy of death, sin, and hell over 
life.55 Rehm seems not to be disturbed by the fact that Christ is 
spoken of only once in the debate, and nothing is said of His triumph 
over death. 
Other interpreters, in contrast, rather than finding in the 
debate a victory for life and an answer to death, believe the conflict 
to be undecided. Barbara Konneker states that the work ends in an open 
question.5^ Ernst Cassirer claims that no answers are given, " . . . 
the dialogue only presents us with the oppositions themselves, not 
with their solutions. There is, apparently, no decision in the battle 
between the peasant and death. 
The suggested lack of a resolution is regarded by some as medieval 
and by others as modern. Friedrich Ranke points to the late medieval 
tolerance for contradictions which were allowed to coexist without 
being resolved. Ranke speaks of "das Ja und das Nein," Giinther Miiller 
of "das Sowohl-Als auch [sic],'des' Mittelalters . . . jenes Sichtragen 
der Wirklichkeit durch Gegensatze, die abstrakt gesehen unvereinbar sind. 
Thus 110 definite answer to the questions would be necessary since 
". . . erst wenn beide Seiten gezeigt und genau ausgewogen sind, hat 
man die Wahrheit; denn die Wahrheit ist der ungeloste Gegensatz" 
(Ranke, p. 318). Such contradictions were not viewed as questionable 
at the time. 
Other interpreters, however, who agree that the conflict is 
undecided regard this lack of a resolution as problematical in the 
author's view and as evidence that earlier explanations were no longer 
satisfactory and no longer automatically accepted. They find in it a 
sign of the weakness of late medieval religious faith. Walter Blank 
explains that the debate illustrates that religious faith was no 
longer taken for granted, but had to be achieved through understanding 
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as an act of the will. This study supports the thesis that Tepl 
intended to question certain popular beliefs and that this need to 
examine accepted truths resembles Job's confrontation with a similar 
set of traditionally accepted doctrines. 
Gerhard Hahn suggests that the author believed that the issues 
could not be solved in this life and that the author's recourse is a 
recognition of the awesome incomprehensibility of God.^^ Hugo Kuhn 61 describes the conflict as not only unresolved but unresolvable. 
Spalding regards this awareness on the part of the author as a sign 
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of the work's modernity. 
On the other side of the controversy are those who view the 
debate and the issues as harmoniously resolved. Most believe the 
verdict and solution to be consistent with earlier medieval attitudes. 
According to Ella Schafferus, the Plowman concedes in the fight and 
falls back on God's mercy. He submits himself without question 
"klaglos and willenlos" to God?s verdict which is wise, just, and 
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altogether satisfactory. She, in contrast to Kuhn, stresses that 
there is no evidence of the deus absconditus of the Nominalists in 
the debate. God's power is not characterized by incomprehensibility 
but by mercy and justice (pp. 222-23). In her view the questionings in 
t*ie Ackermann do not go beyond, and are consistent with, the view 
accepted in traditional church doctrine. Hubner likewise argues, "der 
Schiedspruch Gottes, . . . konnte nicht christlich-mittelalterlicher sein, 
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als er ist." In content the work is strictly consistent with medieval 
traditions. It is the form, "die neue Latinitat," which is innovative 
(p. 384-85). 
In addition to the question of how God's verdict decides the 
issues argued there are differences of opinion over who actually wins 
the debate proper. Some interpreters accept God's verdict that Death 
is the winner in the debate literally. Ren^e Brand, whose important 
work strongly influenced Ackermann interpretation, maintains that the 
sympathies of the author lie of the side of Death and are represented 
by Death's arguments.^5 The debate is a process of education for the 
Plowman who learns to accept the "Existenzberechtigung des Todes 
neben dem Leben" and who, in accepting the necessity of death, becomes 
reconciled to the divine harmony (p. 22). According to Brand's inter-
pretation, Death's arguments and those of God are the same: "Es wird 
. . . deutlich, wie sehr im Grunde die Argumente Gottes und die des 
Todes identisch sind" (p. 43). Death convinces the Plowman that he 
should not grieve for his wife: "Er hat bewiesen, dass nicht nur kein 
Grund zur Klage und Anklage vorhanden ist, sondern nicht einmal zum 
Schmerz" (p. 45). Franz Bauml agrees with Brand's bold intrepretation, 
giving the victory to Death on the grounds that Death succeeds in 
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invalidating the Plowman's initial accusation. Like Brand, Bauml 
argues that the standpoint of the author is to be identified with 
that of Death (p. 118). In all of these interpretations much depends 
on how the Plowman reacts to Death's arguments and whether or not he 
is convinced by them as some suggest. The attitude expressed in the 
work can only be determined by an examination of the speeches of the 
participants and the words of the closing prayer. The following 
section will review the Plowman's speeches to determine whether, in 
fact, it can be maintained that he actually capitulates to Death in 
the course of the debate. 
The question of the outcome of the contest necessarily leads to 
the question whether or not the final prayer is to be regarded as an 
integral part of the process and spoken by the Plowman, or as an 
epilogue spoken by the author. Burdach, DeBoor, Deinert, Spalding and 
others believe that the Plowman is speaking.^ Brand, Weber, and 
68 
Krogmann suggest that it is not the Plowman but the author speaking. 
Hahn is uncertain, saying: "Spricht der Ackermann oder spricht der 
Dichter nun direkt?"69 
Let us look briefly at some of the reasons for proposing that the 
prayer is the Plowman's reply to God's judgment. In Tepl's letter of 
introduction, which accompanied the copy of the Ackermann sent to his 
friend Peter Rothirsch, Tepl states that the plaintiff begins the 
argument and becomes mollified: "arenga invehitur et demollitur. 
Blaschka translates the passage: "der Wortfuhrer beginnt den Streit 
und wird beschwichtigt."71 Heilig renders it: . . mit der Arenga 
wird Zeter geschrien und versohnt" (p. 141). Walshe's version states 
72 that "the spokesman inveighs and is brought to yielding." The verb 
demollire, [which is defined to mean "to completely soften" (vollig 
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erweichen, ) ] would seem to indicate that a significant change does 
take place in the Plowman's outlook. But the question remains, when 
does this occur? During the debate or as a result of God's appearance 
and verdict? If it can be shown that the Plowman is not convinced by 
Death's arguments but rather by God's intervention and judgment in the 
matter, then the final prayer may possibly be viewed as spoken by the 
Plowman, since it does show a real change of attitude.. 
In the tradition of the medieval Streitgesprach it was customary 
that an argument be decided not by the capitulation of one side or the 
other in the debate, but by the verdict of an independent third party 
at the end. The judge was often God or a personified figure such as 
"reason." Only rarely did one party defeat the other before the end 
of the debate, and then it was usually only in the case of a contest 
between Christian and heathen in which the heathen would suddenly repent. 
Indeed, it would seem important to the structure of the debate 
that Death does not win the contest outright, but rather that God 
decides it. For if Death were to refute the Plowman's arguments him-
self, then God's appearance and decision in the matter become super-
fluous. But, if the conflict is not decided, God's role becomes the 
decisive factor in the debate as it is in the Jobean conflict. It is 
inconceivable that Job would have conceded to his counselors* We will 
return to this question after first considering whether or not it can be 
maintained that Death convinces the Plowman of his case in the course 
of the debate proper. 
Renee Brand and Franz Bauml are the strongest advocates of the 
opinion that the Plowman undergoes a fundamental change during the 
debate. Brand believes that Death necessarily must invalidate the 
Plowman's arguments in order for God to pronounce Death the victor in 
the debate: "Damit Gott zu dem Schiedspruch gelangen kann: . . . muss 
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derTod die ungeheure Anklage vorher von innen entkraftet haben." 
Bauml too finds that Death succeeds in "invalidating the Ploughman's 
initial accusation and the complex of motivations upon which it was 
b a s e d . H e explains Death's victory as "his successful transforma-
tion of the Ploughman from accuser to supplicant" (p. 113). 
In Brand's view the Plowman betrays a certain ambivalence about 
the justness of his suit from the beginning, which comes more pro-
nounced until Death succeeds in convincing the Plowman of the 
necessity for his existence in the world order and the foolishness 
of rebellion against it. 
Contrary to assertions that death is the victor in the debate, 
I hope to show, through an analysis of the strategies and attitudes of 
the opponents, that Tepl intended the debate to end in a draw. The 
work is constructed as a mosaic of contradictions, oppositions, and 
juxtapositions which reflect the author's wrestling with the meaning 
of death—the contradiction of life—and with death's relationship to 
God, who is the common denominator of both death and life. Like Job, 
the Plowman tries to grasp God's relationship to the evil he has 
experienced in the death of his wife and tries to come to terms with 
the contradictions he senses. How can God allow such an outrage? 
Why does He tolerate such an evil servant? That the work is intimately 
concerned with the working out of a view of God is evidenced by the 
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extended description and explanation of God's nature in the final 
prayer. 
In addition to the central issue of the Plowman's opposition to 
Death's function and to his very existence, there are juxtapositions 
large and small surrounding and reflecting the central issue at every 
turn. They form a mosaic of small oppositions and comprise a carefully 
maintained equilibrium between the contestants, which survives in 
spite of the shifting offensives and varying approaches of the 
combatants. 
Tepl's fondness for contrasts as a stylistic device is illustrated 
by the first line of his letter to Peter Rothirsch in which Tepl 
writes: "Grato gratus, suo suus, socio socius, Petro de.Tepla 
Johannes de Telpa."77 Heilig's translation preserves these oppositions: 
f,Dem liebwerten versichert der liebwerte, dem ergebenen der ergegene, 
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dem Genossen der Genosse, dem Peter von Tepl der Johannes von Tepl." 
Describing his technique in composing the Ackermann Tepl emphasizes his 
use of contrasting elements saying: 
Hier wird ein langes Thema kurz, ein kurzes lang abgehandelt, 
hier bilden Lob und Tadel der Dinge, ja oft eines und 
desselben Dinges den Inhalt. Genauer Ausdruck findet sich 
neben ungenauem, bald steht der gleiche Name fur 
verschiedene Sachen, bald verschiedene Namen fur die 
gleiche Sache.n79 
He points as well to the contrasting interplay of irony and seriousness: 
80 nhier treiben auf demselben Flecke Scherz und Ernst ihr Wechselspiel.11 
To this description of his method Tepl adds playfully: "sie alle soil 
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der aufmerksame Horer herausfinden." If we are to take Tepl's hint 
seriously we should not be surprised to find numerous such contrasts 
and oppositions not only between the arguments of the opponents but within 
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the individual speeches themselves* The author characterizes both of 
his contestants as holding views which are partially wrong and partially 
right. The opponents openly accuse one another of placing false 
statements next to true ones, of mixing truth with falsehood. The 
Plowman charges Death six times with using just such contradictory talk, 
saying for example in chapter xi: "Gaukelweise treibt ir mir vor, 
under warheit falsch mischt ir mir ein" (3-4) and in chapter xv: "Susse 
und sauer, linde und hert, gutig und scharpf pflegt ir euch zu beweisen" 
(2-3). 
Both contestants change strategies and approaches during the contro-
versy. First the Plowman accuses Death of trying to distract or trick 
him out of mourning his wife. A few speeches later we find him asking 
how to drive grief out of his heart. Then in his next speech he again 
reverses his position, crying that he will never stop grieving for his 
wife. Death, who is drawn into the argument by the Plowmanfs outraged 
curses and accusations, at first behaves calmly in a condescending, 
almost bemused manner, but soon he too becomes angry and joins the 
Plowman in hurling insults. During the course of the conflict he shifts 
from defending himself to attacking his opponent and life which the 
Plowman represents. The Plowman, who begins with harsh imprecations 
in a fierce attach on Death, is forced by Death to shift to defending 
himself and the value of life. In their final speeches both abruptly 
return to the stance held at the beginning of the debate* The combatants 
exchange roles, becoming alternately calm and angry, each admonishing 
the other to remain calm and exercise more restraint. The author 
juxtaposes human and inhuman perspectives, reason and emotion, 
practicality and idealism, stoicism and passionate involvement, as well 
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as praise and blame of women, marriage, the human body, and man's 
reason. 
The author characterizes the Plowman's point of view as naive and 
Death's attitude as contradictory, containing elements of both the 
orthodox Christian and the Totentanz ways of depicting Death. It is 
the contradictions within, rather than between, the arguments of the 
opponents which reveal the inadequacies of their views. Both positions, 
which represent popularly accepted beliefs, are shown to be wrong and 
are replaced at the end by a more mature and complete concept of God 
and His relationship to the world order. Tepl's depiction of the 
naivete of some popular thinking about death, his attempt to deal with 
the problem of evil as a real problem, and his unintimidated attitude 
toward the figure of death mark his work as going beyond previous 
treatments of the subject. 
Chapter I 
The Ackermann debate lacks the kind of scene-setting frame for 
which the prologue in heaven of the book of Job is the prototype, In^ 
stead it begins with the dialogue itself and, as in the book of Job, 
with an urgent expression of the protagonist's anguish. The Plowman's 
first outcry attacking Death could scarcely be framed in stronger 
terms: "Grimmiger vertilger aller leut, schedlicher durchechter 
aller werlt, freissamer morder aller menschen, her Tot, euch sei 
verflucht!11 (1-2). His cursing of Death, accusations that he is a 
terrible murderer, and demands that Death be banned from God's creation, 
express the Plowman's outrage and confidence in his cause. There is 
no evidence of any ambivalence about the justness of his suit. The 
ambivalence is rather of another sort. From the very first the lines 
of the principal contradiction with which the Plowman has to deal are 
already drawn. He calls on God to join him in cursing this murderer, 
whom, he also acknowledges, God Himself has created. He cries: f!Got, 
euer tirmer, hasse euch" (3). On the one hand the Plowman tries to 
separate Death from God and to avoid implicating God in Death's evil 
doings, while on the other he recognizes, but can scarcely grasp, God's 
ultimate responsibility in the matter. Death is called "Unverschamter 
bo'sewicht" (14), the opponent of God and creation. God, man, and all 
of creation are placed on one side and opposed by Death on the other. 
In contrast to the Plowman, it is precisely because Job recognizes his 
suffering to be directly overseen by God and directly related to his 
control of the universe that his dilemma arises. 
There is in this first speech a conscious effort to create 
suspense. Tepl does not explain who has been murdered or the circum-
stances of the suit, but leaves the reader to wonder what may be the 
specific cause of the accuser's outrage. 
Chapter II 
To the Plowman's wildly agitated state of mind Tepl juxtaposes 
the cool, composed bearing of Death who answers in a bemused, somewhat 
sarcastic manner: "Horet, horet, horet neue wunder! Grausame und 
ungehorte teidinge fechten uns an" (1-2), He is an avuncular, almost 
fatherly figure who reacts in a calm, amicable fashion, calling his 
opponent "son" and asking what is wrong: "Dannoch, sun, wer du bist, 
so melde dich und lautmere, was dir leides von*uns widerfaren sei" (4-6), 
Death is proud of his office and cautions the Plowman not to be over 
hasty in judging him. He is supremely confident of the Tightness of 
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his actions and seems surprised at the Plowman's complaint. His restraint 
at this point contrasts sharply with his later agitation. While he here 
counsels temperance, later it is the Plowman who does so, reversing the 
present roles. 
Chapter III 
Now the plaintiff introduces himself, not directly, but by means 
of a riddle: "Ich bins genant ein ackerman, von vogelwat ist mein 
pflugtf (1). He continues the riddle, giving the reason for his complaint: 
"Gehessig, widerwertig und widerstrebend sol ich euch immer wesen: 
warm ir habt mir den zwelften buchstaben, meiner freuden hort, aus dem 
alphabet gar freissamlich enziicket" (2-5) . The Plowman does not come 
straight out with the information that it is his wife whom Death has 
taken, but supplies a few more pieces to the puzzle by referring to her 
as "meine lichte sumerblumen, meiner wiinnen nar, . . . mein auserwelte 
turteltauben, meiner selden haft" (5-7), 
After berating Death in his opening speech as the cause of 
universal misery, he begins to curse Death as the cause of his personal 
misery, contrasting in the sharpest terms his former happiness and his 
present wretchedness. In typically contradictory fashion the Plowman 
demands restitution for a loss which, he repeatedly asserts, cannot 
ever be made good. It is not really compensation for what he has lost 
that he wishes, however, but revenge or at least understanding of 
this evil. 
Brand's assertion that the Plowman has doubts about his case 
from the start is based on his comment to Death: "Weget es selber, ob 
ich icht billich ziirne, wute und klage" (8-9), Brand calls it "ein, 
wenn, auch verdeckter, Zweifel an der Gerechtigkeit der eigenen Sache."®^ 
One may, however, question whether asking his opponent to consider if 
he has just reason to lament necessarily indicates doubt. Or whether 
it might not instead be interpreted as evidence of how certain the 
Plowman is of his position, particularly in view of his other unequivocal 
assertions that he is in the right and his appeals to God to restore 
this right. Job too questions his friends rhetorically whether he is 
not correct. But the question is an expression of his certainty about 
his integrity and an attempt to convince his opponents of his case 
(24:25). The ambivalence Brand detects is not about the justness of 
his suit, of which he is perfectly confident, but about God's role in 
allowing this outrage. 
Chapter IV 
Death again takes up the motif of the riddle which the Plowman 
began and names the city in which Margaret lived: 
in einer festen hubschen stat auf einera berg werlich 
gelegen; der haben vier buchstaben: der achzehend, der 
erst, der drit und der drei und zweinzigist in dem 
alphabet einen namen geflochten. Da haben wir mit 
einer erbern seligen tochter unser genade gewurket; ir 
buchstabe was der zwelfte. 
(5-9) 
Ironically, we learn more objectively about the Plowman's wife from 
Death than we do from the Plowman himself. It is Death who tells us 
the name of the city in which she lived and the exact date of her death. 
Death's attitude thus far is generous; he praises Margaret's exceptional 
virtue in a manner similar to God's praise of Job in the prologue. Like 
Job, she was a blameless and upright person—from the Plowman's point 
of view a clear case of virtue unrewarded. 
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Death again stresses the unusualness of this attack on him: "Wunder 
nimt mich solicher ungehorter anfechtung, die uns nie mer hat begegent" 
(1-2). Although, as mentioned earlier, cursing of death was not 
unusual, the author here himself acknowledges that the audacity and 
violence of the Plowman's attack are something exceptional in tradi-
tional laments over death. 
Chapter V 
The Plowman, now more downcast than ever, recapitulates in wide 
ranging variations the magnitude of his loss. He calls his wife: 
". . . mein frideschilt fur ungemach; . . . mein warsagende wunschelrute! 
. . . mein lichter stern an dem himel, . . . meines heiles sunne: . . . 
mein lichtbrehender morgenstern, . . . mein herter, steter diemant . . . 
mein rechte furender leitstab . . . meines heiles verneuendem jung-
brunnen." At this point his mood has not progressed beyond a distraught 
expression of anger and despair. He seems to be marking time in his 
thoughts. Blindly he returns to cursing Death in the strongest of 
terms and again calls on God to destroy evil Death. 
The first actual turning point in the Plowman's attitude, claimed 
by Brand, occurs in this chapter with the Plowman's use of the words 
"Ja, herre, ich was ir friedel . . ."in his answer to Death's question 
about the identity of his wife. This response is regarded by Brand as 
the first turn toward moderation: "den ersten Wendepunkt von der 
wutenden Anklage zur Selbstbesinnung und zur Massigung dem Tod 
gegenuber. 
It is true that the phrase "Ja, herre," is more polite than the 
epithets the Plowman has previously addressed to Death. But it actually 
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represents little more than an acknowledgment of Death's power, which the 
Plowman has recognized from the beginning, and not a real change of heart, 
since the Plowman immediately returns to his cry of "Zeter! Wafen!" (11) 
and curses Death as harshly as ever: "Lastermeiliger, schandengiriger, 
wirdenloser und grisgramiger geselle, sterbet und in der helle erstinket! 
Got beraube euch euer macht und lasse euch zu pulver zerstieben!" (17-20). 
Bauml, who agrees with Brand in most points, does not cite this as a 
turning point. 
Chapter VI 
Death now begins to actively defend himself, attempting to prove 
the justice of his actions. He resorts to sarcasm and insults the 
Plowman for the first time, calling him "knecht" and "von Poppenfels." 
He presents in its first variation the argument which he uses over and 
over again to justify his function, the claim of his impartiality and 
universality. In Death's terms impartiality equals justice. He is 
proud of the fact that there are no exceptions, extenuating circum-
stances, or special cases: " . . . niemands adels schonen, grosser 
kunst nicht achten, keinerlei schone nicht ansehen, gabe, liebe, leit, 
alter, jugent und allerlei sachen nicht wegen wir" (7-9). 
Death is pleased with his office. He arrogantly stresses his 
superiority even over the Pope. Trying to intimidate the Plowman, 
Death emphasizes the hopelessness of the Plowman's situation against 
his office before which even kings and popes tremble. 
Chapter VII 
The Plowman counters with the assertion that, however correct 
Death may feel in his actions, he, the Plowman, too is justified in 
bringing his complaint. He bases this justification on his human nature. 
Indeed he would not be human if he did not mourn his loss: ". . . 
unmenschlichen tete ich, wo ich solich l&'bliche gabe, die niemant 
dann got allein geben mag, nicht beweinetTT (4-5) . Here Tepl introduces 
another of the oppositions which contribute to the dynamics of the 
debate—the contrast between human and inhuman perspectives. The Plowman 
obeys the dictates of his human nature, an impulse which inhuman and 
pitiless Deatft cannot understand. Like the Plowman, Job feels justified 
in complaining since he views his human condition as a direct result 
of God's interest in man as his creator and the relationship of mutual 
responsibility for integrity which exists between them. The Plowman's 
idea of what it means to be human is also based on his concept of man's 
relationship to God as the beloved creature of a loving creator. He 
thinks of his wife as God's gift to him. How could God have destroyed 
her? Here the paradox of God's nature as creator and destroyer, which 
plagues both Job and the Plowman, is hinted at for the first time. 
In this chapter Brand points to the Plowman's use of the words 
MBillichen klage ichtf and "herre Tot, ir wisset es selber" again as 
evidence of the Plowman's ambivalence: "einerseits Anklage und 
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nebenherlaufend die Ruckfrage: Habe ich wirklich recht?" This is 
interpreted as an attempt on the part of the Plowman at conciliation 
or at least to convince Death amicably: 
Hier hingegen wendet sich der Klager an den Angeklagten 
und will ihn gutlich uberzeugen. Dieser Appell an das 
Mitgefuhl des Todes ist als eine Geste der Vermittlung, 
als ein unmissverstandlicher Hinweis auf eine sich 
langsam anbahnende Verstandigung auszulegen (p. 26). 
The tone of the rest of the chapter, however, far outweighs any hints 
at an amicable understanding. The Plowman vows: "Ich wil keren von 
euch, von euch nichts gutes sagen, mit allem meinem vermugen wil ich 
euch ewiglich widerstreben" (14-16). 
Brand is correct in pointing out that the Plowman at times seems 
to adopt a conciliatory tone in arguing with Death. But it is possible 
to read too much into these swings of attitude which are usually 
followed by a swing in the opposite direction and renewed opposition. 
They reflect a tendency of the plaintiff to try out different poses 
and approaches in his argumentation, rather than a consistent trend 
toward mollification. Just as the author enjoys adopting and mimicking 
different prose styles, he also relishes the juxtaposition of contrasting 
ideas and attitudes. He attempts to make the contest more dramatic 
by introducing a certain give and take between the opponents, who 
alternately attack each other and are forced to defend their positions. 
Chapter VIII 
Death1s response is still dispassionate, cool, and logical in 
keeping with the lack of human feelings which he exemplifies. He calls 
on the Plowman to be reasonable, emphasizing that God has created his 
office for the reason of controlling overpopulation and maintaining 
order. He coldly pictures himself as a necessary evil. If it were 
not for him every living thing would devour the other. He seems to 
ignore the fact that living things do continually devour each other 
and Death does not prevent that evil. 
Chapter IX 
To Death's detached and logical argument the author juxtaposes 
the Plowman's first person perspective. Death's explanation that he is 
necessary to prevent overpopulation is totally ignored by the Plowman 
who continues to lament more than ever. His thoughts do not escape from 
his first person point of view: "Unwiderbringlichen mein hochsten hort 
han ich verloren. . . . *Traurig und jamerig muss ich bi$ auf mein ende 
harren. . . . Enteigent habt ir mich. . . . Micheler eren het ich" 
(1,2-3,4-5,6). Whereas Death introduces various lines of thought in 
regard to the fact of the woman1 s death, the Plowman keeps coming back 
to the same point, repeating over and over what he has said before. 
Death's arguments merely seem to bounce off, failing to penetrate 
behind the Plowman's wall of grief. It is the very unresponsiveness of 
the Plowman, his refusal to listen and respond to Death's arguments, 
which the author uses to draw Death further and further into the 
argument, causing him to become more and more angry and insulting 
his opponent in ever stronger terms. 
The Plowman again emphasizes Death's lack of a human perspective, 
attacking him with the comment that Death has never known the joy of 
an excellent mate: "Was weiss davon ein tunnner man, der aus disem 
jungbrunnen nie hat getrunken?" (20-21). The Plowman praises the 
merits of possessing a worthy spouse and speaks here, as nowhere else 
in the debate, directly to the reader, saying; "Freue dich, ersamer 
man, reines weibes, freue dich, reines weib, ersames mannes! Got gebe 
euch beiden freude!" (18-20). With this the Plowman includes the 
reader on his side. This would seem to argue against the assertion 
that the author identifies with Death, since at no time does Death 
speak directly to the reader in the way that the Plowman does. 
God should appreciate the Plowman's plight since it was He who 
gave the Plowman the gift of his wife. God certainly could not have 
taken it away. There was no reason to. On the contrary, God must 
surely be outraged by this theft. The Plowman calls on God to hate 
Death, destroyer of good marriages: "Euch, boser Tot, aller leut feint, 
sei Got ewiglich gehessig!" (24). This chapter appears to pose a 
puzzling contradiction to God's reprimand in chapter xxxiii accusing 
the Plowman of failing to recognize that the Plowman's wife belonged not 
to him but to God. That accusation is contradicted here by the Plowman's 
clear acknowledgment that she was God's gift: "Allein mir twenglich 
herzenleit ist geschehen, dannoch danke ich got inniglich, das ich die 
unverruckten tochter han erkant" (21-23). It is, however, not the 
lack of gratitude but primarily the naivete of the Plowman's view of 
God, seeing only the one aspect of His role, which is in error. Job 
in contrast, states: "[T]he Lord gave and the Lord has taken away" (1:20). 
There is nothing in chapter ix to indicate that the Plowman is 
being softened by Death's arguments. The reverse is, in fact, more 
nearly true. The Plowman renews his demands for revenge: "Der milte 
got, der mechtige herre, gereche mich an euch, arger traurenmacher!" 
(3-4). 
Chapter X 
While Death may not have drunk of the fountain of human experience, 
as the Plowman claims, his opponent certainly hasn't drunk of the 
fountain of wisdom. Death, gradually becoming more and more annoyed, 
insults the Plowman, calling him an ignorant puppy: "Du hast niclit 
aus der weisheit brunnen getrunken: das bruf ich an deinen worten wol. 
In der natur wurken hastu nicht gesehen . . . ein unverstendig welf 
bistu!" (1-4). Nevertheless Death continues to try new arguments, 
hoping to get a response to his line of reasoning from the Plowman. 
Instead of his impartiality he now emphasizes his universality. He 
attempts to minimize the Plowman's cause for complaint by showing that 
even the most immovable rocks, lofty trees, mighty lions, powerful 
champions, great and learned men are subject to the laws of mutability 
and death. All are changed from being to non-being. Such is the lax* 
of the earth. Why should his wife be an exception? Greater beings 
than she must perish. 
The argument of universality and necessity does little to assuage 
the Plowman's grief. Rather, as for Job, the pervasiveness of evil 
only makes God's government of the world order more suspect. 
Death now tries to intimidate the Plowman, reminding him that 
even he will not escape: "Du selber wirdest uns nicht entweichen" 
(17-18). 
Chapter XI 
The Plowman is not intimidated by Death's grim reminder. He 
reacts without fear, confident that God will protect and avenge him: 
"Got, der mein und euer gewaltig ist, getraue ich wol, er werde mich 
vor euch beschirmen und umb die vor gewiirkten ubeltat, die ir an mir 
habt begangen, strenglich an euch gerechen" (1-3). He seems unaware 
of the contradictory implications of his own words. On the one hand 
he asserts that God was his excellent wife's protector and showed 
mercy to him for her sake, but he does not question why God allowed 
Death to take her if He is in control. Rather than facing the question 
he reverts to intoning his wife's virtues. Whereas in the two 
previous speeches the Plowman described her good character, noble 
birth, and the regard in which she was held by the community, this time 
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he remembers the way she cared for him. 
Two contrasting approaches which we see in the Plowman's behavior 
are his present accusation that Death is trying to make him forget his 
grief which he holds to be a point of honor, and his later request for 
advice on how to forget his sorrow (ch. xxi) . That advice is subse-
quently rejected (ch. xxiii) and the Plowman swears again never to let 
go of his wife's memory but to keep it as his guiding principle. His 
ultimate decision to relinquish his claim to her and to affirm the 
state she is now in, comes only at the very last, after God's verdict. 
Both Brand and Bauml view this chapter as representing a new 
phase in the argument, a reversal of the Plowman's original attacking 
position and a transition to a defensive stance in which he stresses his 
right to grieve. To say, however, that from this point on the transition 
from offense to defense is maintained, is contradicted by the fact that 
two speeches later the Plowman makes his most explicit attack on Death, 
directly demanding his destruction. 
In this chapter (xi) the Plowman expresses how little convinced 
he is by Death's arguments, accusing him of contradictory and deceptive 
doubletalk: "Gaukelweise treibt ir mir vor, under warheit falsch 
mischt ir mir ein" (3-4) . He voices his confidence that God will 
vindicate him and again ends with inflamatory cursing: "Ach, ach, 
ach! unverschamter morder, her Tot, boser lasterbalg!,f (22). Such name 
calling and the fearless assertion that God will protect him are further 
evidence of the vastly different attitude from such earlier dialogs 
with Death as the Dialogus Mortis cum Homine and the Legende von der 
Todes-Vision des Magister Polycarp which typically address Death with 
fear and trembling. 
Chapter XII 
Seeing that his argument of universality will not distract the 
Plowman from thoughts of his wife, Death tries to divert him with 
thoughts of finding another wife, but admonishes him this time not to 
love too dearly; for the more one loves the more one suffers. At this 
point Death offers his first piece of advice, albeit unsolicited. The 
advice is typical of his coldly practical point of view. Death deduces 
logically that the Plowman either found his first wife virtuous or he 
made her so. Therefore he can either search out another good woman 
or train one. His emphasis thoughout is on man's present situation, 
given the fact of death. What does one do since everything that is 
artful, noble, honorable, brave, and worthy is bound to be destroyed 
anyway? His advice is stoical, but his attitude borders on the 
nihilistic in its stress on the destruction of all things animate and 
inanimate. 
Death offers more advice. The Plowman should have avoided love 
in the first place. Even how he can minimize his pain by simply 
deciding to abstain from such emotions as joy and grief. Here the 
author introduces another important opposition—the conflict between 
apathy (the Greek apatheia) and involvement, the choice between tran-
quility or equanimity on the one hand and joy alternating with pain 
on the other. 
That Death is patently wrong in his counsel that love is to be 
avoided is shown by God's acknowledgment in the verdict that the 
Plowman's suffering (leit) is a worthy cause for the conflict. It is 
the Plowman's sorrow which provokes the contest and Death is forced to 
speak the truth as a result. 
The adage that love and sorrow are inevitably related was a 
commonplace of medieval literature. The more one loves, the more one 
suffers. Suffering was accepted as the price to be paid for the joys 
of love. In a courtly society in which minne and minnedienst were an 
essential part of the practice of knighthood, knowledge of the hazards 
of love did not lead to the conclusion that one should avoid love. 
On the contrary, the aspirant was thought to be ennobled by his 
suffering. The sign of great love was great sorrow. Oswald says: 
MIch sprich es wol auf meinen aid, / ie grosser lieb, ie merer laid / 
kompt von den schonen frauen" (9:39-41).^ Veldeke proclaims "di 
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minne maket reinen mut" (62,2). The implication is that, although 
such pain can be avoided, the lover, knowing the cost, is elevated and 
refined by his suffering in the service of love, a sentiment which 
the Plowman himself later voices. 
Chapter XIII 
Again Death has failed to draw the Plowman's attention away from 
the central fact of his loss. The length of the Plowman's persistence 
in repeating his lament in all its variations shows the depth of his 
grief. It is here particularly poignant and effectively depicted 
through Tepl's piling up of assonances to express the excruciating 
sense of loss: !1Ellende, allein und leides vol beleibe ich" (14). 
Death does not succeed in drawing the Plowman's attention onto a 
different line of thought until chapter xv. 
The Plowman regards the suggestion that he find a new mate but 
avoid love as absurd and impossible. It seems to him an impracticable 
philosophical argument. The Plowman opposes philosophizing with 
common sense, dry logic with bitter experience. He states that he has 
not studied under esoteric and clever teachers as Death apparently has. 
On the contrary, he knows only one thing—and this very clearly—his 
pain and its source. Death may theorize, but, not having experienced 
either such love or such grief, he is not qualified to judge it or to 
make prescriptions. Death is an unfeeling destroyer of marriages and 
families, one who leaves children orphaned. Can that be intelligent? 
In this chapter the proposed transformation from attacker to 
supplicant is not advanced. The Plowman aggressively continues to 
insult Death and sarcastically suggests that no one could expect 
restitution from such a dishonorable character: ,fWie ist dem, her Tot, 
aller leut eren brecher? An euch kan niemant ichts gutes verdienen 
noch find en; nach untat wellet ir niemant genug tun; niemant wellet 
ir ergetzen" (17-18). 
The Plowman shows little sign of weakening or of being convinced 
that Death was justified in taking his wife. Instead he issues an 
ironic curse: ?fSoliche guttet, . . . soliche genade, . . . solichen 
Ion, so ir den leuten gebt; solich ende, so ir den leuten tut—schicke 
euch, der des todes und lebens gewaltig sei!TI (20-24). This represents 
a sarcastic rejection of Death's reference to taking the Plowman's 
wife as an act of favor, which he calls "unser genade11 (iv,8-9). The 
Plowman again ends by calling on God to avenge him on the "erzschalk 
Tot!" (27). 
The Plowman's confusion is again apparent. Although he has 
previously said that God is not the cause of his suffering, he indirectly 
implicates Him with the words: "als lang got wil, muss ich es von euch 
leiden" (3-4) and at the same time calls on God to punish Death. 
Chapter XIV 
Death answers with restraint that such angry talk is likely to 
arouse his enmity but continues to exercise control. He now takes up 
the Plowman's challenge, taking seriously the statement that he should 
receive just such justice as he gives. He proceeds to defend his 
actions with an abrupt about-face in tactics. He turns the tables on 
the Plowman, admitting that he did the deed, but reversing the Plowman 
argument by denying that it was an evil deed. He contradicts the 
basic premise of the Plowman's suit, arguing that what he did was 
actually good and trying to show the Plowman that his wife's fate 
was not an evil. He quotes the authority of "the philosophers" who 
say that the best time to die is when one most desires to live: "Das 
haben gelobt, das haben begert die philosophen, wann sie sprechen, 
am besten zu sterben, wann am besten liebet zu leben. Er ist nicht 
wol gestorben, der dor sterben hat begert; ee hat zu lange gelebt, 
wer uns umb sterben hat angeruft" (9-13). 
Having allowed himself to become angry, Death regains his com-
posure and, in this chapter assumes the role of a magnamimous bene-
factor. In keeping with his affirmation of the goodness of his 
function, he graciously concedes—in spite of some slight irritation 
at the Plowman's behavior—that the Plowman's soul shall join that of 
his wife in the blessings of the hereafter. Death is able to exercise 
such restraint and even generosity because he is supremely confident 
of his power: "Als wenig du kanst der sunnen ir licht, . . . als 
wenig magstu uns unser macht berauben!" (25-28), While it is Death 
who here sets himself up as an example of tolerant behavior for the 
Plowman, the attentive reader will note that the Plowman in a later 
chapter plays this same role to contrast with Death's angry outbursts. 
As earlier in the debate, Death is the one who gives us the 
objective information about the Plowman's wife. In this speech he 
reveals the exact year of her death as calculated in two ways. 
It is perhaps this unexpected pose of magnanimity which finally 
causes the Plowman in his next speech for the first time to cease 
marking time in his thoughts and to begin to rationally consider Death's 
nature. Death's assertion that he is a good presents a puzzling new 
facet to the Plowman's picture of his opponent. It represents the high 
point of Death's conciliatory overtures. 
Chapter XV 
Representing as it does the approximate middle of the Plowman's 
speeches in the debate, chapter xv is held by some to be a pivotal 
chapter in the progress of the argument. Bauml states: 
Chapter xv marks a turning point in the relationship of 
the two disputants: the motif 'accusation* which forms 
the basis of the development of the dispute through 
chapter xv loses its significance as principal impetus 
to the development of the second half of the dispute. 
The relationship that emerges is no longer that of 
accuser and accused, but rather one of mentor and 
supplicant for advice.87 
It is true that this chapter marks a new phase in the debate. The 
Plowman now finally breaks away from the variations on the theme of 
his lament with which he has concerned himself and begins to argue 
systematically with his opponent and to critically examine the 
relationship between Death and God. Instead of a repetition of the 
cursing and expressions of grief of the earlier chapters, the Plowman 
for the first time questions his opponent directly. It is not, 
however, done in an attitude of supplication, but is a challenge to 
Death to explain who he is that he has the right to take the Plowman's 
wife: "Darumb weste ich geren, wer ir weret, was ir weret, wo ir 
weret, von wann ir weret und warzu ir tuchtig weret, das ir also vil 
gewaltes habet und on entsagen mich also ubel gefodert" (10-13). 
The Plowman accuses Death of trying to deceive him with contra-
dictory talk making reference to the devious juxtapositions in Death's 
arguments: "Susse und sauer, linde und hert, gutig und scharpf pflegt 
ir euch zu beweisen, den, die ir meint zu betreigen" (2-4) . If this 
chapter represents a change from accuser to supplicant, it seems 
peculiar that here we also have one of the Plowman's strongest indict-
ments of his opponent since the opening, his direct demand that God 
destroy Death who is His enemy and subverts the order of His creation: 
f'Gib, herre, plage, tu *verkurzung, leg an klemmnuss und vertilge 
den greulichen Tot, der dein und aller unser feint ist!" (16-18). 
This would hardly seem to be a step toward acceptance of Death's 
necessary role in God's world order. On the contrary, this chapter, 
along with chapters i, xxi, and xxxi, contains the Plowman's strongest 
indictment and rejection of Death. 
However much Death may seek to excuse his action by calling it 
good, the Plowman does not accept the explanation. He knows that he 
personally has experienced a terrible event. The argument now turns 
to the question of the source of this evil. The Plowman identifies two 
possible sources—God and Death. Although he refuses to attribute 
any responsibility to God for it, he recognizes that GodTs relationship 
to the problem has to be defined. His reason for excluding God 
from blame is the very unfairness of his wife's early death. Unlike 
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Job, he cannot attribute this injustice to God. According to his 
thinking, his wife was of such spotless virtue that she could only 
have been stricken because of someone else's sins—the Plowman's. 
God could not be responsible for this, because He would either have 
punished the evildoer himself—not the innocent party—or would have 
forgiven him: "So bin ich von got nicht also geplaget: wann hette 
ich *mich *verwurket gen got—als leider oft geschehen ist—das hett 
er an mir gerochen oder es hette mir widerbracht die Wandelson. Ir 
seit der tlbelteter!" (7-10). Because, as a rule, deaths are 
obviously unrelated to the virtue of the victims, God cannot be 
responsible. Again the Plowman is confused in expecting there to be 
a link between virtue and long life. If death were caused by an 
individual's specific lack of virtue his wife might never die. Death 
is caused by original sin, but the mechanism of random choice by which 
it functions is mysterious. The Plowman's confusion points up the 
problem, about which Job also agonizes—the inequity in the fates of 
the good and the wicked. Whereas Death emphasizes the fairness of 
the inescapability of death for all classes of men, the Plowman stresses 
the reverse situation—the case of the early deaths of the virtuous. 
Both are aspects of the enigmatic impartial workings of nature and the 
problematic lack of overlap between the natural and the moral orders. 
The Plowman believes that the two must intersect at some point if God 
is truly in control of the creation. 
The questions which result from the assertion that Death alone is ihe 
evil one recall the ancient dilemma of the source of evil in the world. 
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They raise the spectre ofKseparate origin for evil reminiscent of the 
Manichean heresy. The Plowman wants to know what death is, where he 
comes from, the source of his power and the reason for his existence. 
Earlier thinkers, in particular Augustine who combatted the 
Manichean heresy, dealt with the problem of evil by denying its 
existence. Tepl's Plowman, however, acknowledges certain injustices 
which seem to contradict the essential harmony of God's world order. 
He grapples with the problem of how to reconcile the reality of 
the evil he has experienced in the death of his wife with the definition 
of God as all-good. The Plowman realizes at the end what Job realized 
at the beginning, that the problem of evil is really the problem of 
God, and, like Job, achieves a new and expanded view of God's nature. 
Chapter XVI 
In response to the Plowman's questions about his nature, Death 
expresses a sincere desire to explain himself, to substantiate his 
legitimacy and prove that he has been unjustly accused. In this 
chapter Death again insists that he is not evil but good. He calls 
the Plowman's complete misunderstanding of it ignorance. The Plowman's 
opinion of him is exactly the reverse of the truth. Deathfs comment 
underscores the contradictoriness of the issue: "Was bose ist, das 
nennen gut, und was gut ist, das heissen bose sinnlose leute; dem 
geleich tustu auch" (1-2). The question is not one of fine distinctions 
but of totally opposite interpretations. Is Death a great evil or an 
actual good? The oppositions which Death uses in this speech to 
describe himself further underline the confusing contradictions in his 
nature. Many of these oppositions are expressed as riddles. Death 
says he is something and yet nothing, an end and a beginning, everywhere 
and nowhere. 
To support his argument that he is actually a good, Death states 
that he is God's tool, a scythe which cuts straight. His confusion 
seems to be in thinking that justice involves nothing more than sheer, 
random chance selection: "Unser sengse geet fur sich: . . . Sihe, das 
ist rechfertigkeit!" (5-9). 
Tepl juxtaposes the origins of the two opponents. Death's 
origin, like man's, is in paradise where he was created by God. Death 
conveniently does not mention original sin in this connection except 
euphemistically as "verboten speise" (32). Proudly he argues that, 
on balance, he does the world more good than harm. He directly contra-
dicts his opponent's basic premise by asserting that the Plowman, far 
from lamenting, should actually be thanking him for what he has done: 
f?Lass dich begnugen! und danke uns, das dir von uns so gtftlich ist 
geschehen!" (36-38). The argument now has been turned completely around. 
Death's view of his function is as slanted as the Plowman's view 
of God. Although Death claims to be God's tool, his statements 
actually emphasize his own arbitrariness, his own judgment more than 
God's judgment. He glories in his unassailable power and in the 
fact that even giants must fall before him: "Die grossen heunen 
*mussten vor uns fallen" (16-17). In the picture on the wall of a 
Roman temple he defeats all opponents: "bestreit der Tot und begrub 
sie alle!" (26-27). He calls himself "herre und auch gewaltiger auf 
erden, in dem luf t und meres streum" (34-35) . His attitude is 
vainglorious revelling in the office with which he has been entrusted« 
Chapter XVII 
Instead of merely expressing outrage as he has done before, the 
Plowman now responds with reasoned arguments and vigorous sarcasm. 
Unconvinced by Death1s complete reversal of the interpretation of his 
function, he counters with a similar trick, calling Death an old, 
experienced, widely travelled man, but then he slyly turns this 
description around to insinuate that Death is an experienced, old 
liar: "Alter man neue mere, gelerter man unbekante mere, . . . Wann 
ir nu auch ein solicher alter man seit, so miigt ir wol tichten" (1-5) * 
He now begins to argue systematically, contradicting Death on specific 
points. First he objects to Death's assertion that he is impartial 
and cuts straight with his scythe. The Plowman accuses him of cutting 
selectively, saying: " . . . jedoch hauet euer sengse uneben" (6), 
He points to the thistles, weeds, and wicked people which abound, in 
contrast to the paltry number of good flowers, herbs, and decent people 
with which he contrasts them. The Plowman's bias on this point is 
evident, as well as his confusion in arguing both for impartiality and 
for partiality (favoring the virtuous). 
The Plowman next attacks Death's declaration that he does the 
world more good than harm. He contradicts Death by using one of the 
most popular themes of medieval and ancient writings on death, the 
ubi sunt theme. It is the typical complaint of every age: Where are 
the great people who lived in times past?: 
. . . wo sint die frumen, achtbern leute, als vor zeiten 
waren? Ich wene, ir habt sie alle hin, mit in ist auch 
lieb, die useln sint och iiberbeliben. Wo sint sie bin, 
die auf erden wonten, die mit gote redeten, an im genade, 
hulde, auch reichtum erwurben? Wo sint sie hin, die auf 
erden sassen under dem gestirne, umbgiengen und entschieden 
die planet en? Wo sint sie hin, die sinnereichen, die 
meisterlichen, die gerechten, die frutigen leute, von den 
die kroniken so vil sagen? Ir habt sie alle und meine 
schone und zarte ermort; die snoden sind noch alda. (11-20) 
He cleverly turns this common complaint, that things are not as they 
used to be, against Death and makes Death responsible for the evil 
state of things in the world. It is precisely Death's unfair choices, 
his practice of cutting down the most worthy people and leaving the 
wicked ones which has brought on the sorry state of the times, the 
general decline of society and culture. To further support his 
argument the Plowman cites the case of the two armies, which he wit-
nessed in battle, as evidence that Death is not impartial: "In dem here 
etelich totet ir, etelich liesset ir leben. Mer knecht dann herren 
sach ich tot ligen" (27-28). He concludes that, since Death is 
obviously lying about his impartiality, he is probably also lying 
about his origin in paradise. This shows little inclination to accept 
Death's arguments. 
Walshe suggests that in actively opposing Death's arguments, 
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the Plowman has risen above a personal view. Brand too cites as an 
important sign of the Plowman's changing attitude, his recognition that 
the injustice of Death is a universal human problem and not simply his 
own individual one. Brand sees this as a weakening of his position 
since "Die St&rke der Position des Ackermanns lag in seinem Beharren 
auf der Ebene des Personlichen." To view things from Death's universal 89 
point of view makes the Plowman's position "von innen her unhaltbar." 
Yet in another sense the recognition that Death affects people 
in general unfairly, as in the case of the two armies, might also be 
regarded as a strengthening of the Plowman's position in the same way 
that it is in the book of Job. Job too is led by his own experience 
to reflect on the fate of others and becomes acutely aware of the 
injustices suffered by them. His argument is reinforced by the fact 
that it is not merely he alone who is being punished unfairly, but 
that the world at large seems to be out of joint. If Job were the 
only one, perhaps there could be a mistake or a misunderstanding, but 
it is the very fact that so many good people suffer unjustly, while 
wicked people prosper, that threatens his faith in God's justice. His 
own experience is merely the impetus to the realization that something 
is radically wrong in the world. The fact that death happens to 
everyone universally, and not simply to one individual, is not a 
justification for it. Universality is not an answer to the problems 
of suffering and death. 
Far from being conciliatory, the Plowman makes a sarcastic 
attack on his opponent in this chapter which serves to throw more 
wood on the fire and provokes in turn Death's caustic assault in 
chapter xviii. After rejecting Death's arrogant, though apparently 
well meant, attempt at an explanation of his nature and origin, the 
Plowman offends him by ironically commenting: ffIst das rechte gemeet? 
Ist das rechte gericht? Geet so euer sengse hau fur sich? Wol her, 
lieben Kinder, alle wol her! reiten wir engegen, enbieten und sagen 
wir lob und ere dem Tot, der also rechte richtet! Gotes gerichte 
ist kaum also gerecht11 (29-33) . Death retaliates angrily in 
chapter xviii with a satirical discourse of his own on the Plowman's 
wisdom or lack of it: "Hetten wir dich vor bekant, wir hetten dir 
gefolget; wir hetten dich, dein weib und alle leuk ewig lassen 
leben. Das hetten wir dir allein zu eren getan, wann du bist zumale 
ein kluger esel!ff (28-31). The Plowman in provoking Death is still 
on the attack. 
Chapter XVIII 
That Death is stung by the Plowman's biting sarcasm is shown by 
his equally venomous reaction and the ad hominem argument to which he 
resorts in this chapter. He prefaces this, however, with what appears 
at first to be a move toward conciliation, explaining that he has 
behaved wrongly toward his opponent whom he has seriously underrated. 
Then he proceeds to praise his opponent in ironic, exaggerated fashion, 
comparing him with mock respect to famous figures of the past, men such 
as the Plowman has just lamented in his ubi sunt speech. The barb 
is two-pronged in that some or all of the figures he cites are only 
distinguished by their folly. Thus Death compares the Plowman to some 
truly great fools with whom even he cannot compete. Death shows these 
men's deeds, and later all of man's collective wisdom, to be nothing 
but foolishness and vanity. 
Due to the obscurity of many of the references, critics are 
divided on whether Death intends to mock all or only some of the figures 
90 he cites. Walshe suggests that the author juxtaposes both types to 
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contrast greatness with folly. The oxymoron with which Death ends 
his speech, calling his opponent a "kluger esel," corresponds to his 
approach to the chapter as a whole, the juxtaposition of examples 
of cleverness and foolishness. It is characteristic of Death's penchant 
for the "contradictory talk" about which the Plowman often complains, 
Death's mixing of statements that are "suss und sauer, falsch und 
richtig." 
Chapter XIX 
Both Brand and BSuml agree that the Plowman's transformation to 
supplicant, which began in chapter v, is fully accomplished in this 
chapter. Brand writes: "Damit ist die Wandlung des Anlclagenden in den 
92 um Rat und Hilfe Bittenden endgilltig und sichtbar vollzogen." Bauml 
concurs, saying, "Here, however, the Ploughman assumes, for the first 
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time in such completeness, the role of supplicant." 
At this point it must be asked what is meant by the term suppli-
cant and whether this is the proper term to describe the Plowman's 
state of mind. Generally, one would define a supplicant as someone 
who makes a request with humble demeanor. The Plowman, however, does 
not approach Death with a humble attitude in this chapter. With his 
sarcastic attack Death has come down off his pedestal. The Plowman 
has drawn him out. He is no longer the avuncular figure of the early 
speeches but a vicious opponent. In contrast the Plowman now assumes 
the opposite role. Having gotten Death to lose patience, he sets him-
self up as an example of restraint and admonishes his opponent that he 
is behaving badly. He speaks to Death not humbly, but rather high-
handedly, saying: "Take me as an example:" "Nemet beispild bei mir! 
Wie zu kurz, wie zu lang, wie ungutlich, wie unrechte ir an mir habt 
gefahren, dannoch gedulde ich, geriche es nicht, als ich zu rechte 
solte: noch heute wil ich der besser sein" (9-12). 
The Plowman's absurd threat of personal revenge on Death amounts 
to the ant threatening the elephant. It is an audacious, even comical, 
bluff. The Plowman asks Death to acknowledge his opponent's moderation 
and forbearance, challenges him to prove that he, the Plowman, has 
been unfair or has spoken in an unseemly fashion: "Han ich icht 
ungleichs oder unhubsch gegen euch gebaret, des underweiset mich: ich 
wil sein gernwilliglich widerkomen" (12-13), Can Death have forgotten 
his violent curses of the opening speech? He appeals to Death's better 
nature, hoping to get him to admit his injustice and to confirm what 
the Plowman perceives in the world order. 
The request that he makes of Death is not an entreaty but an 
ultimatum followed by a threat. He demands restitution for his 
loss, not as an inferior from a superior, but mindful of what he is 
firmly convinced to be his legal right to restitution. Death must 
either make good the loss he has caused, show the Plowman how to make 
#it good himself, or come with him before God: 
. . . so ergetzet mich meines schadens oder underweiset 
mich, wie ich widerkome meines grossen herzenleides. 
Werlich, so zu kurz geschah nie manne! . . . Eintweder ir 
widerbringet, was ir an meiner traurenwenderin, an mir 
und meinen kind en arges habt begangen, oder komet des 
mit an got" (14-19). 
Again he emphasizes his right to restitution: " . . . ich getrauet euch 
wol, ir wurdet euer gerechtigkeit selbs erkennen, darnach mir genugen 
tun nach grosser untat (21-22). He closes with the threat: "Anders 
es miisste der hamer den amboss treffen, herte wider herte wesen, es kome 
warzu es kome!" (23-24). 
The most critical word here for the interpretation that the 
Plowman capitulates is the word widerkomen which Brand construes to 
mean that the Plowman must "overcome" his heartache. It is true that 
the Plowman later asks advice on how to rid himself of his grief, but 
in the context in which the word wider komen is used in this chapter, 
it seems at least equally likely that it means "to make good" a loss. 
In line 13 above this is clearly its meaning: "Han ich icht ungeleichs 
. . . gegen euch gebaret, des underweiset mich: ich wil sein gernwillig-
lich widerkomen" (12-13) . The second use of wider komen is followed by 
another allusion to restitution in the words genugen tun (22). 
Situated between these two references, it seems not unlikely that the 
term denotes the same idea. 
In fact, although Walshe interprets it as signifying "to overcome" 
and Spalding as "to recover," other critics opt for the other inter-
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Krogmann interprets wider komen in the first instance to mean "Ersatz 
96 leisten" and in the second to mean "Ersatz bekommen." And Feliz 
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Genzmer renders it as "Vergutung erlangen." Thus it is far from 
certain whether or not the Plowman is entreating Death for aid or 
demanding what is his right. 
Aside from this one phrase, there is no other indication that 
the Plowman is asking for anything but what he believes is due him. 
The fact that the Plowman here for the first time mentions bringing the 
matter before God, shows his continued confidence that he is legally 
in the right: " . . . oder komet des mit mir an got, der da ist mein, 
euer und aller welt rechter richter" (18-20). 
It is a matter of conjecture whether asking for advice, which the 
Plowman later does, necessarily implies a change from attacker to 
supplicant and whether this constitutes a capitulation in the argument. 
Chapter XX 
Death quickly recovers his balance and responds to the Plowman's 
new tone with approval, claiming that this is what he wanted to see in 
his opponent all along. He proceeds to counsel a stoic acceptance of 
the unavoidable fact of death and bereavement. He advises that death 
is not something which one should lament, but is the natural course of 
things, the appropriate compliment to the beginning: "Anfanges 
geswistreit ist das ende. Wer ausgesendet wirt, der ist pflichtig 
wider zu komen" (10-11) . One should not complain about what must 
happen. The life that is lent to a man must be returned to the lender: 
"Was ein mensche entlehent, das sol es widergeben. . . . jegliches 
mensche ist uns ein sterben schuldig und in angeerbt zu sterben" 
(12-13, 16-17). 
The Plowman has proceeded all along from the assumption that life 
is good and worth living. In order to portray himself as a good, the 
Plowman's opponent must establish that life is not as good as the 
Plowman thinks. Having failed to reverse the Plowman's view of death, 
he now tries the opposite ploy of reversing the Plowman's view of 
life. He has already begun by assailing the Plowman's and mankind's 
collective wisdom in chapter xviii. Men, in his view, are aliens on 
this earth. They are due to be transformed from something to nothing: 
"Ellende bauen alle leut auf erden. Von icht zu nicht mussen sie 
werden" (13-14). He stresses the depressing, negative side of man's 
situation; old age is not a joy, "es ist suchtig, arbeitsam, ungestalt, 
kalt und alien leuten iibel gefallen" (20-21) . His choice of words 
reveals a contempt for man in the statement that ripe apples gladly 
fall into the mud: " . . . zeitig epfel fallen geren is das kot" (22-23). 
A more neutral expression such as "ripe apples gladly fall into the 
grass" would have carried a less scornful connotation. What we 
consider beautiful must become distorted and ugly: "Alle rosenfar 
miindelein, alle rote wengelein mussen bleich werden, alle lichte 
augen miissen tunkel werden" (25-27) . His is a cruelly materialistic 
orientation. Huizinga describes the contempt for the world expressed 
in the macabre, late medieval literature on death as expressing T!a very 
materialistic sentiment, namely, that all beauty and all happiness are 
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worthless because they are bound to end soon." He calls such a 
renunciation based on disgust unchristian. The interaction between 
the Christian and folk traditions in Tepl's characterization of the 
figure of Death will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Chapter XXI 
In chapter xxi the reversal of roles is maintained. The Plowman 
continues to behave calmly and to set a salutary example for Death. In 
his previous speech the PloxTman scolded Death for refusing to accept 
reproof, saying: "Wer 3bel tut, wil nicht undertan sein und strafung 
leiden und aufnehmen, sunder mit alien dingen tlbermut treiben" (6-7). 
Now he demonstrates hy his own example how Death should take reproof: 
"Gute strafung giitlich aufnehmen, darnach tun sol weiser man, hSre ich 
die klugen jehen. Euer strafung ist auch leidenlich" (1-2). Whereas 
earlier the Plowman vowed never to relinquish his grief and accused 
Death of trying to influence him to do so, he now reverses his position 
and inquires how he may forget and rid himself of his pain, using 
such zealous terms as ausgraben, austilgen, und ausjagen. This appeal 
for advice on how to overcome his great loss would seem to be the 
first strong support for Brand's thesis. Strangely, however, Brand 
devotes little attention to this chapter. The Plowman here seems to 
pause and at least honestly try to consider what Death has to suggest. 
At the same time, however, his appeal is still based on the idea of 
restitution, on what he believes to be a legal right. Death is duty 
bound to make good the loss that he has caused: "Hilfe, rates und 
widerbringens seit ir mir pflichtig, wann ir habt mir getan den 
schaden" (16-17). The Plowman has not accepted Death's right to take 
his wife. He speaks to Death here more or less as an equal before the 
law and ends with the threat that, unless Death makes compensation, 
God will have to avenge it: !fWo das nicht geschehe, gerochen musst es 
werden—weder dann got bet in seiner almechtigkeit nindert rachung!— 
und solte darumb hauen und schaufeln noch eins gemutet werden!" (17-20). 
The fact that the Plowman still maintains his legal prerogative 
shows he has not given up. This chapter presents the Plowman at his 
most docile. It is a dramatic sort of wavering on the brink before 
finally and definitively rejecting Death's solution and renewing the 
attack. 
The Plowman still holds to the naive idea that God must be 
avenged because He is not associated with the deed and must be offended 
by it. His threat, "solte darumb hauen und schaufeln noch eins gemutet 
werden!" (20), appears to be either a reference to his own suicide, 
which seems very unlikely, or represents an absurd threat to kill 
Death himself. This, in turn, is either more bluffing on the Plowman's 
part or a further example of the intentional characterization of the 
Plowman's naivete through a parody of the credulous idea that one can 
kill Death. This theme is taken up in Chaucer's Pardoner's Tale, a 
story which deals with three village rogues who foolishly set out to 
find death and kill him. 
Chapter XXII 
Despite his new, more rational stance and his request for advice, 
the Plowman again temporarily lapses into lamenting over his wife in 
the way that he did in the first part of the debate. Death does not 
understand why the Plowman continues to grieve and is angered by it. 
Seeing that his stoical counsel has met with little success, Death again 
loses patience and turns abusive. He mocks the Plowman's threat, "Ga! 
Ga! ga! snatert die gans,f (1) and insults the Plowman with the words 
f,Kanstu es versteen, stumpfer pickel?" (35-36). Death's severest 
speech so far is matched by his most arrogant and overweening claim, 
the assertion that all of life is created for the sake of Death: 
"Lass dir eingeen und vernim: das leben ist durch sterbens willen 
geschaffen11 (6-7). With new harshness he says: "Eintweder du bist 
sere ledig oder unvernunft hauset zu dir" (9-10). This statement 
represents a distinct contrast to his earlier, more tolerant comment 
on the Plowman's attitude which we recall from chapter ii: "Du tust 
dem geleich, als dir ernst sei und dich not swerlich betwinge" (ii: 
10-11). He continues now with sharp impatience: " . . . brich ab! 
lass far en! nim fur dich, das ein wint ist das leben der leute auf 
erden!" (11-12). 
Whereas the Plowman has maintained all along that Death owes him 
restitution, Death now again cleverly reverses his opponent's argument, 
insisting that it is not Death who owes the Plowman something but 
vice versa. Death is the toll keeper to whom every man owes his 
life: "Seint den malen das wir ein zolner sein, dem alle menschen ir 
leben zollen" (3-4) . Under the circumstances the best thing a man can 
do is to avoid sorrow by practicing restraint in all his undertakings 
and relationships. One must avoid all joy, pain, fear, and hope: 
"Aristotiles hat dich es vor gelert, das freude, leit, forchte und 
hoffenung die viere alle werlt bekumern und nemlich die sich vor in 
nicht kiinnen huten" (13-16) . These polarities produce the opposing 
extremes of man's experience: "Freude und forchte kurzen, leit und 
hoffenung lengen die weil" (16) . Each is individually followed by its 
opposite: "Nach freude trilbsal, nach liebe leit muss hie auf erden 
komen" (18-19). They are complimentary and inseparable: "Liebe und 
leit mussen mit einander wesen: eines ende ist anfang des andern" 
(19-20). 
Chapter XXIII 
The Plowman remains calm in spite of Death's insults. He concedes 
that Death's proverbs sound good. Banishing all love and hope would 
help one to avoid pain; but what would life be without them? He 
counters Death's polarities with a set of opposites of his own: good 
and evil constantly vie with each other for supremacy in man's thoughts. 
It is a law of human nature that the mind is never idle but is always 
occupied with either good or evil: "Wann menschliches mutes sinn kan 
nicht miissig wesen: eintweder gutes oder arges muss allzeit der sinn 
wiirken" (9-10). This opposition is as inevitable as the others: 
"Wurden dann dem sinn gute gedanken benomen, so wurden im bose eingeen; 
gut aus—bose ein, bose aus—gut ein: die wechselung muss biss an das 
ende der werlt weren" (11-14). One must cultivate the good to combat 
evil, particularly in these days since the decline of courtly virtues. 
The Plowman clings to the memory of his wife as his guiding principle 
against evil. If he were to forget her he would be an evil person. 
Brand gives little significance to this chapter, oddly dismissing 
99 
it as "schwach und belanglos." Far from being weak and irrelevant, 
however, it is actually one of the most important chapters in the 
debate and contains the Plowman's strongest reply to and rejection of 
Death's claims. It represents the backbone of the Plowman's opposition 
to Death and his most poignant affirmation of life. Structually, it 
is placed back to back with Death's most exaggerated claim to primacy 
over life, his assertion that life was created for the sake of death. 
The Plowman may have made an honest effort to hear out Death's 
solution, but he ends by rejecting in no uncertain terms Death's stoic 
recommendation to drive the memory of love out of his heart. In reply 
he gives his strongest, most moving, and only real defense against 
Death—his love for his wife. Rather than forgetting about his wife 
and driving love out of his heart, he says that as long as he lives 
she will live on in his memory: ". . . als mer wil ich meiner 
allerliebsten allweg gedenken. . . . ferre wege, lange jar scheiden 
nicht lieb *mit *lieb. Ist sie mir leiblichen tot, in meiner 
gedechtnuss lebt sie doch immer" (18-23). 
Contrary to Brand's assertion that Death has proved his case, 
the Plowman is not convinced. He closes with the words that Death 
must give him better advice than this: "Her Tot, ir musset getreulicher 
raten, sol euer rat icht nutzes bringen" (23-24) . From this point on, 
in fact, his opposition, rather than declining, stiffens. 
In his next speech the Plowman renews his attack. He is forced 
back into active opposition by Death's tactical errors of exaggerating 
his own importance (chapter xxii), and insulting man (xxiv). In 
attacking the two values that the Plowman still firmly believes in and 
prizes most highly, his love for his wife and man's worth, Death prevents 
his opponent from accepting his counsel and provokes the Plowman to 
counterattack, crying: "Pfei euch, boser schandensack!" (xxv,l). 
Chapter XXIV 
Death himself acknowledges in this chapter that the Plowman has 
rejected his advice: "Wer umb rat bittet und rates nicht folgen wil, 
dem ist auch nicht zu raten. Unser gtitlich rat kan an dir nicht 
geschaffen11 (2-4). This failure provokes him to try a still stronger 
tactic. He attempts to debase the object of the Plowman's love, the 
ideal of womanhood which he cherishes. Death intends to tell the 
gruesome truth which he has up to now held back. It is a sad fact 
that beneath even the most beautiful woman's exterior lies nothing but 
baseness. What the Plowman bewails is in reality worthless and dis-
gusting. He recites a whole list of the most insulting metaphors to 
describe man's physical nature. Man is: "ein besmirter binstock, 
ein *glanzer unflat, ein unreiner lust, ein kotfass, ein wurmspeise" 
(11-12) and worse. 
Although the theme sounds the same as that often repeated in 
memento mori literature, the emphasis is slightly different. Memento 
mori literature teaches one to value the life in the hereafter over 
this life by explaining that what man how admires will not last, but, 
at death, will become ugly. The Frau Welt symbol refers primarily to 
the state of physical decomposition after death, in the snakes, toads, 
and skeleton which make up the back. The Plowman's opponent, however, 
emphasizes the disgusting physical nature of the living man. From 
Death's point of view there is nothing admirable in man. The Plowman 
makes far too much of him. Death objects: " . . . dein holes herze 
wil aus leuten mer machen dann die gewesen mugen. Du machest aus einem 
menschen was du wilt, es mag nicht mer gesein dann als m±1 ich dir 
sagen wil" (6-9) . He concludes rudely that the Plowman must let both 
his love and his sorrow go: "La hin fliessen lieb, la hin fliessen 
leit, lass rinnen den Rein als ander wasser! Esel! Dorfweiser 
gStling!" (28-29). 
As has been pointed out, the roles are now reversed. Whereas 
formerly the Plowman—the representative of life—attacked Death, it is 
now Death who attacks the value of life. This development, however, 
is not accompanied by increasing docility on the part of the Plowman, 
who actively defends man. The pitch of the battle is not diminished. 
Both combatants continue to insult each other. 
Chapter XXV 
Brand regards chapter xxv, along with chapters xxiv, xxviii, and 
xxix, as a sort of detour in the argument, having no real function in 
the development of the debate.^^ While it is true that these chapters 
do not show progress toward the Plowman's proposed change of heart, 
it is not true that they are not important to the debate. On the 
contrary, in chapter xxv the Plowman presents his second strongest 
attack on the assertion that all life is miserable and only exists for 
the sake of Death. He argues for the value of life and the worth of 
man as God's good creation. 
The Plowman's pointed statements that he is not convinced cannot 
be overlooked. He springs to the defense, crying: "Pfei, euch, btfser 
schandensack!" (1). Any progress toward conciliation is contradicted 
by his claim to have unmasked Death as a fraud and Death's assertion 
that he was created in paradise as a lie: "Allererst brufe ich, das 
ir lugenhaftig seit und in dem paradisse nicht getirmet, als ir 
sprechet" (3-4). Death's slander of man proves that he is no tool of 
God, since any servant of God would know that God created man and all 
things to be good. Far from remaining on the defensive, the Plowman 
traps Death in a contradiction and opposes him directly: "Weret ir 
in dem paradisse gefallen, so wesset ir, das got den menschen und alle 
ding beschaffen hat, und hat sie alle zumale gut beschaffen" (5-7). The 
argument he uses is one which Death cannot deny and never does refute. 
Man cannot be as vile as Death claims, for God would then be a bad 
creator: 
Solte dann der mensche so bose und so unrein sein, als ir 
sprechet, werlich, so het got unreiniglich und unnlitzlichen 
gewiirket! Solte gotes allmechtige und wirdige hant so ein 
unreines und unfletiges menschwerk haben gewUrket, als ir 
schreibet, streflicher, gemeilter wiirker were er; so 
stdnde auch das nicht, das got alle ding und den menschen 
uber sie alle zumale gut het beschaffen (11-16). 
Death does not deny that. 
With the introduction of this paradox Tepl returns to the question 
of God's nature. Man is indeed a base and perishable creature, but he 
is also the image of God, a part of the creation which God called 
good. God is responsible for both aspects of man. 
Although it is man's soul, rather than his body, which was formed 
in God's image, it is of the senses which the Plowman now speaks, and 
of the body "der lieblich kloss" (40) . The amazing senses reveal the 
care and skill with which God fashioned man and are evidence of man's 
value. As mentioned, the book of Job also places heavy emphasis on 
the theme of God's loving care in shaping man and deals at length with 
the question of man's worth and what he may expect from God. Both 
protagonists are puzzled by the contradiction between the concern for 
man evidenced in the act of creation and God's apparent lack of concern 
over the destruction of His creature, His nonintervention in Death's 
doings and Job's sufferings. Throughout the debate the Plowman clings 
exclusively to the image of God as the loving creator and is unable 
to conceive of his wife's death as anything other than a breakdown of 
moral providence. It is not until after God's verdict that this view 
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is changed. Death's evil slander of man merely reinforces the Plowman's 
position. 
Chapter XXVI 
In addition to the five senses the Plowman praises man's reason. 
Death next undertakes to ridicule this faculty. He begins with the 
most reputable sciences and proceeds to the black arts and magic, 
significantly leaving out theology. He exults that in spite of all 
man's great cleverness, he still must fall victim to Death. He hopes 
to undermine his opponent's confidence in himself, calling him "tlppiger 
geuknecht!11 (40). Job's opponents likewise question the efficacy of 
any man's wisdom to deal with the issues Job examines. 
Chapter XXVII 
The Plowman's unruffled reaction to Death's insult in chapter xxvi 
shows that he still has the upper hand: "Man sol nicht tibel mit libel 
rechen, gedultig sol ein man wesen, gebieten der tugent lerer; den pfat 
wil ich nach treten, ob ir icht noch nach ungedult gedultig werdet" (1-3). 
In this chapter the Plowman does directly ask advice from Death 
and in a respectful way. Yet one must consider whether or not this 
really represents a capitulation to Death's claims of justness, priority 
over life, and man's meanness; or whether it is not possible that the 
Plowman asks Death's advice purely for the sake of hearing his opinion 
on a troublesome matter. He still rejects the solutions Death has 
offered thus far, saying, "I see you think you have advised me well": 
"Ich vernim an euer rede: ir meinet, ir ratet mir gar getreulichen" (3-4). 
But he wishes to hear if Death still cannot give him some useful 
advice. He hopes to bind him to this with an oath: " . . . so ratet 
mir in treuen, in gesworen eides weise" (4—5)• 
The Plowman now considers whether he should choose a secular or 
a clerical life, stating that he has found all walks of life to be 
imperfect. The only institution he wholeheartedly endorses is 
wedded life. This life gives meaning to work, produces virtue and 
good behavior: 
Wunnesam, lustsam, fro und wolgemut ist ein man, der 
ein biderweib hat, er wander wo er wander. Einem jedem 
solichem man ist auch lieb nach narung zu stellen und 
nach eren zu trachten. Im ist auch lieb, ere mit eren, 
treue umb treue, gut mit gute zu bexahlen und 
widergelten (16-20). 
It is the only value he still clings to, the source of good behavior 
and high ideals. 
Bauml notes that the Plowman has not mentioned his right to 
grieve for a while. He asserts that "With the falling away of the 
Ploughman's insistence that he had a right to grieve, the necessity 
for his former antagonistic attitude toward Death also ceases. 
But the fact that the Plowman has not mentioned his right to grieve 
for a while does not necessarily mean that he has given it up. The 
Plowman momentarily forgets his despair in the heat of defending the 
values he will not surrender. 
Chapter XXVIII 
Seeing the importance which the Plowman places on married bliss, 
the last stronghold of virtue in a vain world, Death in the guise of 
giving advice, now seeks to undermine this single aspect of life 
which the Plowman praises. After having attacked the physical nature 
of the object of the Plowman's devotion, he turns to discrediting 
woman's character and role as wife. In his libelous attack he repeats 
with reverse meaning the words he has used earlier (ch. xiv) to defend 
himself, referring to his act as unser genade and saying: J,mit 
ungekrenkten eren haben wir sie in unser genade enphangen" (8-9) . 
This time he gleefully comments that no husband may rid himself of 
a shrewish wife unless Death favors him with his genade. 
In this chapter Tepl uses the interplay of contrasts to provide 
a kind of comic relief. First Death accuses the Plowman of Immoderate 
praise of women and then himself proceeds to blame them immoderately. 
This humorous depiction of Death's foibles represents a counterpoint 
to the Plowman's credulousness in his earlier speeches. The 
characterization of Death as a comic and fallible figure serves to 
make him less formidable and a more suitable match for the Plowman. 
Such glimpses of the foibles of both combatants, in addition to the 
insults they hurl at each other, provide a certain comic relief and 
distance to so solemn a topic* 
Chapter XXIX 
It is clear to the Plowman by now that Death's opinions are 
not to be trusted. Death's unchivalrous views cannot be associated with 
God's. His latest defamation of women particularly rankles the Plowman 
who loses patience and replies with an insult to Death as he has not 
done for some time, calling him "haubtman von kriege!" (26). He no 
doubt feels betrayed after having made a request in good faith for 
advice about whether or not to remarry, that Death should answer him 
with a disrespectful and slanderous indictment of married life. He 
bravely defends marriage and the ennobling influence of women, praising 
them as the protectresses and teachers of virtue and high ideals. Un-
daunted, he continues to affirm this aspect of life and to cling to 
the memory of his wife as his guiding principle and ideal for a good 
and worthy life. 
Chapter XXX 
Death responds to the Plowman's insult with an angry insult of 
his own in which he uses his by now characteristic technique of juxta-
position. In this case he opposes precious and worthless articles 
which a fool like the Plowman can't distinguish, saying: M. . . als vil 
als ein esel leiren kan, als vil kanstu die warheit vernemen" (13-14). 
Whereas Death earlier has attached individually man's accomplish-
ments in the sciences, his physical body, and marriage, he now extends 
his attack to include the whole of life which he pictures as futile 
and vain in every respect. Both man and Death claim to have been 
created by God in paradise. The question at issue concerns who is to 
be the ultimate master of the earth. Death realizes his function is 
only justified if all of life can be devalued. His view point appears 
to resemble the sentiment, commonly expressed in memento mori literature, 
that the attractions of this life are deceptions. One should prepare 
for and look forward to the hereafter, for, as Augustine said, to die 
is to be "delivered from this bondage of sin" (City of God, Bk. xiii, 
Ch. 3). Yet Death barely mentions the hereafter. Instead of stressing 
an alternative to life, as Augustine does, the Plowman's opponent gloats 
over its extinction. His view is a strangely nihilistic one for a 
self-proclaimed servant of God. He emphasizes repeatedly how all must 
be changed by him from something into nothing, but refers only in 
passing to the blessings of the hereafter. 
Again in this chapter Death tries to show the Plowman !s lament for 
his wife to be futile and absurd in comparison to the more famous and 
important figures who also have passed on. Death cannot resist exulting 
in his power over even the greatest of men: frDannoch beleiben wir Tot 
hie herre!" (25-26). His attitude does not reflect the divine origin 
of his power. 
Chapter XXXI 
The Plowman's last speech returns to the opening theme of Death's 
justice and to the antagonism he showed toward his opponent earlier in 
the debate. His final speech of the debate shows the least inclination 
of any chapter so far to accept and be consoled by Death's arguments. 
In it the Plowman attacks even more strongly than he did in chapters 
xxi and xxv. Instead of being reconciled to Death, the Plowman expresses 
grave doubts about Death's arguments and points out contradictions in 
them. 
Brand has little to say about chapter xxxi, calling it simply a 
summing up of the situation which is ffweder sehr Uberzeugend noch 
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dichterisch stark.'1 To say at this point that the Plowman is 
convinced by Death's arguments simply does not fit the Plowman's words 
In this chapter. He says here no less than four times that he is not 
persuaded and repeatedly accuses Death of lying, of saying one thing 
and then another: 
Eigen rede verurteilt dicke einen man und sunderlich 
einen, der jetzunt eines und danach ein anderes redet. 
. . . Zwo widerwertig rede miigen mit einander nicht 
war gesein. . . . Nach euer wechselrede, kan sich 
niemant gerichten. . . . Mit euer wankelrede, darauf 
nu niemant bauen sol, we^let ir mich von meiner klage 
schrecken (1-2, 5-6, 15-16, 25-27). 
In these comments there is little of the docile supplicant to be seen. 
They give no evidence that the Plowman's mind is changed. 
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The Plowman proceeds to point out specific inconsistencies in 
Death's arguments. He first attacks Death's assertion that all life 
collectively and earth itself will have an end. Death boasts that he 
then will be lord here. But if there is no life on the earth, there 
will also be no more death; that is, Death will no longer have a 
function. The Plowman feels he has caught Death in a clear contradiction. 
The Plowman also contradicts Death's emphasis on the annihilation 
of created things by citing the authority of "Plato and other philosophers" 
who say that the end of one thing is the beginning of another. All 
things are founded on the transformation of one into another in a kind 
of eternal renewal. 
In this last speech the Plowman reasserts his best defense of life, 
the argument that Death has not answered and cannot gainsay. Although 
Death says that man is evil, stupid, and useless, man is nevertheless 
God's creation and, therefore, cannot be other than good. Death's 
position is inconsistent with the definition of God as a good creator. 
Death offers no answer to the objections raised by the Plowman in this 
chapter, but seems to ignore them completely. The question how God, 
as the creator of a contradictory world order, is to be viewed is left 
open. 
Again we must ask if the contention that Death convinces the 
Plowman of the necessity of his part in the world order is really born 
out. It is hard to see how this can be maintained when the Plowman1 s 
final speech itself assails the truthfulness of Death's arguments, and 
his final words in the debate express his skepticism and his determina-
tion not to abandon his complaint; "Mit euer wankelrede, darauf nu 
niemant bauen sol, wellet ir mich von meiner klage schrecken. Des 
beruf ich mich mit euch an Got meinen heilant, her Tot, mein verderber" 
(25-28). His last words are not even conciliatory: MDamit gebe euch 
got alles ubel! AmenTt (28-29). 
The Plowman's last offensive is quieter than his first offensive, 
but it is not a weak one. It merely represents a different kind of 
argumentation. The Plowman has shifted from woebegone lamenting and 
cursing to reasoned arguing and affirmation of the values he still 
believes in. The two requests for advice do not constitute an acceptance 
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of Death's arguments. In fact, he pointedly rejects Death's advice when 
he finds that it consists of stoic prescriptions and slander of women. 
Nowhere does the Plowman state that Death has convinced him. 
This analysis concludes that the Plowman's position cannot be 
characterized as a uniform progression from attacker to accepting 
supplicant, but rather he exhibits a variety of approaches, alternately 
becoming angry, high-handed, sincere, sarcastic, etc.. All of these 
approaches are part of the intended rhetorical display, a show of 
virtuosity in which variety seems to be more important than consistency. 
His request for advice is only one of the many attitudes he exhibits. 
The shifting of the offensive back and forth between the contestants, 
the changes in tactics, the give and take of the debate, all underline 
the conclusion that the match is intended to end in a draw. 
It is not Death who convinces the Plowman of the rightness of 
the world order, but it is God who does it. If the Plowman were 
defeated by Death's arguments, as Brand and Bauml suggest, and recog-
nized his error, God's role in the debate would be greatly diminished 
in importance. There would be no purpose in bringing the matter up 
before God at all. It is significantly God's appearance and His 
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verdict in the case which bring about the real change in the Plowman, 
who accepts God's judgment and ceases questioning as does Job in 
similar circumstances. 
Chapter XXXII 
In his final speech Death does not attempt to reply to the Plowman's 
charges that there are glaring inconsistencies in his arguments. Instead 
he summarizes and restates what he has already said about the vanity 
and miserableness of human life and, at the last, abruptly offers some 
very orthodox Christian advice: turn from evil, do good, keep a clean 
conscience. In this final speech Death seems to show a new side, 
partially returning to the more pious face he showed at the beginning 
of the debate. His parting words are very unlike the advice which he has 
offered up to this point. Here he does not insult man or resort to the 
kind of unacceptable, stoic arguments which he has offered before. 
When asked for his counsel on earlier occasions, Death showed a 
singular lack of sympathy or inclination to comfort the Plowman, arguing 
only that it was useless and wrong to grieve, that old age is not a 
blessing anyway, and that one must endeavor to avoid love and joy for 
they ultimately only bring pain. Asked for his recommendations on the 
subject of marriage, he has replied by maliciously slandering women. 
But in these last few words he drops his snide attitude and offers 
his first acceptable advice. It is not advice on how to cope with 
grief or a defense of himself, but advice on how to live. 
It is odd that he should wait to the very end to give it. It 
comes as a surprise after his assertions that life exists for the 
sake of death, his deprecations of man's physical nature, of women, 
and his condemnation of the vanity of the world. His advice on how 
to live may be what God is referring to in saying Death has spoken the 
truth, since much else that he has said would not be applauded by God. 
Parts of Death's last speech are reminiscent of the catalog of 
man's activities given in chapter 28 of the book of Job. Both stress 
the vanity and futility of these activities and the fact that true 
wisdom is only to be found in God and in the pursuit of the knowledge 
of Him. 
We do not know what the Plowman's response would have been to 
these words. He has already made his last speech of the debate. Perhaps 
Tepl saves this for the end because it might have unbalanced the debate 
too much in favor of Death. The issue is left to God to decide. 
Tepl's Characterization of the Figure of Death 
We have considered the naive and erroneous concept of God which 
characterizes the Plowman's viewpoint in the debate. A comparison of 
Death's arguments with certain common medieval attitudes about death 
reveals a bias of another kind. An examination of the way in which 
the conflicting Christian and folk traditions interact in Tepl's 
characterization of the figure of Death gives us further insight into 
the plan of Tepl's debate. A work which is particularly pertinent to 
an examination of the Ackermann is the Tractatus de Crudelitate Mortis, 
another dialogue between Death and man, which Tepl is believed to 
have had a copy of and to have borrowed from in composing his own 
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work. A consideration of the arguments and phrases from the 
Tractatus which Tepl incorporated into his Ackermann and those that 
he left out indicates that he purposely characterized Death in a more 
negative way than the Tractatus does. 
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between the two depictions 
of death is that TeplTs figure seems to purposely avoid arguments which 
would offer some real consolation to a bereaved person. Only txtfice in 
Ackermann debate does Death offer a consoling thought about the 
afterlife. In Chapter xiv he says that the Plowman's wife has earned 
eternal rest and joy as a result of her good life. He even suggests 
that the Plowman's soul may eventually join that of his wife in 
heaven. In chapter viii he hints that she may expect a reward. Aside 
from these references, however, Death gives none of the traditional 
arguments of consolation which appear in other works on the subject of 
death. The figure of Death in the Tractatus twice explains that Christ 
has completely conquered him:"*"̂  
Quam Christus per me devicit 
Sicud per prophetam dicit: 
'0 mors, tuus ero morsus,1 
Ego reddo bona prorsus 
In terra vivencium 
(13,3-7) 
He adds that because of Christ's victory, he has become the means 
through which the world is reborn and that death should actually be 
precious to the sanctified: !fMe Christus est amplexatus, / Per me 
mundus est renatus, / Ego sanctis presiosa" (14,1-3). He helpfully 
explains that she can be overcome, if not escaped: 
Hoc mandavit ipse Deus, 
Ut stringatur per me reus:^^. 
Ergo proferte modum, (Ego) 
Quo meum solvatis nodum, 
Vel certe vos emendetis, 
Quia me mon evadetis 
(23,1-6) 
The figure of Death in the Ackermann does not mention any of these 
consolations. Christ is referred to only once and not in the debate 
itself but in the closing prayer. 
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Burdach was particularly impressed by the fact that the work 
lacks all mention of Mary and the saints who customarily were called 
on to intercede for the souls of the dead."^ He interpreted this 
absence as characteristic of what he called the "free religiosity" 
(freie Religiositat) of pre-reformation sects in Bohemia and attempted 
to link Tepl with religious reform groups such as the Taborites who 
rejected the intercession of the saints, believing instead that God 
could be approached directly. Burdach*s suggestion that Tepl himself 
opposed the veneration of the saints is contradicted, however, by TeplTs 
documented provision for an office in honor of Saint Jerome (the "St.-
Hieronymus-Offizium" at the St. Niklas Church in Eger).~^ 
Burdach1s interpretation also does not explain the absence of any 
mention of Christ's victory over death in the Ackermann. Although the 
Tractatus does not refer to Mary or the saints, it does mention Christ 
many times. An alternate explanation might be that Tepl simply wanted 
to characterize his figure of Death more negatively than the other 
work did and not to give his character too many redeeming qualities 
so as not to unbalance the debate in Death's favor. 
Death in the Ackermann does not console his opponent with the 
argument that death is good to the good, as does Death in the 
Tractatus: 
Respondet mors: Non sum dura, 
Tempus meum dat futura 
Bonis bona, malis mala 
Meritorum ex mea salla (messella) 
(12,1-4) 
This common consolation is expressed by Saint Paul in the New 
Testament when he writes: "For me . . . to die is gain" (Phil, 1:21) 
and by St. Augustine who comments: "Of the first and bodily death, 
then, we may say that to the good it is good, and evil to the evil" 
(City of God, Bk. xiii, Ch. 2). 
Many of the arguments describing Death as a positive force for 
good which are used in the Tractatus do not appear in the Ackermann. In 
t h e Tractatus Death argues, for instance, that he removes cruel tyrants 
from the earth, thereby ending their crimes and alleviating the 
suffering of humanity: "Ecce crudeles tyranni . . . si eos non 
visitarem, / Culpas eis ampliarem / Et penam pauperibustf (15:1, 5-7), 
Tepl's Death mentions only his control of overpopulation. In the 
Tractatus Death also says that she causes many men to turn from 
crimes: flEt multi meo timore / Corde, visu, manu, ore / Derelinquunt 
vicia,f (12,5-7). She calls herself the sinner's cudgel, the wrong-
doer's switch. If death were to leave the world, evils would spread 
further, since God himself has ordered Death to hold culprits in 
check: 
. . . ego fustis peccatorum 
Virga sum et pravorum, (improborum) 
Me a vobis iam evello, 
A gravamine apello 
Et effundar latius. 
Hoc mandavit ipse Deus, 
Ut stringatur per me reus: 
(22,3-23,2) 
Death in the Ackermann makes use of a similar argument, but instead of 
stressing his role as a positive good, he emphasizes manrs wickedness, 
saying that all men are so inclined to evil that none of them does 
anything good except out of fear of death: "Alle menschen sein mer 
zu bosheit dann zu tugent geneiget. Tut nu jemant ichts gutes, das 
tut er uns besorgend! (xxxii,11-13), 
Instead of describing how death can be overcome, as does the 
Tractatus, or referring to MaryTs intercession for the dying, as do 
many other late medieval works, the Plowman's opponent lists all 
the things that will not rescue one .from death. Instead of Christ, 
the sacraments or the saints, Death lists witches, doctors and magic 
potions, stressing the negative aspect and the hopelessness of the 
situation: 
Alle die meister, die geiste kunnen betwingen, . . . Die 
bilwis und die zauberinne kiinnetv vor uns nicht beleiben: 
sie hilfet nicht, das sie reiten auf den krucken, das 
sie reiten auf den btfcken. Die erzte, die den leuten 
das leben lengen, mussen uns zu teil werden: wurze, 
kreuter, salben und allerlei apotekenpulver kttnnen sie 
nicht gehelfenTI (vi, 11-17) . 
The Plowman berates Death for taking virtuous people and leaving 
the wicked. He implies that good people should be spared. Death, on 
the other hand, argues for impartiality. Yet Death does not explain 
why the virtuous cannot be spared. One traditional explanation found 
in the writings of Augustine is that if virtuous people were spared, 
everyone would want to be saved for the wrong reason and "faith itself 
would be thereby enervated" (City of God, Bk. xiii, Ch. 4). Nor does 
Death try to justify the concept of impartiality on the grounds that 
some element of uncertainty and pain is necessary as a test of dis-
interested virtue. This major theme in the book of Job, though 
pertinent to the problem, remains undeveloped in the Ackermann. Such 
arguments likewise might have strengthened Death's position more than 
Tepl wished to. 
Instead of holding out the hope of a blessed afterlife for the 
souls of the faithful, as he might be expected to do if he is really 
God's servant, Death argues from a strictly worldly and materialistic 
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point of view. Old age is not a blessing because physical beauty fades. 
Life is of little value precisely because it does not last. The 
rationalizations he gives express a materialistic, stoic attitude: 
". . .am besten zu sterben, wann am besten liebet zu lebenn (xiv, 10-11). 
Such values as love, joy and hope are to be avoided because they 
ultimately bring only pain. 
Instead of giving positive arguments to justify his existence 
and offering comfort to the Plowman, Death concentrates on denying the 
value of life. He devalues human knowledge and accomplishments in 
general, the sciences in particular, the institution of marriage and 
man's physical body. There is no positive consolation, only doubtful 
rationalizations such as his argument that if it were not for death, 
overpopulation would make life unbearable anyway. The Plowman never 
poses or deals with the question why the universe should be ordered 
this way. Death's most nihilistic statement, that life is created for 
the sake of death: . . das leben ist durch sterbens willen 
geschaffen" (xxii,7), which is suspect according to the account of 
creation given in Genesis, is never disputed. 
Considering Death's conspicuous lack of positive arguments, it 
is no wonder the Plowman sees him as God's enemy and not as God's 
servant. As has been suggested, Tepl seems to have purposely depicted 
Death more negatively than he need have. The fact that he did not use 
all the arguments available to him in defending Death's position 
indicates that he did not intend for Death to convince the Plowman. 
He deliberately characterizes Death not as God's advocate or the 
consoler representing God's point of view, which Brand suggests, but 
primarily as the opponent of the Plowman, the representative of the 
negative side of the argument, for the purpose of producing a lively-
debate. 
In the Tractatus a clear differentiation is made between the 
first death and the second death. A distinction which, as we have 
mentioned, the Plowman plainly fails to grasp. Tepl must have been 
aware of this difference from his reading of the Tractatus in which 
Death clearly says that she is merely a physical process, "the mistress 
of the flesh," and that she does not condemn: "Ego carnis sum 
domatrix / Et non ilia mors dampnatrix" (13, 1-2). In explaining that 
Death can be overcome but not escaped, he acknowledges that there is a 
second aspect to the process. After death, he says, there is good to 
the good and bad to the bad according to merit, but Death himself does 
not cause damnation. Thus death in the Tractatus is depicted as an 
impartial force and separated from the function of judgment. Why is 
this distinction not made in the Ackermann? The Plowman repeatedly 
refers to Death as a "false judge," and Death does not contest this 
designation. Perhaps both the Plowman and Death fail to make the 
distinction because it would have robbed Death of some of the malice 
and importance necessary to make him a good opponent for the Plowman. 
Stating directly that Death is merely a process of transition and does 
not judge would have placed the real responsibility on God, a truth 
which the Plowman is intended to learn only as a result of Godfs 
verdict. It would have required a better understanding of God's 
nature than the Plowman possesses. Tepl required a naive and confused 
Plowman and a beligerent Death to insure a lively debate as an 
interesting vehicle for the rhetorical display he planned. 
Both the Tractatus and the Ackermann contain elements of the two 
conflicting medieval ways of regarding death, the gleeful, malicious 
death figure of the Totentanz tradition and the more hopeful Christian 
view. In common with the Totentanz tradition, the Ackermann shares the 
persistent theme of death's inevitability and power (ii, 16-17; xvi, 
15-18; 21-27; xxvi, 3-6; 38-40), his impartiality (vi, 7-11; 19-24; 
xvi, 5-9), the emphasis on extinction and decay (x, 13-14; xx, 14; 
25-27), on the repulsive, physical side of man (chapter xxiv) , the 
vanity of life (xxx, 5-7; xxxii, 13-14; 33-35), and its transience 
(xxxii, 4-5; 14-16; xxiv, 24-25). Elements of the Christian view are to 
be seen in Death's acknowledgment that he is God's hantgezeuge (xvi, 4) 
and was created in paradise (xvi, 30-31), as well as his brief mention 
of the eternal bliss awaiting the soul of the Plowman's wife (xiv, 19-21) 
and his praise of God in his closing speech. 
Tractatus by comparison gives stronger emphasis to the more 
positive picture of death. The view that eventually wins out in the 
Ackermann is the Christian view. Although God does not actually call 
Death His messenger, He clearly indicates that He has given Death his 
power and that Death operates with His sanction. 
The victory of the Christian view, however, is not without 
difficulties. By linking God more closely with death, this view raises 
new questions about God's nature. The image of an evil, gleeful and 
malicious death does not mesh well with the view of Death as God's 
hand. The religious interpretation faces the problem of either denying 
the badness of death or of trying to reconcile the brutality and 
maliciousness of the Totentanz figure with God's control of this 
function. The incompatibities between the two traditions give rise to 
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some of the questions about God's nature which are the subject of the 
Ackermann debate. 
The Verdict 
Both the Plowman and Death have ended by calling on God to settle 
the dispute; the Plowman cursing Death and saying: "Des berufe ich mich 
mit euch an Got, . . . Damit gebe euch got alles libelfAmen" (xxxi, 27-29), 
and Death, confident of his case, saying: ". . * des komen wir mit dir 
an Got, den ewigen, den grossen und den starken" (xxxii, 53-54), In 
chapter xxxiii God appears, not in a great thunderstorm, but relatively 
quietly and makes the awaited judgment. What is his verdict? Does it 
answer the questions the Plowman has raised about the fairness of 
Death or explain why God tolerates such an evil or clarify His rela-
tionship to a contradictory world order? 
Unfortunately Godfs answer is not at all clear. Although God 
reaches a decision in the debate, He explains nothing of the reasons 
for His decision. Taken altogether, the verdict is rather unsatisfactory 
to anyone who had expected answers. We learn that God is ultimately 
responsible for and approves of Death, including the death of the 
Plowman's wife. He affirms His control of the world order in general 
terms. But He does not explain why the universe is ordered as it is 
or why Death operates the way he does. 
Each contestant is both reprimanded and rewarded. Even though 
God technically grants the victory to Death: "Darumb: klager habe 
ere! Der Tot habe sig!" (18), it is not an unqualified victory. The 
Plowman is also honored. Each is reproved for having made inappropriate 
claims on part of God's creation. Both have claimed to possess some-
thing that was not theirs and have viewed the world order from a false 
perspective. The Plowman has praised the creation, but his fault is 
that he seems to have loved it too much, wanting to possess it. Death, 
on the other hand, has gloried in his power and has wanted to make 
his function more important than life. 
In spite of these errors on both sides, God concedes that the 
conflict has not been unjustified: "Jedoch der krieg ist nicht gar on 
sachM (15-16). He acknowledges the Plowman's right to grieve over his 
lost wife. This would seem to contradict the contention that Death 
proves man has no right to grief: TfDer Tod entkraftet Klage und 
Anklage, indem er beweist, dass kein sterblicher fbillichen' klagt, 
sondern aus Tummheit, aus Eisichtslosigkeit,T (Brand, p. 54). On the 
contrary, God's verdict recognizes this right: "Ir habt beide wol 
gefochten: den twinget leit zu klagen, disen die anfechtung des klagers 
die warheit zu sagen" (16-17). 
God commends Death for having spoken the truth. This is a dis-
turbing judgment since, surely, everything that Death has said cannot 
qualify as the truth and be approved by God. He has already been repri-
manded for his error of arrogance. Which part of Death's speeches is 
meant? 
The verdict itself does not resolve the debate. Far from pro-
viding an explanation, God merely restates and affirms the status quo 
with the pronouncement: "Seit jeder mensche dem Tode das leben, der 
erden den leib, die sele Uns pflichtig ist zu geben" (18-20). The 
ultimate nature of the relationship between life and death is left 
unexplained. Yet God's appearance produces a striking effect, a 
distinct change in viewpoint in the final prayer which follows it. 
Before discussing the role of the final prayer in the debate, let us 
turn to the book of Job. 
The Outcome of the Conflict in the Book of Job 
The situation at the end of the debate in the book of Job closely 
resembles that in the Ackermann. Neither contestant has convinced the 
other and God is called on to settle the issue. The Job debate con-
sists of three rounds of arguments in which each of JobTs three friends 
attempts to convince him that his suffering is justified. The opponents 
become progressively more direct and specific in their accusations that 
Job is hiding some secret sin. Job becomes more and more resolute in 
defending his integrity and more confident that he is right as their 
successive arguments prove to be inadequate to explain his plight or to 
comfort him. 
At first Job, like the Plowman, is frightened and confused by his 
suffering, cursing the day of his birth and no longer wishing to live. 
He appeals directly to God for justice, although he is painfully aware 
of his smallness and helplessness in relation to God and realizes that 
he cannot hope to contend with Him: 
But how can a man be just before God? 
If one wished to contend with him, 
one could not answer him once in a thousand times. 
Though I am innocent, I cannot answer him; 
I must appeal for mercy to my accuser. 
(9:2-3,15) 
If Job can find a reason for his suffering he will agree that it is 
justified and that the world order is functioning as it should. 
Unlike the Plowman, Job from the beginning offers to listen and 
to give up his suit if his opponents can convince him that he is wrong 
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about his situation and what he sees in the world around him. He has 
said to the friends: "Teach me, and I will be silent; / make me under-
stand how I have erred11 (6:24). He makes an honest, soul-searching 
effort to find a reason for his calamity in his own sins and, having 
failed, says poignantly to the friends: "But now, be pleased to look 
at me; / for I will not lie to your face. . . . Is there any wrong on 
my tongue? / Cannot my taste discern calamity?" (6:28-30). 
The opponents1 arguments are mainly variations on a few basic 
themes which ignore or contradict the evidence of Job's plight. Primary 
among them is the truism that the good are always rewarded and the 
wicked punished. If Job is suffering, there has to be some reason. 
Where there is smoke there is fire. Like the Plowman's opponents, each 
of them admonishes Job that man is nothing. Whatever misery Job is 
suffering, it is less than he deserves, Man's wisdom is simply in-
sufficient to understand God's ways. All advise him to humble 
himself, to repent, and God will deliver him. 
The name calling and exchange of insults at times approach the 
intensity of those in the Ackermann. At the end of the first round 
of arguments, after all of them have spoken once and Job has replied 
to each one, he says to them: "As for you, you whitewash with lies; 
worthless physicians are you all" (13:4). In the second round he 
calls them "miserable comforters" speaking "windy words" (16:2-3). 
Angrily he cries, "But you, come on again, all of you, / and I shall 
not find a wise man among you" (17:10). To Zophar he replies; "How 
then will you comfort me with empty nothings? / There is nothing left 
of your answers but falsehood" (21:34). 
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In the third and last round of arguments the friends openly accuse 
Job of doing evil: "Is not your wickedness great? / There is no end 
to your iniquities" (22:5). Elipaz recites a long list of criminal 
accusations, which we know from the prologue to be unfounded. Job 
replies sarcastically: 
How you have helped him who has no power! 
How you have saved the arm that has no strength! 
How you have counseled him who has no wisdom, 
and plentifully declared sound knowledge! 
(26:2-5) 
But Job's stand is not weakened. Now, far from giving in to his 
opponent's arguments, he becomes more and more firmly convinced that he 
is right. He has held out to the end; he has heard every argument 
his friends have to offer and has been tested to the full. They have 
given no satisfactory answer to his suffering, no comfort. There is 
no question of capitulation. Job says in his last speech before God 
intervenes: 
Far be it from me to say that you are right; 
till I die I will not put away my integrity from me. 
I hold fast my righteousness, and will not let it go; 
my heart does not reproach me for any of my days. 
(27:5-6) 
He is determined to hold out: 
as long as my breath is in me, 
and the spirit of God is in my nostrils; 
my lips will not speak falsehood, 
and my tongue will not utter deceit. 
(27:3-4) 
As a last resort he swears the oath of innocence, the negative con-
fession, and waits for God to answer: "Here is my signature! Let the 
Almighty answer me!" (31:35) He is eager to have his case settled 
because he is confident of the outcome. 
As in the Ackermann, the debate has reached an impasse: 
So these three men ceased to answer Job, because he 
was righteous in his own eyes. Then Elihu the son 
of Barachel the Buzite, of the family of Ram, became 
angry. He was angry at Job because he justified him-
self rather than God; he was angry also at Job's 
three friends because they had found no answer, 
although they had declared Job to be in the wrong. 
(32:1-3) 
Elihu himself says, "Behold, I waited for your words, / I listened for 
your wise sayings, . . . and, behold, there was none that confuted 
Job, / or that answered his words among you" (32:11-12). Since the 
friends have admittedly failed, only Elihu is left to attempt an 
answer. But Elihu does not succeed either. He adds a few new points, 
suggesting that suffering can be a warning and can cause a man to turn 
from wrongdoing—the assumption still being that Job's chastening is 
caused by secret sin—but mainly he repeats the arguments which have 
already been put forth by the friends and rejected by Job. Thus there 
is no resolution to the conflict before God's intervention. 
Throughout Elihu's speech a powerful storm has been gathering on 
the horizon. Elihu's last words refer to the rumbling of thunder, to 
lightening, snow, hail and whirlwinds. Finally God speaks. One can 
imagine that all except perhaps Job have run for cover. But Job waits 
expectantly for an answer, terrified yet confident. An answer from God 
is his most earnest wish. When God speaks out of the whirlwind it is 
with shattering effect. His majestic words immediately dwarf Job's 
complaint. He says: "Who is this that darkens counsel by words without 
knowledge? . . . Where were you when I laid the foundation of the 
earth? . . . when the morning stars sang together, / and all the sons 
of God shouted for joy?" (38:2, 4-7). The impact of these words on Job 
can hardly be overstated. He falls in the dust laying his hand over his 
135 
mouth. Yet the fact that God answers him at all is, in part, a vindi-
cation of Job's suit. That God hears and answers Job is proof that 
man is not without rights in God's creation. He is not alone and 
unheard in the universe. 
As stated earlier, Job's problem is that he must place God in 
the wrong in order that he may be right himself. Everything is at stake 
for Job. He is caught in an impossible dilemma. Either he is right 
and God is unjust, malevolent, or even indifferent, or else God jLs 
just and Job's rights, his integrity, even his sanity are forfeit. The 
situation seems insoluble. God says to Job: "Will you even put me in 
the wrong? Will you condemn me that you may be justified?" (40:8). 
Job's response is to relinquish his claim and to cease questioning. 
His rebellion is over. He is overwhelmed, saying: "Behold, I am of 
small account; what shall I answer thee? / I lay my hand on my mouth . 
. . . I will proceed no further" (40:4-5). In response to God's query, 
"Who is this that hides counsel without knowledge?" Job replies, 
". . . I have uttered what I did not understand, / things too wonderful 
for me, which I did not know. . . . I had heard of thee by the hearing 
of the ear, / but now my eye sees thee; / therefore I despise myself, 
and repent in dust and ashes" (42:3-6). It is the encounter with God, 
not the arguments of the opponents, which overcomes Job's rebellion. 
Like the Plowman, Job is both reprimanded and rewarded for his 
part in the debate. He is reprimanded for speaking of what he did not 
understand. Then, however, God acknowledges that Job has spoken the 
truth, saying to Eliphaz two separate times: "My wrath is kindled 
against you and against your two friends; for you have not spoken of 
me what is right as my servant Job has" (42:7), 
In what sense has Job spoken the truth and the friends falsely? 
Job has said that God does not always act justly. Why does God condemn 
the friends when they have defended Him, arguing that He does always 
act justly and that suffering iis always justified? After all, Job's 
restoration at the end would seem to confirm what the friends have said. 
His restoration, however, does not alter the fact that he has suffered 
without cause. 
Job has spoken the truth in the terms of the wager. He has 
insisted that God was punishing him unjustly. According to the wager 
this was correct. God has praised Job with the words: " . . . there 
is none like him on the earth, a blameless and upright man," saying to 
Satan: " . . . you moved me against him, to destroy him without cause" 
(2:3). The friends have been intellectually dishonest; they have closed 
their eyes to the evidence of the plight of those around them. Everyone 
does not get what he deserves. There are many cases of injustice. In 
asserting that God does not punish the righteous, thai suffering is 
always retribution for sin, they have lied in order to defend their own 
interests. For if Job is innocent, then they are not safe either. 
God's vindication of Job for speaking the truth is a vindication 
of "the right of a man with God" (16:21), a relationship which Job has 
affirmed all along. Job's opponents are alarmed by Job's audacity in 
speaking to God as he does and at his confidence in his integrity. They 
claim that man is nothing compared to God. Elihu says: 
Look at the heavens, and see; 
and behold the clouds, which are higher than you. 
If you have sinned, 
what do you accomplish against him? 
And if your transgressions are multiplied, 
what do you do to him? 
If you are righteous, what do you give to him; 
or what does he receive from your hand? 
(34:5-7) 
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Eliphaz remarks: Is it any pleasure to the Almighty if you are 
righteous, / or is it gain to him if you make your ways blameless?" 
(22:3). The implication is that man can do nothing for God and is 
nothing to him. Yet we know from the prologue that God does care 
whether man is virtuous or not. He rejoices in Job's righteousness, 
and Job's disinterested virtue reflects directly on God. 
The real test in the book of Job is whether or not man will serve 
God without motives of reward. It is the test of disinterested 
righteousness. Goodness for the sake of reward is frowned upon in the 
prologue. Satan scoffs: "Does Job fear God for nought? Hast thou 
not put a hedge about him and his house and all that he has, on every 
side? Thou hast blessed the work of his hands, and his possessions 
have increased in the land" (1:10). The prologue reveals that God is 
indeed affected by what Job does; God Himself stands to gain or lose by 
how Job withstands this trial. 
Though Job does not know it, his "right of a man with God" is 
affirmed. Job never learns about the wager or the reason for his 
suffering. Even after God speaks to him, he is never told. Paradoxi-
cally, in his encounter with God Job relinquishes his claim to justice 
and to his rights. He trusts God simply because of what He is. The 
sight of God's full majesty causes him to affirm God's nature as the 
absolute which transcends understanding. The question of Job's innocence 
is drawfed by this ineffable majesty and power. He repents his 
questioning, accepts and affirms God's right. Through this act God is 
vindicated in the wager, for Job, without learning the reason for his 
suffering, still affirms the principle that God deserves worship, not 
for the sake of reward, but simply because He is God, the alpha and 
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the omega, the final reality. This is the disinterested virtue that 
was the subject of the wager. 
As in the Ackermann, much remains unexplained. God's ways are 
shrouded in mystery. But, though beyond Jobfs comprehension, God's 
ultimate justness and righteousness are affirmed, as well as His 
concern with man and man's own responsibility for righteousness. 
The friends have said, in effect, that God is predictable. But 
Job has been honest enough to say that God is not predictable, while 
at the same time trying to hold on to his belief that God is just. The 
paradox of the book is that if God were always to behave predictably, 
that is, as man would expect Him to, He would no longer be free. 
By accepting this paradox, Job allows God to be both just and 
free. The God who is revealed to Job is much larger than the simple 
rewarder and punisher of the friends1 description. He proves that He 
is not under obligation to function within man's limits. In Robert 
Frost's play about Job, The Masque of Reason, a modern caricature of 
God says: l!I had to prosper good and punish evil. / You changed all 
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that. You set me free to reign. / You are the emancipator of your God.?f 
In the book of Job God is not emancipated by Job, though vindicated by 
him in the wager. God reveals that the small conception of Him upon 
which the argument turned was but a fraction of His true nature. Job 
learns that "not all suffering is punishment, but that the rationale 109 
of what is not is known only to God." 
No complete answer is given to the problem of suffering in either 
book. G. K. Chesterton states of the book of Job: "God comes in at 
the end, not to answer riddles, but to propound them.'1"*""̂  God's ways 
remain mysterious, the rationale governing the seemingly random selection 
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of men for suffering and death, an enigma. The best attempt at an 
answer results in a paradox: God is both just and free. 
The Plowman faces a similar problem in arguing that Death should 
be both predictable and impartial. Predictability and impartiality, 
like GodTs justness and freedom, are linked in a paradox. The im-
partiality of death and God's justice overlap at some unknown point. 
But both are actually functions of God and beyond man's comprehension. 
The Final Prayer 
In both debates the answer comes from the realm of revelation. It 
is the experience of God's absolute sovereignty rather than specific 
explanations which affects the questioners. In each case the plain-
tiff abandons his suit, ceases questioning and affirms the order of the 
universe as it is. 
In the old testament work Job's response to God's appearance to 
him represents the culmination of the work. Job affirms that God is 
more magnificent and more inscrutable than he had imagined. In the 
Ackermann the final prayer serves a similar function. Framed as a hymn 
to God's wonders in the world of nature, it reveals the vastness and 
splendor of a God who transcends explanations. The limited view of 
God expressed earlier by the Plowman is replaced by a new and larger 
concept. For the Plowman it is the Jobean realization that the real 
responsibility rests with God which forces an abrupt reevaluation of the 
concept he has held up to now. From the verdict he has learned that 
God is not the enemy of Death, but that Death operates with His sanction 
and under his auspices. God is not merely the chivalrous benefactor 
and avenger he has imagined. He controls both life and death. The 
140 
theme of oppositions and contradictions which has been such a per-
vasive feature of the debate so far is incorporated into the new ex-
planation of GodTs nature, an explanation which includes aspects of 
both opponents1 views. 
There have been many schemes for analyzing the structure of the 
Ackermann debate. Most of them give only cursory treatment to the 
prayer, regarding it as an afterthought rather than as an integral 
part of the confrontation of the issues. There are, however, several 
reasons for suggesting that the closing prayer, far from being an after-
thought, should be viewed as an essential part of the work. 
According to Tepl's comment in his letter to Peter Rothirsch which 
indicates that the plaintiff is thoroughly pacified, or "is brought to 
yielding,11 one would anticipate a greater change in the Plowman's 
attitude than occurs in the debate itself. It would be expected that 
the Plowman, who began his suit with such intensity, should come to a 
better understanding about his grief than is provided by his last con-
fused and doubting words to Death in chapter xxxi, his final speech in 
the debate. 
The assertion that the Plowman has been convinced by Death is 
contradicted by the final words of his last two speeches: "Damit gebe 
euch got alles ubel! Amen" (xxxi, 28-29) and "Das gelaubet, haubtman 
von kriege!" (xxix, 26). Since the Plowman's tone and words of 
chapter xxxi do not indicate that he is in any way satisfied or 
mollified by Death's arguments, perhaps we may be justified in looking 
to the prayer which follows God's appearance for the scene of the 
Plowman's real change of attitude. 
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In the prayer an attempt is made to finally come to terms with the 
issue of death and God's relationship to it. It supplies the culmina-
tion to the Plowman's search for an explanation. As in the book of 
Job, it is the reaction to God's verdict which constitutes the high 
point and goal of the work. 
The prayer is not a separate piece, but is closely tied to the 
rest of the work. One such link is the use of the name Margaret in the 
prayer: "Mich reuet Margret, mein auserweltes weib" (xxxiv, 69-70) 
which corresponds to the first initial of the name of the wife mentioned 
in chapter iii by the Plowman: ". . . ir habt mir den ̂ .welften 
buchstaben, meiner freuden hort, aus dem alphabet gar freissamlich 
enzucket" (iii,3-5) and in chapter iv by Death: "Da haben wir mit 
einer erbern seligen tochter unser genade gewurket; ir buchstabe was der 
zwelfte" (iv,8-9). The twelfth letter is the letter m. (The alphabet 
did not include j .) The name Margaret links the woman in the prayer 
to the Plowman. 
If it could be established, as Blaschka, Bauml and others 
suggest, that Tepl's work is purely a rhetorical fiction having no 
actual biographical basis in fact, there would be no doubt that the 
Plowman is still the speaker in the prayer. The only known historical 
records indicate that Tepl was married to a woman by the name of 
Klara who survived him.111 It is generally assumed that Tepl must have 
been married previously and that Klara was his second wife. But the 
issue can only be settled definitely by the future discovery of some 
record of another wife, possibly with the name of Margaret. 
Certain phrases in the letter to Rothirsch do seem to cast some 
doubt on the thesis that the work was written out of the author's 
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personal grief, particularly Tepl's reference to his work as being 
harvested "out of the field of rhetorical jocundity" ("ex agro 
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rethoricalis iocunditatis"). The phrase implies a certain light-
hear tedness of attitude. The playful salutation: IfMay all things else 
remain as they are, unless they are changed for the better" ("Reliqua 
stent, ut stabant, nisi fuerint in uberius reformata") also suggests that 
nothing is really wrong in the author's life. The reference to the 
work as one "in which the essentials of rhetoric are expressed" ("in 
qua rethorice essencialia exprimuntur") and the inclusion of a lengthy 
description of the techniques used, seems to lend support to those who 
view it as a rhetorical fiction. It suggests that the theme simply may 
have been chosen as a worthy vehicle by which to display clever argu-
mentation and rhetorical artistry. 
On the other hand,.even the assumption of a biographical back-
ground for the work does not eliminate the possibility that the 
author intended the speaker in the final prayer to be the Plowman, as 
the use of the initial M and the name Margeret in the two parts would 
seem to suggest. 
In addition, the title preceding the prayer in manuscripts H, 0 
and Q states that in chapter xxxiv the klager (or anklager) , the name 
by which the Plowman is referred to throughout the debate, prays for 
his wife's soul: "In dem hernach geschriben capitel bitt der anklager 
fur sein hausfrauen und wirt sein name erkant bei den roten buchstaben" 
(manuscript H). Manuscripts A and D refer to him in the title as the 
ackerman: "Hie bitt der ackerman fur seiner frauwen sele der roten 
buchstaben der grossen nennet als der clager Diss cappitel stett eins 113 bets weyse und ist das XXXIIII cappittel" (manuscript A) . 
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Weber argues that it was riot part of the literary tradition of the 
debate form that one of the contestants should speak after the judge's 
decision and, therefore, the prayer should be considered an epilogue of 
the author; unless one believes that Tepl broke with the tradition 
(p. 278, note 13). Yet in one of the oldest debates of all, and one 
with which Tepl would have been familiar, Job responds to God's 
verdict, and his response is the goal of the work. If it were so 
unlikely for the Plowman to have spoken the prayer, one wonders why 
the earliest manuscripts unanimously refer to the klager/anklager or 
the ackerman as the speaker, and none of them to the author. 
However that may be, the prayer remains the high point of the 
debate. It is in the prayer that the speaker, Plowman or author, 
actually attempts to resolve the questions raised. 
Thematic connections between the prayer and the rest of the 




or "so be it,
11
 of affirmation which is spoken at the very end of 
the prayer and which recalls and contrasts with the Plowman's last 
words in the final round of the debate, his hoses Amen which ends 
chapter xxxi (Krogmann edition). The closing words of the prayer, the 
appeal to all creatures to join him in affirmation of God
f
s will, 
recalls the words of the beginning of the debate and forms a striking 
counter piece to the Plowman's appeal to all creatures, his call to 
arms in opposing Death, of the first chapter. In the prayer the 
speaker says: "Alles, das under des ewigen fanentragers fanen gehSrt, 
es sei welicherlei creature es sei, helft mir aus herzen grunde 
seliglich mit innigkeit sprechen: Amen!" (73-75). In his opening 
speech the Plowman cries: [A]lies, das leben und wesen hat, sei euch 
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unhold, imgunstig und fluchen euch ewiglichen! . . . von rair und aller 
menniglich sei tiber euch ernstlich zeter! geschriren mit gewundenen 
henden!
11
 (1,9-11, 15-17). 
The prayer itself consists of two parts. The first part is a 
long catalogue of God's wonderful and incomprehensible qualities, and 
a hymn to His power in nature. The second part of the prayer, 
comprising the last thirteen lines, commends the soul of the wife to 
God's care and ends with a touching acceptance and affirmation of the 
fact. Much of the first part, the catalogue of God's virtues, resembles 
similar passages in the book of Job. Both works praise God'straight in 
governing the forces of nature and mention lightning, snow, rain, hail 
and winds. In the Ackermann God is called: 
. . . des meres streum *trenner; der luft unstetigkeit 
mischer; des feures hitze kreftiger; aller elemente 
tirmer; doners, blitzens, nebels, schaures, snees, 
regens, regenbogens, miltaues, windes, reifes und aller 
irer mitwurkung einiger essemeister; alles himelischen 
heres gewaltiger herzog (49-54). 
The book of Job says: 
. . . he thunders with his majestic voice 
and he does not restrain the lightnings when his voice 
is heard 
. . . (2 lines) 
For to the snow he said, 'Fall on the earth;' 
and to the shower and the rain, 'Be strong.
1 
. . . (2 lines) 
From its chamber comes the whirlwind, 
and cold from the scattering winds. 
By the breath of God ice is given, 
and the broad waters are frozen fast. 
He loads the thick cloud with moisture; 
the clouds scatter his lightning. 
They turn round and round by his guidance 
to accomplish all that he commands them 
on the face of the habitable world. 
(37:4-12) 
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The picture of God which is revealed in the prayer transcends 
the Plowman's former narrow view. It culminates in the assertion that 
God encompasses all phases of the creative process. He is called 
creator, upholder, and destroyer: "erquicker, aufhalter und vernichter"— 
a sharp change from the Plowman's assertion in chapter xv that God 
cannot be responsible for his wife's death. The final words in the 
catalogue of God's virtues describe him as embodying all aspects of 
creation: 
aller weilwesen, aller zeitwesen und immerwesen ganz 
mechtiger erquicker, aufhalter und vernichter, des 
wesen auch, als du in dir selbs bist, ausrichten, 
visieren, entwerfen und abnehmen niemant kan; ganzes 
gut {iber alles gut! (58-62). 
The fact that this description is the final one in the long list of God's 
virtues lends it particular significance. It constitutes the end of 
the hymn to God. The passage which follows it marks a new phase in 
the prayer; it no longer describes God, but is devoted to intercession 
for the soul of the wife and begins with the words: "Allerwirdigister 
ewiger herre Jhesu! enphahe genediglichen den geist, enphahe gtltilchen 
die sele meiner auserwelten liebsten hausfrauen! Die ewigen rue gib ir, 
herre!" (63-65).
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Although Death has ignored the questions the Plowman raises in the 
last round of the debate about Death's arguments, the prayer returns to 
some of these issues, for example the matter of the annihilation of life 
from the world. In chapter xxxi the Plowman contradicted Death's pre-
diction that there will be an end both to the world and to all life by 
citing the authority of "Plato and other philosophers
11
 who say that the 
universe is built on the principle of eternal renex^al. In the prayer 
that process of eternal renewal is made part of the new image of God. 
The speaker recalls Death's repeated boasts that everyone and every-
thing will be transformed "von icht zu nicht" (xx, 14; x,13-14, 15-16; 
xvi,14-15). But in the prayer this action is shown to be God's 
province. This time the concept is expanded and completed by the 
addition of the reverse phase. The direction is no longer presented 
as the one-way cycle that Death pictures, moving inexorably from 
existence to non-existence, but is complimented by the reverse process 
and the explanation that God is the one who annihilates, but He also 
creates from nothing: "aus ichts nichts, aus nichts ichts allein 
vermugender wurker" (xxxiv, 57-58). This line immediately precedes 
the final naming of God as upholder and destroyer. 
The description of God in the closing prayer makes use of many 
oppositions and antitheses to depict God. He is called "altgreiser 
jungeling" (xxxiv, 7), "anfang und ende
M
 (14), "licht, das . . • 
verfinstert
1
' (9), "ewiger freuden spender, irdischer wunnen stBrer" 
(33). In His all-encompassing nature he is "wirt, ingesinde und 
hausgenosse" (34), "Kroner und die kron, loner und der Ion" (4), 
"erquicker, aufhalter und vernichter" (59-60). He is the ruler of 
heaven but also the creator of hell, "der helle stifter" (49). He 
guides his creatures into life and into death: "aus der muter leib 
in der erden gruft selbmugender geleiter" (25-26). 
God is shown to be both the kindly benefactor and avenger which 
the Plowman saw in him: "widerbringer aller gebrechen" (xxxiv,19-20) 
and also ultimately responsible for the death of his wife: "ursacher 
aller sachen" (21-22). Both contestants are partly right and partly 
wrong about God. Both hold incomplete views. 
Thus the image of God has changed radically from that earlier 
view which only saw Him as comforter and avenger and which rejected His 
association with death. The final view of God is a concept not unlike 
that with which Job has xrcestled from the beginning—the Old Testament 
God who is both creator and destroyer:
 Tf
The Lord kills and brings to 
life
11
 (I. Sam. 2:6), "In his hand is the life of every living thing / 
and the breath of all mankind" (Job 12:10). He is a God who "wounds, 
but he binds up; / he smites, but his hands heal" (Job 5:18). 
It has frequently been pointed 
out that some of the phrases in 
the final prayer seem to have been taken directly from Neumarkt's 
Buch der Liebkosungen, a work which also grapples with the problem of 
evil. The fact that Tepl chose these particular ideas with which to 
end his hymn of praise indicates their significance for the work. 
Hruby suggests that Tepl made use of an as yet undiscovered pre-
cursor in composing his Ackermann. Hruby
T
s thesis is that the proto-
type was strongly Aristotelian in its bias and that Tepl attempted to 
bring the ideas in this prototype, particularly the doctrine of eternal 
renewal, into line with more orthodox Christian doctrines."'""'"̂  Actually, 
however, the idea of eternal renewal was not entirely incompatible 
with orthodox Catholic theology. Thomas Aquinas, who subscribed to 
the New Testament doctrine that there would be an end to the world, also 
looked forward to the creation of a new heaven and a new earth. Aquinas 
argued that, although God has the power to annihilate as well as to 
create, his power and goodness are primarily manifested by the conser-
vation of things, and, therefore, he denied that anything at all would 
be annihilated. The problem of how the existence of evil is to be reconciled with 
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God's good nature is a difficult one for any monotheistic svstem to 
explain. Both the book of Job and the Ackermann deal with the question 
how a just God can permit evil, but Job and the Plowman approach the 
problem from opposite sides. Job knows from the first that both good 
and evil come from God, but questions God's justice. The Plowman, on 
the other hand, trusts God's justice, but cannot comprehend that God 
should allow evil. Both come to affirm the total picture of God's 
nature including both aspects, though aware that they are unable to fully 
understand it. God's vindication of Job affirms paradoxically that He 
is just though not to be comprehended by man. The Plowman, who trusted 
in God's justice all along, learns that God approves Death and is 
more complex and unfathomable than he had imagined. 
For the Plowman the answers to the insoluble questions can be and 
are postponed to the hereafter where rewards and punishments will 
correct all injustices of this life and all questions will be answered. 
The dilemma does not have to be solved in this life as it must for a 
world view which does not include the hope of immortality. This is the 
fundamental difference between the Plowman's situation and that of Job. 
Modern thinkers point out that the idea of rewards and punishments in 
an afterlife still does not explain the existence of evil or resolve 
the paradox how to harmonize God's goodness and omnipotence with the 
existence of evil, a problem which was not really dealt with throughout 
the Middle Ages. 
It has been pointed out that the medieval mind considered God 
to be the essence of all courtly virtues and found it difficult to 
reconcile unpleasant traits with this image. Medieval thinkers could 
not grasp the relationship between God and an evil and unruly servant 
like Death. Yet the idea that there should be a lack of harmony in the 
world was simply beyond their comprehension. The Plowman's view of the 
relationship between God and Death is a caricature of this attitude. 
By the end of the work this view has been transcended. It is no longer 
beyond his understanding that God should encompass both functions. 
Tepl's treatment of the problem of evil is more modern than 
views which preceded it and some which followed it in confronting evil 
as a real problem and trying to reconcile it, in the same way that Job 
does, with God's nature. Even a later thinker such as Nicholas of 
Cusa, though achieving a view of God which is in some ways similar to 
that of Tepl, failed to come to grips with the problem of evil as Tepl 
does. Tepl's solution, which views God as mysteriously encompassing 
contradictions, appears to resemble Cusa's definition of God as the 
coincidence of opposites.^^ Although the two ideas seem similar, they 
actually represent very different ways of looking at the world. Cusa's 
definition of God does not arise out of perplexity over problems which 
he perceives in the functioning of the world order. He regards the 
world essentially as a beautiful harmony. 
Cusa, who lived approximately forty years after Tepl, is regarded 
as a transitional figure whose philosophy contains elements of both 
medieval and modern thought. Yet the aspects of his philosophy which 
have the most in common with modern thought are not his attitudes on 
metaphysical issues or his theory of the coincidence of opposites. What 
is new in his thought is his attempt at a scientific approach, the 
application of mathematical concepts to the explanation of metaphysical 
problems. He regards the cosmos as a system that can be studied by 
means of mathematical principles and uses geometry to attempt to 
150 
explain the nature of God and the relationship between God and 
creation. 
The difference between Cusa
T
s doctine of learned or educated 
ignorance, his docta ignorantia, and the attitude expressed in the 
Ackermann is that the acceptance of the paradox in Tepl
T
s final prayer 
indicates a recognition of the insolubility of the problem and the 
end of speculation. For Cusa, however, the docta ignorantia is an 
adopted, systematic method of metaphysical investigation. It is the 
starting point, rather than the end point, of speculation. 
In spite of his new approach, however, Cusa did not advance the 
conception of the problem of evil. His treatment of the matter is the 
same as that which persisted throughout the Middle Ages when evil was 
defined merely as a lack of good or a defective good, having no real 
existence of its own. He writes: "Futility, defectiveness, error, 
vice, sickness, death, corruption, and other such things lack all the 
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quality of being." "Evil and potential sin and death and becoming-
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other are not God's creations." Like his predecessors, Cusa was 
firmly convinced of the harmony of the universe. He viewed the world 
as an emanation of God who is in all things and is all things. The 
world is both nothing apart from God and at the same time it is a mirror 
of God. Thus the world is as perfect as it could be, a beautiful reflec-
tion of the creator and therefore essentially harmonious. He does not 
really consider the problem of evil. Tepl attempts to deal with the 
apparent lack of accord in the world order caused by death and 
suffering. He acknowledges certain injustices which seem to contradict 
this essential accord. 
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The traditional attitude toward suffering—epitomized throughout 
the Middle Ages by the pious, patient figure of J o b — was that of a 
trial or process of purification which was to be accepted without 
question and patiently endured for one's edification. This attitude 
toward proper behavior in suffering has been replaced in Tepl's 
Ackermann by a sufferer who questions. While Hartmann's Armer 
Heinrich deals with the problem of suffering in the medieval categories 
of tugent, triuwe, ere, etc., viewing it as a discipline, never 
doubting the harmony of the world order, Tepl's Ackermann presents a 
case of apparent injustice, the early death of a virtuous woman, and 
seriously questions that harmony. 
While Hartmann's Armer Heinrich represents the traditional, 
medieval attitude toward the Job theme, Tepl's treatment, though 
strikingly similar to the book of Job in structure and content, diverges 
sharply from the prevailing view of Job whose struggle it resembles in 
confronting and questioning traditional assumptions about God's 
nature, the relationship between God and death, and the justice of the 
world order. The audacious attack on the formidable figure of Death 
represents a similar.departure from attitudes which predominated in 
other medieval treatments of the subject. 
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CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION 
The resurgence of interest in the book of Job in the twentieth 
century and the proliferation of works on the Job theme testify to the 
timelessness and universality of the theme. Some critics maintain that 
it is reading too much into the Old Testament book to interpret it in 
twentieth century existential terms. The question of the meaningless-
ness or absurdity of man's existence was not an issue in ancient Hebrew 
times when all world views were strictly theocentric. Yet the question 
of God
T
s nature—whether He is to be trusted or not—was no less 
threatening and urgent to Job than is the modern dilemma of man in an 
absurd universe. The problem whether there Is a purpose to man's 
existence, any values which can be trusted in absolutely, any explana-
tion to the seemingly aimless pain and suffering in life, raises the 
same question at all times: What is God's nature? Why does He allow 
the world to operate as it does? 
These questions are asked more frequently and more insistently 
during times of great calamities, as in the wake of the two world wars 
of this century. The unmatched destructiveness and unprededented 
atrocities of the two wars shattered prewar optimism In man's ability 
to solve his own problems and to create a better world through 
scientific and sociological advances. Modern works on the Job theme 
reflect this crisis of confidence^ They share a renewed concern with 
the issue of the ultimate origin and nature of evil. Like the disasters 
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of this century which produced a reevaluation of traditional assumptions, 
the terrible plagues of the fourteenth century—the first pandemic in 
800 years—must have severely shaken the confidence in the essential 
harmony of the universe which was the heritage of the high Middle 
Ages, resulting in questionings of accepted doctrines and producing 
works such as Neumarkt's Buch der Liebkosungen and Hugo von Mbntfort's 
poems, written at the death of his second wife, which deal with the 
problem of evil. 
The fact that we know so little about the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries has made interpretation of the Ackermann difficult and led to 
many controversies which have yet to be resolved. This study, in 
examining Tepl's work in connection with the late medieval view of 
Job, attitudes toward suffering, death, and the problem of evil, has 
attempted to clarify how the late medieval mind dealt with these 
questions and to establish where Tepl's work stands in relation to 
views which preceded and followed it„ It suggests that Tepl, along with 
other figures, was beginning to seriously confront the problems of 
evil and God's nature, and that Tepl's Ackermann, in posing the 
questions it does, and in recognizing the contradictoriness of the 
answers it accepts, goes beyond previous treatments of these problems. 
While earlier works in the tradition of medieval laments over 
death reveal hatred and cursing of death but no real questioning of 
the justification of Death's existence, Tepl's Plowman shows a new 
boldness in his unintimidated confrontation of the formidable figure 
of Death. Although the author personifies the concept in nominally 
traditional fashion, he also treats death as an abstraction, 
characteristic of the growing tendency in the late Middle Ages to see 
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the figure as a symbol of mortality rather than as the terrifying 
apparition of earlier times. 
Although widely separated in time, Tepl's Ackermann and the Old 
Testament book of Job portray the same archetypal experience of sudden 
insight and resulting questioning which is initiated by an ordeal of 
personal suffering. Since both protagonists are in their middle years, 
a case might be made to identify the experience as a kind of mid-life 
crisis resembling the typological experience of the thirty—year—old 
hero, which is a familiar theme in world literature. Theodore 





 which is followed by
 !,
a timeless 
state of reflection and analysis of existence/
1
 It ends with "a 
conscious decision that determines his [the hero's] future attitude 
toward the w o r l d . S i m i l a r crises can be identified as occurring at 
critical junctures later in life, sometimes brought on by the death of 
a loved one* They constitute part of the process of coming to terms 
with such problems as the fact of mortality and the meaning of suffering. 
Both works are considered by some critics to be authentic ex-
pressions of personal conflict. This has not been firmly established 
in either case. A closely related question is whether the final prayer 
is to be considered as spoken by the Plowman or as an epilogue of the 
author. This study has shown that it is most reasonable to see the 
Plowman as the speaker. Thus, the structural comparison with the book 
of Job becomes very significant. Both works conclude with a final 
prayer that reflects the attempt to resolve the questions raised. 
The most important aspect of the comparison of the two works is 
the treatment of the central theme, that of the justice or lack of 
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justice in the world order and the related problem of the connection 
between the evil in the world and God's omnipotent, all-good nature— 
the problem of theodicy. The theme of justice is reflected in the 
quasi-judicial settings of the works and use of legal terminology. The 
theme is sustained in the Ackermann through the use of variations on 
the terms recht and gerechtigkeit. 
Job is the classic treatment of the problem of theodicy, the 
ancient paradox which was also pondered by such early thinkers as 
Epicurus and Lucretius. The dilemma is that of reconciling the 
existence of evil with the concept of a God who is by definition both 
all-good and all-powerful. The two assertions involve a logical con-
tradiction. Either God wishes to prevent evil but is unable to do so, 
in which case he cannot be omnipotent, or he could prevent evil but 
does not wish to, in which case he cannot be all good. If he is both 
omnipotent and good, where does evil come from? Medieval metaphysicians 
dealt with the problem by denying a real existence to evil, defining 
it instead as a deficient good or lack of good and viewing the world 
as essentially harmonious. Tepl examines the apparent lack of harmony 
in the world order caused by death and struggles in Jobean fashion with 
the problem of reconciling this real evil with the doctrines of God's 
omnipotence and goodness. 
The medieval practice of personifying death and treating it as in 
some way independent of God allowed writers largely to ignore or sidestep 
the question of God's responsibility in creating and tolerating such an 
evil. In partially overcoming the tendency to view death as an indepen-
dent, evil, and malicious being operating contrary to God's purposes, 
(the picture of death presented in the Totentanz literature and the folk 
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tradition) Tepl faces new difficulties. The opposing Christian attitude 
which represents death as the servant of God, must reconcile the brutality 
and maliciousness of the Totentanz figure with God's control of this 
function and ultimately raises the question of God's nature. 
The problem of the explanation of the functioning of Death's random 
selection, the lack of congruence between the natural order and the moral 
order, is another issue with which the Plowman attempts to come to terms. 
The Plowman rails against the justice of Death's existence as an institu-
tion but actually brings arguments which only criticize the way Death 
carries out his function, not the function itself. His feeling that 
there is something unjust about death's impartiality echos the laments 
in the Totentanz literature which criticize death for not sparing 
children and for taking the wrong people at the wrong time. God's 
verdict in the Ackermann endorses Death's random selection in the natural 
order, but in doing so further implicates God in willing the death of 
the Plowman's wife. The point at which God's control and Death's free-
dom intersect is shrouded in mystery. 
The degree to which Tepl is seen to be questioning traditional 
assumptions about death and God depends on one's interpretation of Tepl's 
plan for the structure of his work. Opinions differ on the manner in 
which the debate is decided. This study has attempted to establish that 
Death does not convince the Plowman of the rightness of his arguments 
in the course of the debate, but that the author intended the encounter 
to end in a draw. This conclusion is supported by an examination of the 
arguments Tepl uses to support Death's position which indicate that the 
author depicted Death more negatively than necessary and that he did not 
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intend for Death to convince the Plowman. The Plowman is portrayed 
as confused on the issues of God's nature and Death's impartiality. 
But the erroneous ideas he holds are replaced after the verdict by a more 
complete view. The author purposely depicted the Plowman as naive and 
confused and Death as a belligerent opponent (not God's advocate) in 
order to produce a lively debate and to show that both attitudes are 
wrong. The book of Job employs a similar technique in showing the 
attempts of Job and his opponents to define God by means of their own 
limited parameters to be futile and presumptuous. 
Another question which is affected by the interpretation of the 
structure of the debate is the question of Tepl's attitude toward the 
resolution of the issues raised. This relates to the placement of the 
work in the history of ideas. Critics who maintain that the work 
represents and is consistent with earlier ideas about death, God's 
nature, and the world order argue that the author does not view the 
outcome as problematical. Others, however, see in it evidence of the 
weakness of late medieval religious doctrines and the outcome of the 
debate as expressing an attitude bordering on despair in the face of 
the incomprehensible. My interpretation of the structure of the work 
leads to the conclusion that Tepl was aware of the problematical nature 
of the issues raised but that, instead of giving up in the face of the 
incomprehensible, he attempts a synthesis which resembles the Jobean 
acceptance and affirmation of the contradictory aspects of God's nature 
and the world order, and which goes beyond the popular medieval view he 
parodies in the Plowman's naive, one-sided concept of God. 
Like the debate in the book of Job, the Ackermann ends in an 
169 
impasse until God passes judgment. This interpretation emphasizes the 
role of the final prayer as an integral part of the process of the 
Plowman's enlightenment. The prayer attempts to come to terms with 
the questions raised in the debate and provides the fulfillment of the 
Plowman's effort to reach an understanding of his plight, which clearly 
has not been achieved in the confused and doubting last words of the 
Plowman in chapter xxxi. The final prayer transcends the Plowman's 
» 
earlier concept of the relationship between death and God, replacing 
it with the view that God is not merely the chivalrous benefactor and 
avenger of wrongs as he pictured Him, but controls and approves both life 
the death. The Plowman learns to accept God's ultimate responsibility 
for his wife's death. The new view acknowledges and accepts the 
contradictions in God's nature. 
Like Job, the Plowman defends the integrity of life. In affirming 
such values as love, the joy of a happy marriage and family life, he 
shows that life to him is not all vanity as it is pictured to be in 
Totentanz literature. It is in his final act of acceptance and affir-
mation despite his human feelings of love and sense of loss, that the 
Ackermann ranks with Job as one of the most beautiful and moving treat-
ments of man's attempt to confront the question of God's ultimate 
sovereignty. 
The question to what extent the Job story may have influenced Tepl 
cannot be answered with certainty. It can be stated, however, that the 
two works strikingly resemble each other in structure and content. While 
Hartmann's Armer Heinrich represents the traditional, medieval attitude 
toward the Job story—the ideal of a patient Job, exemplifying passive 
170 
endurance of suffering—Tepl's work diverges sharply from the prevail-
ing interpretation of Job and more closely resembles the modern view 
of the Job story as a real questioning of traditionally popular beliefs 
about God's nature and the justice of the world order. 
171 
Footnote 
''"Theodore Ziolkowski, Dimensions of the Modern Novel (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press), pp. 274, 278. 
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